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ABSTRACT 
 
An individual differences study with 154 adult participants was used to investigate the relationship 
between inhibitory control and theory of mind (ToM), using structural equation modelling. The battery 
of executive function tasks was found to tap two separate inhibitory components, response inhibition 
and response selection. This went against the literature suggesting one inhibitory factor or two 
components of response inhibition. The two ToM tasks used were both level-1 perspective taking 
tasks with similar demands, so were expected to tap the same latent variable. The results showed no 
correlation, suggesting that the tasks might tap separate components of ToM. These were 
characterised as a fast, inflexible component and a slower flexible component. The relationships 
between the response inhibition factor and the two ToM tasks were similar, suggesting that they also 
had executive requirements in common. Additional dual-task studies suggested that response 
inhibition was required for resolving conflict resolution between perspectives. Altogether it is argued 
that the results are more consistent with the existence of two distinct systems for theory of mind, than 
with one system that makes varying demands on executive function in a task-specific manner. This 
two-system interpretation provides a parsimonious explanation for findings that infants and primates 
are able to pass perspective taking tasks and that adults reliably make errors in simple ToM tasks. 
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 1. Literature Review 
Theory of Mind 
 
The ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires and knowledge to oneself is 
a crucial component of what has come to be termed ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). ToM also incorporates the ability to predict another’s behaviour based on their (different) 
beliefs, desires or knowledge. It is therefore critical in being able to socially interact with others. 
 
Research (for example, Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wellman, Cross and Watson, 2001; Wimmer and 
Perner, 1983) has suggested that ToM is an ability that develops through in early childhood, and may 
be fully developed from about the age of four, as at this approximate age children are able to pass 
standard false belief tasks. Investigations into when children are able to predict other people’s 
behaviour, based on their ability to realise that other people have different beliefs and desires to 
themselves, started in the 1980’s. Before this, the work of Jean Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967) was 
the dominant theory in children’s development. Piaget’s theory worked on the principle that children 
are very egocentric (that they do not have the mental ability to understand that others have different 
opinions and beliefs from themselves), and that is why they can not understand another’s perspective, 
belief or desire until approximately seven years old. ToM, as it is termed now, was explained as 
occurring as part of the general move away from egocentrism at this time. 
 
The emphasis on egocentrism (and the move away from this at seven years old) as being an overall 
explanation for development of the understanding of others’ beliefs was challenged when Premack 
and Woodruff published an influential paper in 1978 questioning whether animals, specifically 
chimpanzees in their case, could have a ToM as it is defined in humans. As part of a commentary on 
the paper, the philosopher Daniel Dennett proposed a paradigm that could show whether 
chimpanzees had a ToM (Dennett, 1978). The example used by Dennett took the form of a Punch and 
Judy show. Children are excited at the point at which Punch is about to throw a box over a cliff. The 
children have seen Judy escape from this box whilst Punch’s back was turned, so the excitement is 
based on the children knowing that Punch falsely believes that Judy is still in the box. This shows that 
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 they have some understanding of false belief. This paradigm was the basis of the classic false belief 
task of Wimmer and Perner (1983). This study, and the hundreds of replications that have also been 
conducted, showed that children were able to predict the actions of someone who had a false belief 
(which was different to their own) at around the age of four. This finding was consistent across many 
different methodological variations and cultures (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001).  
 
In contrast to the extensive amount of research in children, there have not been many studies that 
have focused on ToM abilities in adolescents and adults, and those that have tend to focus on clinical 
samples. The assumption seems to be that once ToM has developed in children then it is fully formed 
and no longer develops any further. There is evidence from adolescent and from adult studies (from 
both clinical and typical samples) that aspects of ToM do develop past childhood (activated areas of 
the brain during ToM tasks are different in adolescents than in adults; Blakemore, 2008), and in adults, 
errors are made in ToM tasks that should not occur if the ability was fully developed in childhood 
(Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003). There is also evidence that there are links between ToM and executive 
function, and that ability in both declines with age (German & Hehman, 2006; Zelazo, Craik & Booth, 
2004). There is also evidence that language is also critical in ToM (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2002; 
Newton & de Villiers, 2007), and this implies that as language develops beyond four years old, ToM 
may also develop beyond four years old.  
 
Moreover the established view of ToM as developing through childhood and being fully developed by 
(approximately) age four does not adequately explain the evidence that infants can pass perspective 
taking tasks, as there are some studies that seem to show infants below this age passing perspective 
taking tasks that should be beyond their capabilities (Onisihi & Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian, Thoermer & 
Metz, 2007).  
 
Therefore there are reasons for doubting this simple picture of ToM based exclusively on development 
from two to four years old. Evidence shows that infants are able to exhibit some ToM abilities, but 
without having the underlying executive function and language capabilities that are thought of as 
necessary for ToM. This account also does not explain the errors made by adults in what appear to be 
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 relatively simply ToM tasks (Keysar et al., 2003). There is scope for either a refinement or redefinition 
of the current model of ToM. The current study aims to test adult participants on ToM tasks that are 
similar to those that infants can pass and on those on which they make errors, to compare the 
patterns of results.  
 
Development of ToM 
Pioneering work by Piaget (1937 / 1954) focusing on children provided evidence that children were 
apparently unable to understand that other agents had differing perspectives to their own – this was 
treated as a case of egocentrism. Children were shown a table with three model mountains placed on 
it, They sat at the table, and were asked to choose a picture that represented what a doll, sitting at a 
different position at the table, could see. Children less than six years of age tended to choose the 
picture that represented what they could see, not what the doll could see, thereby exhibiting 
egocentrism. Later work by McGarrigle and Donaldson (1975), with more child-appropriate stimuli1, 
found that children were able to understand that other agents had different perspectives to their own. 
In their experiment children were shown a model brick wall (in the form of a cross), two policeman 
dolls and a robber doll. The children were asked to place the robber where the policemen could not 
see him. In order to pass this task, children must understand what the policemen could see. Children 
of 45 months were able to pass the task, showing that they could understand other agents’ 
perspectives, contrary to Piaget’s findings. However, the level of perspective taking required by 
Piaget’s experiment may be more complex than that required by McGarrigle and Donaldson (1975). 
The experiment of McGarrigle and Donaldson (1975) requires level one perspective taking. This is the 
ability to understand that the content of what one can see can be different from the content of what 
another sees in the same situation. The three mountains experiment required level two perspective 
taking. This requires the understanding that the child and another person can see the same thing 
simultaneously from different perspectives. This suggests that children can pass simple perspective 
taking tasks. The difference in findings between studies with differing experimental paradigms is an 
occurrence that will be returned to later.  
                                                 
1 Although as Piaget worked in Geneva, Switzerland, the three mountains task may have made sense 
to local children. 
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Wimmer and Perner (1983) developed the classic ToM paradigm, the false belief task, in order to 
improve on the procedure of Piaget and of McGarrigle and Donaldson. The task presents children with 
a scenario in which a puppet character places a chocolate bar in Location A, and then leaves the 
scene. Whilst that character is off-screen (and so oblivious to any actions then taking place), the 
mother of the character enters the scene and moves the chocolate bar from Location A to Location B. 
The puppet then returns to the scene, and the child is asked where the puppet will look for the 
chocolate. The correct answer is Location A, as that is where the puppet thinks the chocolate is. The 
answer of children before ages four to five usually is Location B – as that is where they know the 
chocolate is, and they believe that the puppet knows that too. This could be due to not understanding 
that the puppet has its own beliefs or knowledge, or because of difficulty in distinguishing their own 
knowledge from that of the puppet.  
 
Other tasks that are used in developmental studies include unexpected-contents tasks (where the 
child is shown a tube of Smarties, and asked what they think it contains – their answer is Smarties. 
They are then shown the contents, which are pencils. They are then asked what their friends would 
think was in the tube, and their answer (before ages four to five) tends to be pencils (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988). As a result of these findings, ToM was suggested to be a novel cognitive skill (or 
perhaps a domain-specific module; Leslie, 1987) that develops through childhood. Other suggestions 
are that children have difficulty in acknowledging that other agents have different beliefs to themselves 
because this ability requires some level of detachment from reality, and because children themselves 
are still getting to grips with reality (Mitchell & Lacoheé, 1991). Both of these standpoints suggest that 
what we term as ToM is present in children after the age of approximately four.  
 
Some evidence to the contrary comes from a study by Ruffman, Garnham, Import and Connolly 
(2001). In this study children are given a false belief task, but their level of confidence in their 
responses is measured using a ‘betting’ system on their choice of one of two possible locations. If they 
were 100% confident in their explicit location choice they placed all of their bet tokens on to that 
location choice, and if they were not they would place the majority on their explicit location choice, and 
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 some on the alternate choice. The pattern of results through the age groups tested showed that the 
youngest participants tended to explicitly choose the incorrect location (not passing the false belief 
task, and thinking that the character knew what they knew), and also were confident in this choice, 
placing all or most of their tokens onto the incorrect location. The four to five year olds still tended to 
choose the incorrect location explicitly, but would be more likely to place some tokens on the correct 
location – this was argued to show some level of implicit knowledge of the correct location, and hence 
an implicit knowledge of false belief. The next pattern of results was explicitly choosing the correct 
location, but still putting some tokens on the incorrect location – this was taken to show that there was 
still some uncertainty in using the false belief knowledge. The oldest participants chose the correct 
location explicitly, and also were confident in their decision, placing all their tokens in that location. 
This evidence seems to indicate that children have implicit knowledge of false beliefs at an earlier age 
than expected, and that this implicit knowledge exists at a time when they explicitly fail false belief 
tasks. Equally, the initial stages of false belief understanding are characterised by low confidence in 
that understanding, before full understanding occurs.  
 
Other studies (Onisihi & Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian et al., 2007) have found evidence, using non-verbal 
tasks, that infants of 14 and 15 months are able to predict an actor’s behaviour using what may be 
level-one perspective taking or perhaps false-belief understanding. Level-one perspective taking is the 
ability to understand that the content of what one can see can be different from the content of what 
another sees in the same situation. Sodian et al. (2007) used a non-verbal paradigm that involved 
measuring how long infants looked at an actor reaching for an object. Their study also used a screen 
to hide objects from the actor, whilst keeping them visible to the infant. Familiarisation trials 
established a preferred object (of two, the other being a distracter object. The actor could see both 
objects) that the actor reached for. Experimental trials had the distracter object in the position of the 
preferred toy, while the position of the preferred object toy was either visible to the actor or not. The 
actor then reached for the distracter object. Infants spent less time looking in trials where the preferred 
object was not visible to the actor than in trials where the preferred object was visible to the actor. This 
was said to indicate that the infant understood that the actor could see the preferred object in the latter 
trial, so the reach to the distracter object was unexpected, whilst in the other trial they understood the 
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 actor could not see the preferred object, so reaching for the distracter object was expected. They were 
therefore exhibiting some level-one perspective taking abilities, as they were able to represent the 
actor’s viewpoint independently from their own. 
 
Onishi and Baillargeon also used a non-verbal task that used the violation-of-expectation method. 
Infants were shown a video of an actor, facing them with a visor covering their eyes, with two boxes in 
front of them. The boxes could be hidden from the actor by a screen, but were always visible to the 
infant. A (target) toy could be present in one of the boxes, and infants were assessed on how long 
they looked at the location where the actor reached (so where the actor thought the toy was present). 
The premise of the violation-of-expectation method is that the participant will look longer at an 
occurrence that violates what they think should occur. Familiarisation trials established that infants 
looked longer at reaches by the actor to the location where the toy was not present (as they should 
reach for where the toy was present). True and false belief trials (achieved by the movement of the toy 
between the boxes either with or without the knowledge of the actor) showed that infants spent longer 
looking at reaches that violated their expectation of where the actor reached, according to the actor’s 
belief. In the true belief trial, infants looked longer when the actor reached for the incorrect location, 
and in the false belief trials infants looked longer when the actor reached for the correct location. This 
extends the work of Sodian et al. (2007) to what appears to be false-belief understanding. 
 
Both methodologies remove any demand on language (that is usually requisite to pass ToM tasks), 
and both reduce demand on executive function (as the infants are not required to do anything that is 
contrary to their natural behaviour that then might require effortful control – they simply look where the 
actor reaches). This does not need the infant to exhibit an explicit understanding of perspective taking, 
but allows a measure of their implicit understanding to be taken. There is also no requirement to 
explicitly predict future behaviours based on their implicit understanding. All of this evidence points to 
there being a ToM capability present in humans at a much earlier age than was first thought when 
using standard false belief tasks (and variations on it) such as that of Wimmer and Perner (1983). 
However, the fact still remains that children still explicitly fail standard false belief tasks before the age 
of approximately four years of age. There have been differing reasons put forward to explain these 
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 findings: some argue that the non-verbal infant studies can be explained by, for example, infants using 
behavioural rules (such as looking where the other person looked last). This reasoning suggests that 
ToM, as it is defined by Premack and Woodruff (1978), is not present in infants, and is only shown in 
children when they are at least four years old (Ruffman & Perner, 2005). This change is assisted by 
other developments in language (Astington & Baird, 2005) and executive function (Carlson & Moses, 
2001; Carlson, Moses & Breton, 2002; Carlson, Moses & Claxton, 2004). Others suggest that there is 
evidence for ToM being present in infants, at the very least as a conceptual framework for the ToM 
shown explicitly at age four (Leslie, 2005; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), that is in turn given as backing 
for ToM being a specific innate module that is present from birth. The developmental literature remains 
unresolved on this controversy. 
 
The role of language 
Whether ToM is early- or late- developing, there is evidence to suggest that the ability to pass 
standard false belief tasks is connected to both language and executive function. Language has been 
established as an important correlate to false belief understanding, that has been investigated 
because of the individual differences found in the age of false belief understanding occurring (although 
four years old is the approximate age, this varies between three years and five years of age). 
Individual differences in language ability have been proposed as a factor affecting individual 
differences in understanding false beliefs (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2002; Milligan, Astington & Dack, 
2007). There have been links made between pragmatics and ToM, in that in order to understand a 
speaker’s utterances sometimes requires some level of understanding of their mental state and 
intentions at that time (Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Links between semantics and ToM have also been 
made, specifically in the meaning of mental state words such as “think” or “want” (Moore, Pure, & 
Furrow, 1990), and also in more general semantic knowledge (Milligan et al., 2007; Ruffman, Slade, 
Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003). There has also been a relationship proposed between 
grammar and ToM. This relationship is based on the hypothesis that we represent others’ beliefs in 
our mind in the form of a proposition. Evidence (mainly from children: de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) has 
suggested that in order to represent a belief one needs to be able to process embedded complement 
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 clauses (for example ‘Max thinks the chocolate is in the cupboard’) which is how beliefs are expressed 
verbally. This whole sentence can be true, even if the embedded clause (chocolate is in the cupboard) 
is false, and so it can be a true report of false understanding. This may facilitate false belief 
understanding. Understanding of embedded relative clauses (‘The woman pushed the man that 
opened the box’: Smith, Apperly, and White, 2003) has also been linked with belief reasoning, which 
points to a more general role for embedded grammatical structures.  
 
There are different reasons put forward for the relationship between language and false belief: some 
suggest that it is because the standard false belief tasks require some level of verbal ability to pass. 
An analogous explanation is that language is required for the domain general cognitive processes that 
underlie false belief understanding to be used. These views suggest that language is useful to false 
belief understanding in terms of expression and implementation, but that it is not necessarily key to 
actual development (Bloom & German, 2000; Carlson & Moses, 2001).  
 
There is an alternative viewpoint that posits language as a causal element in false belief development 
(de Villiers & de Villiers, 2002). The meta-analysis by Milligan et al. (2007) on the relationship between 
language and false belief in the developmental literature found an overall relationship between 
language ability and false belief performance, and additionally found that the relationship between 
early language ability and later false belief performance was stronger than the reverse relationship. 
The analysis compared different types of language ability: semantic ability (lexical knowledge and 
discourse semantics (meaning of words beyond lexical)); syntactic ability (linguistic structure); 
receptive vocabulary; general language ability (semantic and syntactic ability); and memory for 
complements. Memory for complements tests the understanding of embedded complement clauses.  
 
Examination of the different types of language ability showed that only general language ability (as 
measured by the Test for Auditory Comprehension of Language and the Test of Early Language 
Development I, II, and III) was significantly related to false belief performance (in post-hoc tests) 
(Milligan et al., 2007). This may be due to the general language measures being the broadest in terms 
of potential types of language ability being tapped. This is compared to the non-significant post-hoc 
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 test relationships between receptive vocabulary, semantics, syntax, and memory for complements and 
false belief, all of which could be said to measure a more specific type of language ability. However, 
the largest amount of variance explained in false belief performance was by memory for complements. 
The fact that language is related to false belief performance may indicate that one of the reasons why 
infants are unable to pass standard false belief tasks is due to their lack of linguistic capability and the 
abilities that this engenders. This meta-analysis did not cover conversational linguistic abilities due to 
the difficulty of measuring competence in such an area (conversation is a joint action, not an individual 
process), and the analysis focused on experimental language measures for that reason. This means 
that an area that could contribute to the development of ToM was not considered.  
 
The role of executive function 
Another area that has been investigated as a correlate to false belief understanding in children is 
executive function. Executive function is another complex set of abilities and has been defined as an 
overall function that includes processes such as planning, attention, inhibition, and working memory, in 
order to plan and achieve goal-directed behaviour (Norman & Shallice, 1980; Shallice, 1982). This 
definition gives some indication of the issues of trying to decide what aspects of executive function 
could be related to false belief understanding, and likewise, what tasks could properly be said to 
measure the various subsets of executive function ability. The initial approach to executive function 
was as an overall complex function (this could be compared to using the general language measures 
in investigating language ability; Milligan et al., 2007), but more recent work has aimed to fractionate it 
into simpler components (Brookshire, Levin, Song & Zhang, 2004; Lehto, 1996; Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki & Howerter, 2000). 
 
Developmental studies investigating the relationship between executive function and ToM have found 
a relationship between executive function and ToM even when verbal ability was controlled for 
(Hughes & Ensor, 2005). The direction of the relationship between executive function and ToM has 
also been found to be stronger for early executive function performance predicting later false belief 
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 performance, rather than early ToM predicting later executive function performance (Hughes & Ensor, 
2007). 
 Three of the more readily dissociated functional components of executive function are inhibitory 
control, working memory and planning, and all of these have been used in developmental studies 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson, et al., 2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2005; Hughes & 
Ensor, 2007) looking at the relationship between executive function and false belief understanding. 
From a conceptual viewpoint, looking at these three specific components of executive function is 
logical in terms of false belief understanding: inhibitory control may be required to inhibit self 
perspective (or one’s own knowledge or belief) in order to process or understand another agent’s 
belief. Working memory may be required to simultaneously process both one’s own mental state and 
another’s. ToM (and hence false belief understanding) has been implicated in the ability to plan future 
events by placing oneself in a hypothetical future scenario, in which one has different desires and 
beliefs to one’s current state. In this situation one would use a separate (meta-) representation of 
one’s own mental states, analogous to representing another agent’s mental state as different from 
one’s own current state. In this case the other agent’s mental state is one’s own future mental state. 
Therefore planning ability may be related to false belief performance (however the direction of this 
particular relationship is unclear).  
 
A series of studies by Carlson and colleagues (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson, 
et al., 2004) investigated the components of executive function and their relationship to false belief 
performance using (mainly) individual difference studies. Their findings suggested that inhibitory 
control was related to false belief performance (and the relationship was stronger from early inhibitory 
control performance to later false belief performance than the reverse), and that working memory was 
also related to false belief performance, in the same casual direction. However, once inhibitory control 
was controlled for, working memory no longer had a significant relationship with false belief 
performance. Planning ability was initially related to false belief performance, but after controlling for 
age and language ability, it shared no unique variance with ToM performance (Carlson et al., 2004). 
This gives an idea of the issue of task specificity in executive function. It is difficult to design tasks that 
measure only one component of executive function, as the demands of tasks usually tap more than 
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 one component (inhibitory control and working memory are usually intertwined in some way). Work in 
the current thesis extends Carlson et al.’s solution of regressing out the effects of different 
components of executive function by using the statistical technique of structural equation modelling 
(Blunch, 2008; Kline, 2005). 
 
In Carlson and Moses (2001), there was evidence for division within the construct of inhibitory control, 
beyond the initial division of executive function. They found that the specific type of inhibitory control 
task that was related to false belief performance was the ‘conflict’ inhibition tasks. A separate type of 
‘delay’ inhibition task was also used, but was not found to be significantly related to false belief 
performance. An example of a conflict inhibition task is the Bear / Dragon task. Children were 
instructed to follow the instructions of the ‘nice Bear’ and to ignore the instructions of the ‘naughty 
Dragon’. There seems to be an element of working memory required (to recall which puppet to follow 
instructions from, and which one to ignore), as well as inhibitory control to actually inhibit carrying out 
the Dragon’s instructions. The conflict tasks therefore appeared to tap both inhibitory control and 
working memory resources. A delay task is typified by the gift delay task, in which children were told 
that the experimenter was going to wrap a present for them. Whilst the experimenter wrapped the 
present, the child was sat facing away from them, and was instructed not to look at the experimenter. 
Successfully not looking around at the experimenter (for 60 seconds) was counted as passing the 
task, and would seem to indicate the ability to inhibit impulsive responses. Delay inhibition tasks were 
therefore presumed to tap a relatively pure measure of control over impulsive responses. 
  
The results indicated that working memory (measured using simplified backward digit span, backward 
word span, and counting and labelling measures), once controlled for by age and (or) intelligence no 
longer predicted false belief understanding. Conflict inhibition remained a significant predictor of false 
belief understanding when age and (or) intelligence was controlled for, and regression analyses 
suggested that conflict inhibition shared some unique variance with (and predictive power of) false 
belief understanding, whereas working memory did not. However, as conflict inhibition was not the 
pure measure of inhibitory control that delay inhibition was, the aspects of the tasks that are actually 
contributing to false belief understanding are unclear. Therefore, there is still an issue of task purity, as 
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 even though several tasks were used to establish both the conflict and delay inhibition factors, the 
conflict inhibition factor is still potentially separable into inhibitory and working memory components.  
Therefore there is evidence from developmental studies of three to four year olds for a connection 
between the ability to pass false belief tasks, and hence, demonstrate understanding of false beliefs, 
and language ability and specific executive function capabilities. Their exact contribution is not 
completely understood, although it seems that they are required (or are at least predictive of) the type 
of understanding required to pass standard false belief tasks. It is also unclear whether these 
relationships are necessary for the development of ToM, or whether they are a component in ToM 
throughout the lifespan.  
 
Evidence from adults 
There are different methodologies that have been used to investigate the relationship of both 
executive function and language ability with ToM. One method has been to look at adults with 
acquired brain lesions. The rationale for this approach is that if a function is necessary for ToM, then if 
that function is impaired in the patient there should be an impact on the patient’s ToM performance. A 
similar way of investigating possible contributors to a complex task in typical adults is through the 
method of dual tasking (Phillips, Tunstall & Channon, 2007). In dual task studies the task of interest, 
usually a more complex task (for example the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task in Cinan & Tanör, 2002, or 
the non-verbal belief task in Newton & de Villiers, 2007), is designated as the primary task. The 
secondary task, which is undertaken at the same time as the primary task in the experimental 
conditions, is designed to tap a specific component that the primary task also requires. If the primary 
task does require this specific component, then participant performance in the dual task experimental 
condition should be worse than when the primary task is conducted alone. Performance in the 
secondary task should be collected together with performance in the primary task, in both cases when 
they are performed alone and together, to allow for comparisons to be made.  
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 The role of language 
 
The link between language ability and false belief understanding in children suggests that there may 
be a role for language in the development of ToM, but that does not entail that it is necessary in 
adults. There has been limited research on ToM in adults, but some studies have focused on the 
relation between language abilities and false belief understanding, studying either neurologically intact 
adults or adults with brain injury. These studies can provide evidence for the existence of a 
relationship between language and ToM in adults that would indicate whether language is critical to 
both the development of ToM and to ToM itself.  
 
There have been only three clinical studies that have focused on the relationship between language 
and ToM in patients. All three only focused on the role of grammar in ToM, rather than any other 
aspect of language. Varley and Siegal (2000) studied patient S.A. who suffered a sub-dural 
emphysema resulting in a large lesion of the left hemisphere of the brain. He was left with both apraxia 
and aphasia, but his ability on an executive function task (Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, WCST) was 
not impaired. He also exhibited a severe impairment in sentence parsing and in sentence and verb 
comprehension. He was tested on a ToM task (‘changed container’ false-belief measures), as well as 
a causal reasoning task and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) picture arrangement test. 
His performance on these tasks was well above chance, indicating that his ToM abilities were intact, 
as well as his abilities to reason causally. This was despite his severe impairment in grammatical 
ability.  
 
Varley, Siegal and Want (2001) studied a patient, M.R., who suffered a left hemisphere 
cerebrovascular accident, resulting in severe aphasic difficulties and an inability to understand or 
produce language propositions. He was tested on the WCST to assess his executive function ability, 
that proved to be severely impaired (he failed to complete a single category in 128 trials). He was also 
tested on the WAIS picture arrangement test and a causal reasoning test, together with a picture-
based ToM task. He exhibited above chance performance in all three of these tasks. These results are 
despite his severe impairment in both grammatical (language) ability and executive function ability. 
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 The combined interpretation of these two studies would suggest that ToM ability does not rely on 
either language or executive function in adults. However, while more than one task was used to 
assess language ability, only one was used to assess executive function. The WCST may require 
executive functions that are not required for ToM that in M.R. may mean that he was impaired on 
those executive functions and not on those that ToM also requires. This will be returned to in the next 
section.  
 
Apperly, Samson, Carroll, Hussain and Humphreys (2006) studied a patient, P.H., who suffered a left 
hemisphere stroke, affecting the left medial and superior temporal gyri, and the left inferior and middle 
frontal gyri. P.H. was assessed on a battery of language tasks, as well as several ToM measures. 
Language problems exhibited by P.H. included severe anomia, deep dyslexia, deep dysgraphia and 
difficulties in grammatical processing. He was able to use individual word meaning to interpret 
sentences for semantic plausibility, rather than by grammatical information. He did show impaired 
performance on differing types of embedded sentences similar to the embedded complement 
sentences said to be causally related to the development of false belief understanding in children: 
specifically for target relative clause sentences (“The woman pushed the man that opened the box”) 
and adverbial clause sentences (“Before the woman pushed the man, the man opened the box”)).  
 
The pattern of results suggests that he was able to understand the embedded nature of the 
sentences, but his problem was more with the use of grammar to constrain the interpretation of the 
sentences. This would mean that if belief reasoning tasks, or reasoning tasks in general, rely on 
grammatically structured linguistic representations, P.H. would exhibit impaired performance. A series 
of ToM tasks were administered and P.H. passed the non-verbal measures of first-order false belief 
reasoning, and a non-verbal task that required second-order false belief reasoning. The first-order 
false belief reasoning task was a video-based version of the ‘unexpected transfer’ task (Samson, 
Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005). The second-order false belief reasoning task 
required P.H. to infer that one character would wrongly believe that another character holds a false 
belief. He also passed a test of ToM semantics, and also story-based ToM tasks that did not require 
complex grammatical abilities. The only task condition that he did not score above chance on was the 
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 belief condition of a task that required grammatical understanding of an embedded clause. The task 
required P.H. to process a sentence and then choose the correct picture (from two) that matched the 
meaning of the sentence. There were two conditions, belief and reality, and the sentences were of the 
same format for both (‘he thinks there is a red ball in the box, but really there is a blue ball in the box). 
However, for the reality trials the choice was between two pictures of an actual ball in a box (either red 
or blue ball in a box on a table), whereas in the belief trials the pictures were of a blue or red ball in 
thought bubbles. For the reality trials P.H. only had to process the ‘really there is a…’ part of the 
sentence, and he performed above chance for these trials. For the belief trials, P.H. had to process 
the ‘he thinks there is…’, and in these trials he did not perform above chance. This suggests that 
grammar was only necessary to process the input to belief reasoning, but was not necessary for 
processing belief as such. 
 
The evidence shows that these three agrammatic patients, with relatively spared lexical processing, 
were able to infer false beliefs (all could pass 1st order tasks, and P.H. could pass 2nd order belief 
reasoning tasks). This could suggest that the role of language is in the development of ToM. 
Nonetheless, whilst it is not an integral component, language is likely to be able to facilitate ToM in 
adults. 
   
There have been different interpretations of this relationship, particularly as found in Newton and de 
Villiers’ (2007) study. They investigated the relationship between language (in general) and false belief 
performance. Their study utilised a dual-task methodology to investigate the effect of a rhythmic 
shadowing secondary task and a verbal shadowing secondary task on a non-verbal false belief task in 
adults and an equivalent true belief task. The data showed that the verbal shadowing impaired 
performance on false belief task, but rhythmic shadowing did not. Neither secondary task affected 
performance in the true belief task. This was taken to mean that the false belief task required 
language in order to pass it, and as that language ability was also required by the verbal shadowing 
task, performance in the false belief task was impaired. The fact that the primary false and true belief 
tasks were non-verbal lends more weight to this explanation, suggesting as it does that language is 
required even for tasks that do not actively employ language.  
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 The performances of the participants in the secondary tasks themselves, however, were not reported. 
In dual-task studies, it is useful to examine the performance in both the primary (in this case the false 
and true belief tasks) and the secondary (rhythmic and verbal shadowing tasks) tasks. It is possible 
that the participants in the verbal shadowing task condition made errors only in the primary false belief 
task (but none in the secondary task), and that those in the rhythmic shadowing task condition made 
no errors in the primary task, but made errors in the secondary task instead. This gives an alternate 
picture of the results, in that participants may have focused on the verbal shadowing task rather than 
the false belief task in that particular condition, and that those in the other condition focused on the 
false belief task and not the rhythmic shadowing task. Whether participants chose to focus on one task 
rather than another is unclear, but does give a plausible alternate explanation when the data from the 
secondary tasks is not available. They may achieve this switching of focus using executive function. It 
is also possible that language may make specific demands on executive function.  
 
These studies seem to show that the role of language in ToM is one that is critical to development, but 
that is not so in adults. Language ability may help ToM ability in adults, in terms of efficiency and 
accuracy, but the relationship between the two may not crucial. 
 
The role of executive function 
Studies have suggested that there is a link between certain executive functions and ToM in adults, as 
there are in children. Happé, Malhi and Checkley (2001) studied a patient P.B. after a standard 
surgical procedure to treat bipolar affective disorder. The surgical procedure produced two bi-lateral 
lesions, targeting neuronal connections between the mid-line thalamic nuclei and the orbito-frontal 
cortex. P.B. exhibited impaired performance on test materials requiring mental state attribution. These 
were a story task involving questions requiring an inference about the characters’ thoughts and 
feelings, and also a single cartoon task in which P.B. had to explain why a cartoon was funny (half 
relied on what a character falsely thought or did not know hence required ToM, the rest did not). The 
final task was a cartoon pair task for which P.B. had to choose the humorous cartoon from a pair and 
explain why it was funny. Half the pairs required ToM to understand, half did not (each pair was 
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 identical except for the key humorous element).  He also exhibited impaired executive functioning, 
specifically deficits in generativity, inhibition and set shifting. He was able to answer test materials that 
did not require mental state attribution, so there was a tentative link between executive function and 
ToM proposed. Similar impairments in ToM and in executive function were found by Channon and 
Crawford (2000) in patients with left anterior lesions, and Stone, Baron-Cohen and Knight (1998) 
found that patients with dorsolateral lesions exhibited improved performance on ToM tasks when 
external working memory aids were provided. The most specific relationship between executive 
function, in this case inhibitory control, and ToM was found by Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan 
and Humphreys (2005). They studied a stroke patient, W.B.A., with right prefrontal and temporal 
damage, one of which resulted in poor inhibitory abilities. This exhibited itself, in terms of false belief 
performance, in difficulty in inhibiting his own perspective. However, the results suggest that he was 
still able to infer another agent’s perspective, but that the inability to inhibit his own perspective led him 
to make egocentric errors.  
 
This distinction was drawn through the use of low- and high- inhibition type false belief task, where the 
inhibitory control demands of the task was varied. W.B.A. was shown videos depicting two actors in a 
room. There were two small boxes in which there was a green block. The location of the block is 
unseen by W.B.A.. The female actor would be shown the boxes and the location of the green block by 
the male actor. At this point she would leave the room, and while she was out of the room, the man 
would move the block into the other box (again unseen by the participant). When the woman returned 
to the room, she would place an indicator on the box in which she thought the block would be. W.B.A. 
would then be asked to indicate where the block was. To successfully pass the task, the woman’s 
false belief must be taken into account. In this low inhibition condition, W.B.A. did not have to inhibit 
his own belief. In the high inhibition version, the transfer of the block whilst the woman was out of the 
room was shown to the participant. When she returned, the participant was asked to indicate where 
she would look first for the block. At this point W.B.A. knew where the block really was, but also 
needed to understand that the woman had a false belief of the location of the block (that she would 
look in the initial location of the block. In order to correctly respond, W.B.A. needed to inhibit his own 
knowledge of the block location, in addition to inferring that the woman had a false belief. The degree 
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 of self-perspective inhibition was therefore higher for this (high inhibition) condition. W.B.A. was able 
to pass the low inhibitory control demand task, where he was simply required to infer her false belief, 
but failed when he was required to infer her belief and to inhibit his own.  
 
However, there is evidence that impairment in executive function is not necessarily associated with 
decreased ToM performance (Channon, Sinclair, Waller, Healey & Robertson, 2004; Fine, Lumsden & 
Blair, 2001). Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith and Husain (2004) studied a patient, G.T. After suffering a rare 
form of stroke that resulted in massive medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) damage, an area often 
associated with ToM (Frith & Frith, 2006), G.T. exhibited impaired performance on a variety of 
executive function tasks (the task battery included the Hayling Test, Stroop Test, the Trail Making 
Test, the Behavioural Test of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS), Verbal fluency and the Modified 
Card Sorting Test). The pattern of results suggested impairments in planning and in memory. G.T. 
passed most ToM tasks despite her executive function impairment (these were the Picture sequences 
test, the strange stories task (an advanced test of ToM), the Violations of social norms test, the Faux 
Pas Test and an animations test). These results indicate that there is no relationship between 
executive function and ToM in adults. However, the impairments in executive functioning exhibited by 
G.T. may not be in those executive functions that are required for ToM. Memory may be required, in 
conjunction with inhibitory control, but planning has not been found to be related to ToM, at least in 
children (Carlson et al., 2004). Inhibitory control is the most commonly associated executive function 
with ToM, and on this G.T. was not as impaired as on other executive functions. This may account for 
her relatively normal performance on the ToM tasks. Another consideration is what aspects of 
executive function the ToM tasks used require, as used may not tap those specific executive 
functions. 
 
German and Hehman (2006) also found a relationship between inhibition and accuracy and response 
times in the false belief task in older adults. This suggests that the relationship between executive 
function, and specifically inhibitory control, is present throughout the lifespan. This would seem to 
show that inhibitory control is necessary to be able to inhibit self perspective in adults. As the 
relationship between inhibition and false belief is also present in children, it would seem that inhibitory 
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 control is a necessary component for adults and children, and so is core to the development of ToM 
and to ToM in general. 
 
There is recent evidence from ToM and social cognition dual task experiments that suggest that these 
abilities rely on domain general executive function abilities (rather than domain specific abilities that 
exist for ToM processing only). The evidence from these studies also suggests that there is a role for 
executive functions in ToM in adults (therefore beyond development only). Dual-task studies have 
focused on working memory contributions (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007) and inhibitory control (Bull, 
Phillips & Conway, 2008) to ToM.  
 
McKinnon and Moscovitch (2007) tested adults on a story based ToM task in conjunction with a two-
back task designed to tap working memory. The story task had two versions, a first-order ToM task 
and a second-order ToM task. The results showed significant impairments in both the first and second 
order ToM tasks in the dual-task condition, with performance in the second-order task also being 
significantly worse than in the first-order task. This suggests that working memory is required in belief 
reasoning in general, and to a greater extent in second-order than in first-order belief reasoning. The 
impaired performance in the two-back task in the dual-task condition supports this suggestion.  
 
Bull et al. (2008) used the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test and an amended version of the Stories 
task (amended from an expressive production task to a multiple choice task), together with matched 
control tasks. The dual tasks used all had the basic requirement of listening to a string of numbers. 
The three tasks were an inhibition task (involving adding numbers and withholding the response to a 
certain total), a switching task (participants were randomly auditorily cued to switch between adding 
one or two to the number) and an updating task (participants had to add one to the number heard one 
previously). A version in which participants had to add five to each number was used as a control to 
match presentation and response, but with minimum executive load. Results showed an impairment in 
the Eyes task in the inhibition dual-task condition, suggesting that inhibition is required for that task. 
The Stories tasks (both experimental and control) were significantly impaired by all the dual-tasks, 
suggesting a general overlap of executive function and the Story task demands, not specifically with 
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 any one executive function component. Performance on the secondary tasks was not reported, so it is 
unknown if there were any differences between the secondary tasks.   
 
Evidence therefore suggests a role for both executive function and language in the development of 
ToM, as far as it is the ability that is required to pass standard false belief tasks (at around ages three 
– four). Prior to this, there is evidence showing that infants are able to predict behaviours of other 
agents based on their beliefs being true or false. Whether this is the same ToM ability that is used to 
pass the standard false belief tasks but manifest at an earlier developmental stage, or whether it is a 
separate component of an overall conceptual ToM ability (of which the ability to pass the standard 
false belief tasks is another component) is unclear. However, the available evidence suggests that 
whilst executive function and language are both used in adults’ ToM processes, only the need for 
executive function has been demonstrated as strictly necessary. Language ability, primarily in the 
case of grammar, facilitates ToM performance in adults, but may not be integral to it. The data are 
consistent with the view that some aspects of ToM are dependent on executive function and language. 
However, the infant data does not fit with this view, as those studies show that infants possess some 
perspective taking abilities without having recourse to language or executive function abilities. 
Therefore there could be at least two potential components of ToM. These could be characterised 
respectively as a simple, cognitively efficient ability (infant perspective taking and implicit belief 
understanding) and a more flexible, cognitively demanding ability (the ability shown to pass standard 
false belief tasks, requiring development of both executive function and language, but needing only 
the former and being facilitated by the latter).  Data from animal studies suggest that some animals 
also exhibit a perspective taking ability with limited executive function ability and without language 
ability. This may provide converging evidence for the existence of a cognitively efficient, inflexible ToM 
system that is responsible for perspective taking (at least). It is also possible that typical false belief 
tasks can not be passed by infants or animals only because the tasks have additional task demands 
that require executive function and language ability that they do not have. This view allows infants and 
animals to have an understanding of false belief (that can not be demonstrated using typical false 
belief tasks). 
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 Evidence from animal studies 
Studies from the area of animal cognition provide some converging evidence for the existence of a 
relatively simple perspective taking ability, analogous to what is found in human infants. There are two 
main views on the evidence from this area, one that suggests that what is shown (primarily by apes) is 
at some level, perspective taking abilities (Tomasello, Call & Hare, 2003), and one that claims that the 
evidence can be explained by behavioural rules, and that it is our own ToM that makes us interpret 
other species’ behaviour as showing evidence of ToM (Povinelli & Vonk, 2003). 
 
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne and Moll (2005) have suggested that primates have a basic form of 
ToM, insomuch as they are able to understand others as animate, goal-directed and having intentions. 
The distinction made between this and the ToM present in children (and hence adults) is based on 
humans having a unique motivation to share emotions, experiences and activities with other agents. 
This cooperative motivation is said to be the driving force behind the ‘shared intentionality’ of humans 
that results in what is seen as human cognition, incorporating ToM. This early recognition of others as 
goal-directed, animate and intentional agents may explain why children can succeed in perspective 
taking tasks at 14 months (Sodian et al., 2007), well before ToM is fully developed, and also why apes 
are also able to succeed in perspective taking tasks (Hare, Call & Tomasello, 2001), whilst both are 
unable to pass ToM tasks. 
 
 The cooperative nature of humans is said to be the basis for the development of the skills that enable 
children to then pass ToM tasks sometime after four years of age. Primates have a more competitive 
social arena, so the spur to develop understanding of other mental states is not present or indeed 
needed as it will not bestow any advantage. As noted, some researchers have suggested that 
primates do not have a ToM, and that evidence for ToM in primates (in terms of actions and 
behaviours in experimental settings) can be explained by behavioural abstraction (Povinelli & Vonk, 
2003). The suggestion is also that as humans have a ToM, they are predisposed to interpret others’ 
actions in terms of ToM – this applies to humans (which works well) but can also apply to interpreting 
the behaviours and actions of primates, which may be a fallacy. 
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 The emphasis on the integral role of co-operation and shared intentionality in the developed ToM 
present in children and adults could be seen as an emphasis on a type of behaviour that relies on 
language and executive function. Without language and executive function, the specificities of shared 
intentionality may not be possible: simple perspective taking may be automatic and hence not require 
any executive function (particularly inhibitory control), but the more complex ToM abilities that are held 
to be present in children and adults seem to require language and executive function, and evidence 
from developmental studies bear this out (though adult studies seem to suggest that language ability 
acts as a facilitator, whilst executive function is required). The explanations of the abilities shown by 
infants and apes do seem to point to a potentially common ability to understand at least the differing 
perspectives taken by other agents. The understanding of mental states as such may also be a part of 
this ability, but a more conservative and perhaps more realistic interpretation of the data would 
exclude this (Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Ruffman & Perner, 2005). This gives some converging evidence 
for the presence of a cognitively efficient ToM ability (that does not rely on executive function and / or 
language) that allows infants and apes to pass simple perspective taking tasks, and at the very least 
show some understanding of agents having different perspective to their own. Again, an alternative 
explanation is that full false belief understanding (or ToM) is present in animals (and infants), but that 
this can not be demonstrated using typical ToM tasks because of their requirements for executive 
function and language abilities.  
 
Evidence from neuroscience 
The two main areas of evidence within this field are from neuropsychological studies, highlighting 
regions of the brain that are necessary for ToM, and from fMRI imaging studies that highlight all the 
regions that may be involved. 
 
A detailed explanation of the areas associated with ToM is given by Siegal and Varley (2002). In their 
review of imaging and lesion studies they argue that the core components of ToM are centred in the 
medial temporal lobe-amygdala area, orbitofrontal cortex and superior frontal gyrus. These areas are 
associated with i) inhibition, working memory and empathy ii) empathic ToM, emotional perspective 
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 taking (and the dissociation between ToM reasoning tasks and other closely related tasks) iii) frontal 
eye field and attention respectively. They suggest that the amygdala system and its interconnections 
with the prefrontal and temporal lobe structures could be responsible for a range of socio-cognitive 
behaviours, including lower-level behaviours (such as determining emotional significance). Together 
with what are described as co-opted systems such as the right-hemisphere non-frontal area 
(specifically the superior temporal sulcus (STS) for detecting motion of animate objects, and hence 
inferring intentions from actions, and the right inferior parietal cortex, precuneus and somatosensory 
cortex in distinguishing perspectives of self from others), the frontal lobes (executive functioning), and 
the language centres of the brain (enables propositional reasoning about mental states) enable human 
ToM as we know it. This posits a link between executive function and language and ToM in adults, 
much as there is a link between them in children.  
 
A more recent imaging review by Frith and Frith (2006) has associated the posterior end of the STS 
and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) with perspective taking, in that these areas are associated with 
eye-movement observation (where someone is looking) and also representing the world from different 
visual perspectives. The temporal poles are associated with knowledge about the world, in terms of 
experience of how to behave in certain situations, how particular situations can affect particular people 
that we know, amongst other knowledge gained throughout our life. This knowledge is used to aid 
mentalising. The medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) alone is associated with thinking about the mental 
states of others and the mental states of the self. 
 
It is possible that functions of the PFC can be segregated into different areas, as evidence is present 
that the more ventral regions are associated with emotions of others and the self, while the more 
dorsal regions are associated with monitoring actions of the self and others (more cognitive). The 
region between these areas, the anterior rostral MFC, is activated when we notice someone is going 
to communicate with us. The activation may be in this region as it is adjacent to the two regions 
dealing with emotion and action, and is so able to combine and process those two aspects.  
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 The review by Frith and Frith (2006) posits no direct links between executive function and ToM, 
though it shows how there is more than one area associated with ToM. An interpretation of this could 
be that ToM could be separable into more than one system, potentially with different underlying 
components or demands.  
 
Other patient studies that have investigated ToM impairments and in particular executive functioning in 
(specifically with frontal lobe lesions) have found varied results. Rowe, Bullock, Polkey and Morris 
(2001) found that their sample of patients with unilateral frontal lobe lesions (left and right) had 
common deficits in ToM tasks, and also in executive function tasks. However, they did not find any 
causal relationship between the two sets of tasks. Their argument for the common finding of a 
combination of ToM deficits and executive function deficit is due to the close proximity (or same area) 
of the brain regions associated with both aspects. Therefore it is possible that people can have deficits 
in ToM, deficits in ToM and executive function, or deficits in executive function, all of which are 
independent of each other. However, all this may mean is that there are potentially different brain 
areas that are independently responsible for executive function and ToM. 
 
Other studies that have investigated the areas of the brain associated with ToM include Samson, 
Apperly, Chiavarino and Humphreys (2004) (who identified the left TPJ as necessary for reasoning 
about others’ beliefs), Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino and Humphreys (2004), and Stuss and Anderson 
(2004) (who proposed a hierarchical development of essential brain areas, mostly focused on the 
frontal lobes). Functions associated with these brain regions could result in further evidence on the 
functional basis of ToM.  
 
Perspective taking studies in adults (Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen & Ladurner, 2006), and 
imaging studies using different story conditions (Saxe & Powell, 2006) have investigated the possibility 
of there being, respectively, separate areas of the brain associated with perspective taking and an 
early developing ToM component. Saxe and Powell (2006) gave participants stories that fell into three 
separate categories, and monitored their brain activity whilst they read them. Appearance stories 
described the physical and social characteristics of the protagonist. No subjective or mental states 
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 were described explicitly in this condition. Bodily-sensation stories described the protagonist’s 
subjective feelings, but did not describe explicit mental states, only internal experiences. This type of 
feeling or state was deemed least likely to be interpreted using a rich representation. The final 
category was that of thoughts stories, in which the participants were required to represent the 
protagonists’ beliefs (and thoughts). This category was thought to require the classic ToM abilities that 
emerge around four to six years of age (comparable to the cognitively demanding and flexible 
component).  
 
The results from the study show a different area of activation (the supramarginal gyrus, SMG) for the 
bodily-sensation stories than for the appearance and thoughts stories, but also different areas of 
activation (right and left TPJ and posterior cingulate) for the thoughts stories than for the appearance 
and bodily-sensation stories. The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) was activated in all three story 
categories. The results were interpreted as showing that the right TPJ and  left TPJ and posterior 
cingulate are required for representing and interpreting a protagonist’s thoughts and beliefs, whilst the 
SMG may be (one) of the areas responsible for the attribution of subjective physical feelings. This 
area has also been associated with the attributions of basic emotional states. As the MPFC was 
activated in all conditions, it may have a general role in representation of relevant social and / or 
emotional information of another agent. The upshot of this pattern of results is again a distinction 
between an early developing theory component (involving the SMG, and used in the attribution of 
basic emotional states and also in perspective taking) and a later developing ToM (involving the TPJ 
and posterior cingulate, and used in representing thoughts and beliefs of another agent). The MPFC is 
said to be used in a broad role of the representation of relevant social and emotional information, 
present in both early and late developing ToM aspects. This study also uses the idea of two 
components of ToM, but the areas associated with these components differ from Perner et al. (2006). 
 
Perner et al. (2006) used several conditions of a perspective taking task. This task consisted of six 
conditions, in which five included a short red block and a tall black stick. Of these five conditions, four 
included a human figure and one included a camera. The four human figure conditions were 
presented as a scene with a sentence above them. Participants were required to verify if the sentence 
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 matched the scene as shown (two conditions with different positioning of the block and stick), or if the 
sentence matched the scene as seen by the human figure (two conditions again with different 
positions of the block and stick). In the camera condition participants were asked to judge whether a 
picture shown above the scene could have been taken by the camera in its position in the scene. In 
the final condition participants were asked to judge whether the two groups of objects present in the 
scene were composed of the same or different kind of objects. The results showed that the medial 
prefrontal area of the brain, associated with activation during ToM tasks (Frith & Frith, 2003), was not 
activated in this task. This is even though the tasks required level two perspective taking. However 
another area of the brain associated with ToM tasks, in particular false belief tasks, the STS / TPJ 
area (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), was activated. As false belief tasks and the conditions in the Perner 
et al. study both require the ability to represent belief as perspective, hence making a conceptual link 
with visual-perspective taking, and both had similar areas of activation, the results were said to 
indicate that the STS/TPJ area is required for taking perspectives and predicting behaviour, whilst the 
medial prefrontal area is required for making behavioural predictions and the wider consequences of 
that behaviour, especially the emotional consequences.  
  
 
However, this is a general issue with imaging studies in the ToM literature, with different studies 
finding different areas of activation, sometimes attributing these activations to different potential 
processes and components. Several areas are repeatedly found to be activated in ToM tasks, 
including the MPFC, STS and temporal poles (Frith & Frith, 2003), but a definite interpretation of the 
roles of these areas is still under debate. Some of this uncertainty is due to differing experimental 
procedures, but another reason is the varied types of task that are used to tap or measure ostensibly 
the same process, ToM. Imaging studies often only require participants to read stories or a series of 
images in order to see what areas are activated whilst this occurs. Studies on typical samples, both 
developmental and adult, use stories, images, and videos, which will have different incidental 
demands on them, and would reasonably require different resources to accurately process them. 
Another issue is what other processes the areas activated by ToM tasks are responsible for, or have 
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 been associated with. These could include aspects of executive function. Therefore it is more realistic 
to attempt to constrain the processes that a task is designed to measure. 
  
Two processes of Theory of Mind : Evidence from adults 
A model that incorporates the possibility of there being two systems available for ToM could explain 
the discrepancy between task performances shown in these studies when executive function 
impairment is not associated with ToM impairment: a cognitively efficient (but perhaps rather inflexible) 
system would arguably be unaffected by executive function impairment, and this may be enough to 
pass simple ToM tasks (such as those used with infants, and with some brain-injured patients). This 
system may have the potential to adapt to compensate for the cognitively flexible system that may 
have been impaired by the executive function impairment.  
 
The separation of ToM into two potential components by Perner et al. (2006) mirrors, in some 
respects, the division between the two proposed components of the two-system approach of a 
cognitively efficient inflexible component and a cognitively demanding flexible component. The two-
system approach does not explicitly take into account the particular consequences of behavioural 
predictions, but the emphasis on the difference in complexity between the two components suggested 
by Perner et al. and the two components in the two-system approach is similar. 
  
Flexible and cognitively demanding system 
There have been studies focusing on ToM abilities in typical adults. Keysar et al. (2003) used a 
communication game experiment to investigate adults’ abilities to follow the directions of an instructor 
to move objects around a grid. The basic premise was that some objects were visible to both the 
instructor and the participant, and some were only visible to the participant (as they were hidden in a 
bag by the participant without the director’s knowledge). In critical trials, the instructor’s directions 
could refer to a mutually-visible item or to the object hidden in the bag.  
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 Results showed that participants both reliably looked at the object only known to them as a possible 
choice (the non mutually-visible object) and also made errors by selecting that object to move. A 
second experiment used a false belief manipulation, where after the object (a cassette tape) was 
hidden by the participant without the director’s knowledge, the participant and the director were shown 
a picture of what ostensibly was in the bag. This picture was of a different object to the contents of the 
bag, so the participant should realise that the director now held a false belief about the contents of the 
bag. In the critical trials, where the referent of the instruction could be the item in the bag or a mutually 
visible item, participants still tended to look at the bag as a possible choice, and also chose the bag as 
the item to move. 
  
The pattern of errors from this particular experiment and the other experiments from the same study 
(Apperly, Carroll, Samson, Qureshi, Humphreys, & Moffatt (in submission)) are said to show that 
participants do not have difficulty in taking the instructor’s perspective or in switching perspective, but 
that the difficulty arises from the potential limited capacity for being able to infer and hold in mind the 
instructor’s perspective and the use of this to then respond accurately. These abilities are said to 
relate to generic executive functions, and, as covered, in conceptual terms inhibitory control and 
working memory would likely be the best candidates for the specific executive functions associated 
with ToM. The association of this task with executive function, together with the high error rate (~ 25% 
– 50%), and long reaction times (~ 2000 ms) would associate it with the second component of the 
proposed two-system model ToM, in that it is cognitively demanding (greater requirement for executive 
function), requires flexibility and is complex, and results in participants being more prone to errors. 
There is evidence to suggest that children are able to pass a simplified version of this task (Nadig & 
Sedivy, 2002), but the grids used in that study were smaller with fewer items, so the associated 
executive function demands would have been appreciably less. 
 
Both of these experiments indicate that adult participants make mistakes in utilising their ToM abilities, 
by consistently not taking the instructors perspective or beliefs into account when following their 
instructions to move an object. A reason for this failure to take another’s belief or perspective into 
account could be the difficulty in discounting the self perspective, or the tendency towards 
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 egocentrism (Epley, Keysar, van Boven & Gilovich, 2004a; Epley, Morewedge & Keysar, 2004b; Wu & 
Keysar, 2007). 
 
A review of evidence and theory relating to egocentrism (Royzman, Cassidy & Baron, 2003) 
suggested that there is a tendency in both children and adults towards egocentrism (termed in the 
review as epistemic egocentrism), and that this bias may be mediated by inhibitory control (executive 
function). In addition to the studies already mentioned in this introduction, there are studies on older 
adults that have found impaired (compared to younger controls) performance in ToM tasks (Maylor, 
Moulson, Muncer & Taylor, 2002) but this impairment was present when executive function tasks were 
controlled for. Incidental task difficulty is an issue here, as well as task purity in terms of whether the 
executive tasks are measuring what they are meant to be measuring. This also applies to the 
demands of the ToM tasks used.  
 
Studies have found impaired performance in an older adult sample (again compared to younger 
controls) in executive function tasks (Zelazo et al., 2004). German and Hehman (2006) found impaired 
performance by older adults in a standard false belief task, but not in an equivalent true belief task. As 
mentioned, they also found a relationship between inhibition and accuracy and response times in the 
false belief task. The relationship between executive function (specifically inhibitory control) is hence 
likely to be present throughout the lifespan, as the general impairment in executive function (Maylor et 
al., 2002; Zelazo et al., 2004) has an effect on the performance of older adults in ToM tasks, 
specifically in those requiring representation of false beliefs, that conceptually requires the setting 
aside, or inhibition, of the self perspective.  
 
Egocentrism has been shown to be present in both children and adults (Epley et al, 2004b). The 
results from the study of Epley et al. (2004b), and from the study of Epley et al. (2004a) shows that 
both children and adults tend to start with an egocentric interpretation, but differ in how quickly they 
can correct this. The participants in the latter study serially adjusted their initial egocentric 
interpretation to the most plausible interpretation (not necessarily the correct interpretation), and this 
adjustment was mediated by how different the alternate perspective was from their own (further away 
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 resulted in a slower adjustment, by time pressure (increased bias under increased time pressure), and 
by accuracy incentives (increased accuracy of adjustments). The ability to serially adjust the initial 
egocentric representation to a more plausible representation is more developed, faster and efficient in 
adults, and this is said to be why adults do not show as much egocentric bias as children. This ability 
could be mediated by inhibitory control, as to move away from the initial egocentric intrusion may 
require inhibition of that representation (or at least some level of interference control).  
 
A study by Apperly, Back, Samson and France (2008) investigated the cost of thinking about false 
beliefs. In a non-inferential ToM task, where participants did not need to infer a false belief (they were 
told what the character in the story believed), a cost in terms of efficiency (in both reaction time and 
error rates) was shown when the character had a false belief as compared to when they had a true 
belief. This was put down to the fact that the content of the false belief conflicted with the reality (which 
was not the case in the true belief trial). The ability to deal with this potential interference between 
belief and reality, even when there is no inference required, would seem to plausibly require at least 
some aspect of executive function, and more specifically inhibitory control.  
 
Another study by Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino and Samson (2006) found that participants 
took significantly longer to respond to unexpected probes requiring them to respond concerning where 
another person thought an object was (not where it actually was) seemingly indicating that this type of 
inference, using belief reasoning, is actively carried out only when required. It follows that belief 
reasoning is not automatic. This explanation was supported in other conditions from the same study in 
which participants were instructed to follow the actor’s belief throughout the task. This resulted in no 
differences in the response time to probes about the actor’s belief of where the object was (belief 
probes) and where the object actually was (reality probes). If this is correct, then this type of belief 
reasoning, that is similar to the requirements needed for standard false belief tasks, may well require 
inhibitory control (to inhibit self perspective), and be flexible and more prone to errors (as seen in the 
study by Keysar et al. (2003)). This may be equated to the proposed ToM component that is required 
to pass the standard false belief task, which incorporates executive function and so is cognitively 
demanding but flexible. This might be contrasted to a ToM component that is cognitively efficient (less 
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 requirement for executive function), but may be less flexible (following from the current analyses, 
efficiency comes at the cost of flexibility), that is used by infants to pass perspective taking tasks and 
simple mental state understanding paradigms. 
 
Efficient but inflexible system 
 
There is some evidence for an efficient and inflexible system or component that can process 
perspectives quickly and accurately. Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews and Bodley Scott 
(submitted) designed a task in which the participant was shown a room containing an avatar and 
circles (that could be present or not) on opposite walls. The information in their perspective (how many 
circles they could see) could either be consistent with what the avatar could see or inconsistent (the 
circles were on the walls in front and behind the avatar, so it could only see one wall where circles 
could be present at a time). Participants were asked to judge either their own perspective or that of the 
avatar at the end of each trial by verifying a number of circles that either they or the avatar could see. 
Results showed that participants processed the perspectives faster when they were consistent. When 
they were inconsistent, the response time was significantly longer, indicating some interference from 
the alternate perspective. This was true when they were asked to look from the avatar’s perspective, 
with interference from their perspective, which was expected. There was also, however, interference 
from the avatar perspective when they were asked to focus on their own perspective, suggesting that 
they were processing the avatar’s perspective even when they did not need to do so. This would imply 
that this processing of another’s perspective was a (at least relatively) automatic process that by 
definition is inflexible. The proportion of errors in the task was very low (~ 8.00%), and the reaction 
times were relatively fast (~ 650 ms), compared to those from the Keysar task, which is a pattern of 
results that would be associated to a fast, cognitively efficient, inflexible component, that is less prone 
to errors (due to a lack of complexity of the component). This is in contrast to the type of flexible and 
more error-prone processing that seems to be used in more standard ToM task (such as Keysar et al., 
2003).  
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 The evidence suggests the possibility of two systems for ToM, with data from developmental, adult, 
clinical and non-human animal research converging towards that premise. There is also evidence for 
similar two-system approaches in cognition from different areas of psychology. Feigenson, Dehaene 
and Spelke (2004) reviewed existing literature in the field of number cognition, and related the results 
shown to the possibility of there being two separate systems available. Results from studies 
investigating children’s abilities with groups of objects or items were characterised by apparently 
arbitrary limitations, argued to be attributable to a system for number cognition used for approximate 
representations of numerical magnitude (Lipton & Spelke, 2003). Studies investigating precise 
representations of distinct items found similar arbitrary limitations in terms of the absolute numbers of 
the individual items (Feigenson, Carey & Hauser, 2002). This difference in the results (size of the ratio 
of the groups in the group dictating distinctions between groups of objects, but the absolute number of 
items dictating distinctions between distinct items) is best typified as representative of two different 
systems. The approximate number system is also present in adults and older children, where 
discrimination between groups of items also exhibit ratio-dependent restrictions and is also robust 
across different modalities (Temple & Posner, 1998; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). Study on non-human 
animals have shown a similar pattern of results in approximate number and discrete number 
distinctions, potentially supporting this two-system approach as present across species and across 
differing modalities, all characterised by the same set of arbitrary limitations. Other areas of 
psychology, such as that of general reasoning and social cognition (Todorov, Harris & Fiske, 2006; 
Frith & de Vignemont, 2005) have also used a two-system approach to resolve seemingly anomalous 
sets of results.  
 
The investigation of a potential two-system approach to ToM means that the type of perspective taking 
task that infants have been shown to pass in recent literature (Onisihi & Baillargeon, 2005; Sodian et 
al., 2007) should also inform what type of task should be used. If this type of task is said to typify the 
fast, inflexible and cognitively efficient component (it does not require executive function), then there 
needs to be a task that exemplifies the other component that is suggested to require executive 
function and is more complex and flexible, but more error-prone. 
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 Current study 
The principal aim of the current study was to conduct the first large-scale individual differences study 
of ToM and executive function in adults. The literature gives many possible avenues of research. The 
chosen path was to use two ToM tasks that seemed similar in terms of conceptual demands on ToM, 
but appeared to differ in terms of response patterns (error rate and reaction times). The task that was 
used to tap the proposed fast, inflexible and cognitively efficient component of ToM was the 
perspective taking task (experiment 1a) from the study of Samson et al. (submitted), as detailed 
earlier. The task chosen to tap the proposed flexible, cognitively demanding component of ToM was 
an adaptation of the original task developed by Keysar et al. (2003). This version was developed for 
use in a study by Apperly et al. (in submission). The specific task to be used from this study was the 
ignorant instructor condition of Experiment 3 (also described earlier). 
 
Different predictions follow for the proposed two-system approach as compared to the established 
one-system approach. A one-system approach would suggest that the two tasks will correlate, and 
any differences between them are due to differences in task difficulty. The visual perspective task 
involves taking the perspective of another (in the avatar focusing trials), maintenance of that 
perspective and the information contained, and resistance to any interference from (self or avatar) 
alternate perspectives.  The Keysar task also involves these task demands. In addition, in the Keysar 
task the participant also needs to use that information in order to solve a problem by integrating it with 
the instructions of the instructor. The number of items needed to be held in mind is also greater for the 
Keysar task. However, as the majority of the task demands are similar (perspective taking, the use of 
the information gained from taking that perspective, and dealing with any interference between 
perspectives) the suggestion is that the two tasks will correlate. Executive function may or may not be 
required for the above processes. 
 
The two-system approach would not necessarily predict a correlation between the two tasks, as they 
are posited to tap two separate components of ToM. There may also be differing requirements for 
executive function in the two tasks.  
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Based on the literature, inhibitory control was focused on, as this has been shown to have the most 
specific involvement with ToM. However, it is likely that other executive functions are also involved. 
Developmental literature suggests that working memory may be a candidate for a role in ToM (Carlson 
& Moses, 2001). Working memory may be required by the Keysar task to hold in mind all of the 
potential referents in a trial, whereas it is unlikely to be needed for that role in the visual perspective 
task. Executive function may also be required for the integration of instructions and information from 
perspective in the Keysar task. Inhibitory control could conceptually be needed to take another 
alternate perspective, through having to inhibit the self perspective, and this requirement should be 
common to both tasks. Conflict resolution between the self and instructor or avatar perspectives is 
also common to both tasks, and may also require inhibition.  
 
It is possible that the executive function demands associated with the two tasks may differ based on 
their relative requirements (Stuss & Alexander, 2007). Therefore due to the possibly different demands 
of the two ToM tasks, there may be different executive functions that can contribute to them. This 
interpretation suggests that even though the same underlying system is used in both tasks, the results 
could show no relationship because of their recruitment of different executive functions due to their 
different task demands. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2. Executive Function and task selection for individual 
differences study 
Task Selection 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 1 suggests that there is a role for executive function in theory of 
mind. Evidence has been shown for a relationship between them in children (Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson et al., 2004), and there is also evidence for the relationship in adults, 
from studies on clinical patients (Channon & Crawford, 2000; Samson et al., 2005; Stone et al., 1998) 
and also on typical adults (Bull et al., 2008; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007).  However, this evidence is 
limited by the type of tasks used, as they may measure more than one executive function. The aim of 
the current study was to establish reliable estimates of valid executive functions, which could then be 
used to ascertain any potential relationships between executive function and ToM.  Most of the studies 
that investigate executive function in relation to another construct use a single task as a measure of a 
given executive function. One of the issues to consider in executive function research, and also in 
ToM studies, is what precisely a task may be measuring. Executive function is an overarching term for 
a collection of functions, and the older tasks used to measure it are now understood to actually 
measure a large and varied number of these functions. These functions include planning, attention, 
inhibition, and working memory used singly and in combination in order to plan and achieve goal-
directed behaviour (Norman & Shallice, 1980; Shallice, 1982).  
 
Tasks that have been used to measure executive function include the Tower of Hanoi (ToH) task and 
the Stroop task. These tasks require a combination of processes. The ToH task requires planning 
ability in the movement of the discs whilst anticipating possible future moves. It may also require 
working memory to maintain rules, instructions and strategies. The Stroop task may also require 
working memory, and also requires inhibition of the dominant response of responding to the semantic 
information of the words presented. These tasks therefore do not measure any single process of 
executive function. 
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 Early models of higher cognitive systems, such as the initial working memory model of Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974), often contained a central executive component which was responsible for the regulation 
and control of cognitive processes. This component is analogous to executive function, and shows 
that the initial concept of executive function was unitary. Therefore one of the issues arising from 
attempting to define executive function was to what extent it was a unitary mechanism (or ability) or a 
set of separable processes. Therefore the processes that are grouped under the general executive 
function umbrella have been more recently studied in terms whether they are dissociable or are part of 
a more unitary construct. 
  
Fractionation of executive function 
Although some studies have found evidence for there being a unitary ability or mechanism underlying 
the various components (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson & Freer, 1996), there is evidence for the 
potential fractionation of executive function abilities. This has come from studies on clinical 
populations, where participants have shown normal performance on well defined cognitive tasks 
(Damasio, 1994; Shallice & Burgess, 1991), but have shown impaired performance on tasks which are 
ostensibly more complex and less well defined, such as the aforementioned ToH task and the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST).  Differing patterns of data from different clinical studies have 
shown that participants are often impaired in one type of task and not another, but then other 
participants show the opposite impairment (Godefroy, Cabaret, Petit-Chenal, Pruvo, & Rousseaux, 
1999). Such double dissociations are taken to indicate that there are different components of 
executive function that are tapped by different tasks.  
 
It is generally accepted now that tasks that have been used to measure a particular process of 
executive function can tap more than one of these processes. It is therefore difficult to use one task to 
measure a single executive function, as that task may measure different executive functions in 
addition to, or instead of, the proposed one. It is also possible that an executive function that one task 
is measuring may be more complex than first supposed, leading to a task that again taps more than 
one executive function. For example, inhibition was initially treated as a single construct. Many classic 
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 inhibition tasks, such as the Stroop task (Jaensch, 1929; Stroop, 1935), have been said to tap what 
are now considered differing types of inhibition. The task is to respond to the words shown on a page 
by giving the colour of the ink they are printed in. In the interference or experimental condition, the 
words are also colour words (for example, the word ‘red’ will be printed in blue ink – the correct 
response is ‘blue’). The semantic information of the word (red) conflicts with the visual colour (blue) of 
the word. Dealing with the conflict between the different sets of information taps cognitive inhibition, 
insomuch as it is required for monitoring that conflict (Lansbergen, van Hell & Kenemans, 2007). 
Response inhibition may also be required (Young, Bramham, Tyson & Morris, 2006) in order to inhibit 
any response to the semantic information given (red). It is possible that working memory is also 
required to retain the instructions for doing the task. In this way a task that was said to measure 
inhibition may require response inhibition, cognitive inhibition and working memory, meaning that 
tasks are never a pure measure of a single construct.  
 
Developmental evidence 
 
Executive function has also been studied in children (see Hughes, 2002), and there is evidence from 
developmental studies for separable simple executive functions. Areas proposed include cognitive 
flexibility (comprising working memory, divided attention, conceptual transfer and feedback utilisation), 
attentional control (inhibition, self-monitoring, self-regulation and selective attention), goal setting 
(initiative, conceptual reasoning, planning and strategic organisation), and information processing 
(efficiency, fluency and speed of processing) (Anderson, 2002). Other studies have found independent 
abilities in inhibitory control and working memory, that can be used in conjunction (Beveridge, 2002), 
whereas others have found interactions between them, albeit at an earlier age (Perner & Lang, 1999). 
The implication here is again that there are simple executive functions that may be used in conjunction 
with one another in more complex tasks.  
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 Individual differences studies 
An alternative to patient studies, that can be tested using typical participants, is an individual 
differences approach. This can be used to establish which executive functions are distinct from one 
another. This approach can also show what executive functions are tapped by particular tasks. This 
approach has been used on a variety of a samples: typical young adults (Lehto, 1996) and elderly 
adults (Rabbitt & Lowe, 2000; Robbins, James, Owen, Sahakian, Lawrence, McInnes & Rabbitt, 
1998), clinical populations of adults (Burgess, 1997; Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 
1998; Duncan, Johnson, Swales & Freer, 1997), and children with neurocognitive pathologies (Levin, 
Fletcher, Kufera, Harward, Lilly, Mendelsohn, Bruce, & Eisenberg, 1996; Schachar, Tannock, & 
Logan, 1993; Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991). Participants are given a series of (executive 
function) tasks, and the performances on the different tasks are compared using correlation- 
regression analyses, and sometimes exploratory factor analyses (EFA). A common finding from these 
studies is that the inter-correlations between the executive function tasks is often low (r = 0.4 or less) 
and are often non-significant. EFA results also tend to show executive function tasks loading on many 
different factors (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki & Howerter, 2000). The low correlations indicate 
that though there may be some association between the various processes, the main processes that 
these tasks tap can be treated as separate from one another. This gives support to the view that 
simple executive function constructs can be dissociated from one another. 
 
An issue with using single measures in studies of executive function is that a low score in a task that is 
proposed to measure a given executive function does not necessarily mean there is an weakness in 
that single executive function, for that would assume that the task is a pure measure of (that particular) 
executive function (Miyake & Shah, 1999). The exact nature of the executive function impairment 
shown by a low score in a single executive function task is therefore difficult to ascertain. This is an 
issue of task impurity (Burgess, 1997; Phillips, 1997), and also means that low inter-correlations and 
the loading on multiple factors of executive function tasks do not inevitably mean that those tasks are 
all measuring different functions. As noted, many classic executive function tasks (such as the Stroop 
task, ToH and WCST) do tap many different potential components of executive function.  
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 One way of dealing with the problem of complex tasks is to use simple, more constrained tasks that 
can arguably be said to tap only one executive function component. A number of studies have utilised 
this approach to some degree (Stuss & Alexander, 2007) but even a task that has been constrained to 
ostensibly measure only one executive function component may still require other resources. There 
will also always be incidental task demands that could affect task performance. This method does not 
allow for a task to have any error associated with it – the assumption is that it is a perfect measure.  
 
Stuss and Alexander (2007) used an alternative way of dealing with measurement error, by using a 
series of tasks that varied in complexity. They systematically tested patients with various lesions on 
these tasks, starting with the simplest that ostensibly tapped only single processes. The single 
processes affected by particular lesions could then be seen by the performance on these simple tasks. 
They then tested the patients on progressively more complex tasks (the initial tasks were 
progressively more complex versions of the same task, but the final tasks were established, complex, 
executive function tasks that tapped more than one process). The more complex processes affected 
by particular lesions could be seen by the performance on these complex tasks, but this information 
was informed by the pattern of performance in single processes. Therefore the contribution of single 
processes and incidental task demands (measurement error) to the more complex tasks can be 
estimated. This allows the contribution of measurement error to the complex tasks to be taken into 
account. The pattern of performance in the tasks tapping single and complex processes for the 
different lesions of the patients also showed the possible location of both these processes and the 
network of processes (and which processes were likely to be involved in which network). As noted in 
Chapter 1, another implication of this study is that the executive functions underlying a given task may 
differ depending on the difficulty of that task. A task that has additional demands may require different 
executive functions than a more parsimonious version of the same task. 
 
Latent variable analyses 
An alternate way to deal with the task impurity issue is to use latent variable analyses. This allows 
what is statistically common across multiple tasks to be ‘extracted’ to form a purer factor of the 
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 component of interest (Miyake et al., 2000). These latent variables can represent theoretical 
constructs about characteristics of persons (such as executive function) (Kline, 2005). Therefore when 
studying executive function, several tasks that tap the component of interest would be used to 
measure a latent variable that represents that component. These tasks are defined as indicators that 
allow the measurement of the unobserved latent variable (it is not directly measured). This allows that 
variable to be a pure measure of the construct as it does not have any measurement error associated 
with it. The tasks, which are impure measures of that construct, have associated error terms that 
represent all the variance that is not related to the executive function component. The relationships of 
the tasks with the latent variable therefore creates a pure factor. 
 
Miyake et al. (2000) used this individual differences approach to examine which executive function 
components (from mental set shifting, information updating and monitoring, and the inhibition of 
prepotent responses) were tapped by the ToH task, WCST, random number generation (RNG), 
operation span, and dual tasking (all frequently used executive tasks).  
 
The components were created by testing participants on a battery of executive function tasks posited 
to measure the often cited executive functions listed above. Participants were also tested on complex 
executive tasks (ToH, WCST and RNG). A model consisting of three latent variables fitted the data. 
These three latent variables were interpreted as representing shifting, updating and inhibition by the 
authors. The findings show that the ToH task tapped the inhibition of prepotent response factor; the 
WCST tapped the mental set shifting factor; RNG tapped both the inhibition and updating factor; and 
operation span tapped the updating factor (the dual task tapped none of the factors). The three factors 
were correlated, but not strongly, pointing towards their separability. This indicates that these three 
latent constructs are separable components within the umbrella term of executive function, but that 
there is still some communality amongst them (otherwise there would be no correlations). The study 
also shows that the classic executive tasks do require more than one of the simple executive functions 
identified by the battery of tasks. 
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 Inhibitory control 
Inhibition is the executive function that is the main focus of the current studies. Inhibition is considered 
an executive function, and classic tasks, such as the Stroop task, have been used to measure it. Other 
tasks that have been used to measure inhibition include the go / no go task, stop-signal task, and anti-
saccade tasks. As a counterpart to the fractionation of executive function into simpler components 
(and also with the componential nature of working memory), inhibition has been broken down into 
separate aspects. 
 
Classifications of inhibitory control 
In the adult literature, different classifications of inhibitory control have been used. Nigg (2000) 
classified inhibitory processes into four types of effortful inhibition: i.) interference control, the 
suppression of interference due to resource or stimulus competition; ii.) cognitive inhibition, the 
suppression of irrelevant information from working memory; iii.) behavioural inhibition, the suppression 
of prepotent responses; iv.) oculomotor inhibition, the suppression of reflexive saccades (oculomotor 
inhibition is often associated with behavioural inhibition, but is treated as separate by Nigg). Other 
classifications have come from Harnishfeger (1995) and Dempster (1993). Broadly speaking, their 
classifications follow Nigg’s in the following ways: interference control (Nigg) is equivalent to 
resistance to interference (Harnishfeger) and control of perceptual interference (Dempster). Cognitive 
inhibition (Nigg) is equivalent to the cognitive inhibition of Harnishfeger, and the control of verbal-
linguistic interference of Dempster. Behavioural inhibition (Nigg) is equivalent to the behavioural 
inhibition of Harnishfeger, and the control of motor interference of Dempster. The similarities are not 
absolute, but there is agreement on the existence of and the need to distinguish between distinct 
components of inhibition. The nature of these distinct components of inhibition is also generally 
accepted. 
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 A latent variable analysis of inhibitory control 
Friedman & Miyake (2004) investigated the relationship between three inhibition-related functions, 
defined according to the classification of Nigg (2000). The only difference was that behavioural 
inhibition and oculomotor inhibition were collapsed into one function, termed prepotent response 
inhibition. The other two functions were resistance to distracter interference (similar to interference 
control in Nigg’s model) and resistance to proactive interference (similar to cognitive inhibition in 
Nigg’s model). Based on the need to use latent variable modelling, a set of tasks was chosen to 
measure the three latent variables corresponding to the three proposed inhibition functions (Figure 
2.1). Established tasks were chosen that seemed to fit primarily into one of the three proposed 
inhibitory functions. Three tasks were chosen for each inhibitory function, as this is the recommended 
number of measured indicators (Kline, 2005). Other tasks or constructs thought to involve inhibition-
related functions that were included in the analyses were random number generation, negative 
priming, task-switching abilities, a reading span test, and a series of questionnaires that also 
measured inhibitory control. Two hundred and twenty participants completed all tasks. 
 
The latent variable analysis suggested that the most parsimonious model consisted of two inhibitory 
functions, with the proposed prepotent response inhibition and resistance to distracter interference 
functions being collapsed into one function. This leaves two separable inhibitory functions. The 
collapsed function, termed response-distracter inhibition, was suggested to measure a common ability 
of maintaining the task goal in the face of dominant (and inappropriate) responses present in the 
environment. The other factor resistance to proactive interference was not statistically related to the 
combined response-distracter inhibition factor. This may be because of the different natures of 
interference of the sets of tasks used to measure the inhibitory functions: proactive interference 
corresponded to Nigg’s (2000) cognitive inhibition that was proposed to measure the ability to 
suppress irrelevant information from working memory, whilst both prepotent response inhibition and 
resistance to distracter interference (and hence response-distracter inhibition) measure resistance to 
interference from the environment. Latent variable analysis (and the general approach of structural 
equation modelling) allows for the testing of different models with different configurations of the 
measured tasks on different latent variables. This results in the best model being chosen in terms of 
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theoretical basis, statistical tests and parsimony. An important point for the current study is that the 
authors began with hypotheses about task structures, but were then led by the latent variable 
analyses and theoretical constraints. 
 
The relationship of these two inhibitory functions to the inhibitory tasks again supported the idea of 
there being separable components of inhibition that are able to differentially predict performance on 
different tasks that are thought to involve inhibition. The RNG task was related to response-distracter 
inhibition (but not proactive interference), the task-switching abilities tasks were related to response-
distracter inhibition (again not by proactive interference), and reading span was predicted by proactive 
interference (not by response-director inhibition). There was no relationship between the inhibition 
factors and negative priming, though this was put down to the low reliabilities of the negative priming 
tasks  
 
Although this study was only an initial foray into an individual difference approach to inhibitory 
functions, it does suggest that tasks that are designed to measure inhibition should be at the very least 
reliable. The low reliability of the negative priming task measures indicates that the effect was not 
consistent within the task, which then limited any correlation with other measures. One issue in 
comparing individual differences studies and experimental research in general is reliability. In 
experimental studies, reliability is often not calculated. In individual differences studies reliability 
represents the amount of systematic variance in a measure that can be associated with other 
variables. The lower the reliability, the lower the amount of variance that can be associated with the 
other variables and the lower the potential correlation between the variables (Salthouse, Siedlicki, & 
Krueger, 2006). Therefore low correlations between tasks in individual differences studies may be due 
to the low reliability of the measures, rather than the lack of an actual relationship. 
 
 Output Stage of Processing 
 
 
Relevant responses selected, and 
incorrect ones resisted. 
 
 
Behavioural inhibition (Nigg, 
2000, & Harnishfeger, 1995), and 
control of motor interference 
(Dempster, 1993). 
 
Initial Perceptual Stage of 
Processing 
 
Relevant information selected, 
irrelevant information must be 
ignored. 
 
Interference control (Nigg, 
2000), resistance to 
interference, (Harnishfeger, 
1995) and control of perceptual 
interference (Dempster, 1993). 
Intermediate Level 
 
 
Once information has entered 
working memory 
 
 
Cognitive inhibition (Nigg, 2000, 
& Harnishfeger, 1995), and 
control of verbal-linguistic 
interference (Dempster, 1993). 
Informational Processing of 
Prepotent Response Inhibition 
(c.f. behavioural inhibition and 
oculomotor inhibition, Nigg, 2000) 
 
Antisaccade task (Cue flashes on 
one side of screen, must suppress 
reflexive saccade toward it, and look 
in opposite direction to identify target). 
 
Stop-signal task (built up pre-potent 
response, must withhold response 
when auditory signal). 
 
Stroop task (name colour in which 
colour words and neutral words are 
printed, ignoring dominant tendency 
to read the words). 
Resistance to Distracter 
Interference (c.f. interference 
control, Nigg, 2000): 
 
Eriksen Flanker Task (Identify a 
target letter that is presented either 
alone, or with response-incompatible 
letters flanking it). 
 
Word Naming (Name a green target 
word that is presented either alone or 
with a red distracter word). 
 
Shape Matching (Indicate whether a 
white shape matches a green shape 
that is presented alone or with a red 
distracter shape). 
Resistance to Proactive 
Interference (c.f. cognitive 
inhibition, Nigg, 2000): 
 
Brown-Peterson variant (learn and 
then free recall successive lists of 
words from same category) 
 
AB-AC-AD (learnt list of cue-target 
word pairs to a criterion, must learn 
new list of targets paired with same 
criterion) 
 
Cued recall (View one or two lists of 
four words, must retrieve word on 
most recent list that belongs to cued 
category, ignoring any previous lists). 
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Figure 2.1: Classification of tasks in Friedman & Miyake (2004) 
Formed the latent variable response-distracter inhibition 
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 Selection of inhibitory control tasks 
The relationship between executive function and ToM task performance has been investigated in 
developmental studies, and so the area of investigation for this thesis is the role of executive function 
for ToM performance in adults. Evidence that this relationship exists in adults, together with evidence 
from clinical studies that suggest that language may not be integral to adult ToM performance, would 
indicate a role for executive function in ToM development and beyond, in fully developed ToM use. 
  
Developmental evidence for the role of executive function in ToM task performance found that early 
performance in ‘conflict’ inhibition tasks predicted later ToM performance (Carlson et al., 2002). This 
type of task was acknowledged to also require working memory. Therefore a similar task for adult 
participants would also need to have some level of working memory involvement. The specific point of 
inhibition in conflict inhibition could be at a behavioural level, where the child processes their 
behaviour to the point of execution and then inhibits their response (c.f. motor inhibition or behavioural 
inhibition), or at a cognitive level, where the behaviour is inhibited at some point well before the point 
of execution (once the relevant and irrelevant information has entered working memory). For current 
purposes, these two potential components of inhibition were termed response inhibition and cognitive 
inhibition, and this potential classification of inhibitory control into two separable components has 
some parallel in the two latent variable inhibition model found by Friedman & Miyake (2004) in their 
individual differences study, and also in the classification of inhibitory control components by Nigg 
(2000), Harnishfeger (1995) and Dempster (1993). Response inhibition is an established executive 
function, and is analogous to the behavioural inhibition of Nigg (2000) and Harnishfeger (1995) and 
the control of motor interference of Dempster (1993). Cognitive inhibition was proposed to be 
analogous to the factors of cognitive inhibition (Harnishfeger, 1995; Nigg, 2000), and control of verbal-
linguistic interference (Dempster, 1993). The use of structural equation modelling allows for the initial 
model to be changed and improved by adding or removing tasks from the different latent variables, 
and also by redefining the latent variables in the model (they can also be removed and new ones 
added).  
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 As noted, in latent variable analysis the aim is to choose tasks that share a common variance of the 
theoretical construct of interest, but that differ in their incidental task demands (ideally the common 
variance will only be due to the common underlying theoretical construct and not from having other 
task characteristics in common. Attempting to choose tasks that have different incidental demands, but 
require the same theoretical construct addresses this issue). This analysis addresses the problem of 
individual task impurity as only the common variance is used to estimate the latent variable. The 
unshared variance is represented by separate error variances for each task chosen. This error 
variance also accounts for the differing, and hence unshared, task demands. The number of tasks that 
are used to estimate a latent variable is suggested to be at least three (Kline, 2005), though the more 
that can be used the more powerful the model. This technique also allows the modification of the 
model to improve both the statistical fit and the theoretical basis of the data found.     
 
Therefore there were three tasks chosen to estimate the proposed latent variable of response 
inhibition, and three tasks chosen to measure the proposed latent variable of cognitive inhibition. 
 
Response Inhibition 
Typical response inhibition tasks include the stop-signal task (Schachar, Chen, Logan, Ornstein, 
Crosbie, Ickowicz & Pakulak, 2004), anti-saccade task (Klein & Foerster, 2001), and go / no go task 
(Wager, Sylvester, Lacey, Nee, Franklin & Jonides, 2005).  
 
Go / No Go task 
In the go / no go task, participants are shown serially presented visual stimuli. The stimuli are in two 
categories, go (respond) and no go (not respond). The majority of the stimuli are go stimuli, whilst 
(usually) one is a no go stimulus. The dominant response is therefore to respond, making the 
participant have to inhibit that dominant response when the no go stimulus is presented. In the current 
study, the stimuli were letters, and participants were instructed that they were to respond to all letters 
except the letter ‘K’ by tapping the spacebar.  
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  The mechanism underlying the go no / go task is usually said to be response inhibition (Johnstone, 
Pleffer, Barry, Clarke & Smith, 2005), but more recent evidence has suggested that there may be 
elements of a ‘non-motoric’ stage of inhibition (or cognitive inhibition) as well as response inhibition 
involved. This ‘non-motoric’ or cognitive inhibition may alternatively be a stage at which the need for 
inhibition is identified (Smith, Johnstone & Barry, 2008). The decision to respond or not may also be 
based on the a priori knowledge of the categorical stimuli. It therefore requires decision-making, 
response selection and response inhibition, all high-level cognitive functions assumed to be part of 
executive function abilities. Therefore, compared to the stop-signal and anti-saccade tasks, the go / no 
go task has a lower load on response inhibition but a higher load on response selection (Rubia, 
Russell, Overmeyer, Brammer, Bullmore, Sharma, Simmons, Williams, Giampietro, Andrew & Taylor, 
2000).  
 
Go / No Go task (picture) 
A variation on the go / no go task was developed in order to have a task that required similar 
resources to the go / no go task but had different incidental demands, as per the criteria for the choice 
of tasks in latent variable analysis. As this task relied on similar mechanisms to the go / no go task, it 
is thought that the task would tap response inhibition (Schmitt, Münte & Kutas, 2000), potentially 
together with cognitive inhibition.  
 
Participants were presented with pictures of bird and mammals, and were trained as to what their 
names were. In the task, they were required to differentially respond to bird and animal pictures, but 
were instructed not to respond to those pictures of animals and birds whose names began with a 
vowel. These trials were the no go trials, compared to the pictures that began with a consonant being 
the go trials. This task in particular required response inhibition (to stop any activated response to a no 
go trial), response selection (to decide both which response to use in a go trial with the bird / mammal 
distinction, and whether to respond to a go or no go trial), and working memory (to recall the names of 
the animals in the pictures shown, which would then lead to the response selection). It is likely that the 
categorisation of the image into mammal or bird is available first, followed by the processing of the 
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 initial letter. This would suggest that the go / no go response is based on the initial letter (van 
Turrenout, Hagoort & Brown, 1997). 
 
The picture-based go / no go task has the same underlying paradigm as the go / no go task. The 
various stimuli also have varying responses (name of animal begins with vowel – do not respond; 
name begins with consonant: type of animal: mammal – respond by pressing P; bird – respond by 
pressing Q). The initial decision, perhaps requiring response selection, is whether the animal is a bird 
or mammal. However, response inhibition should be required in order to avoid responding to an animal 
whose name begins with a vowel. 
 
Stop-Signal task 
Participants are shown serially presented visual stimuli, in this case either the letter ‘O’ or the letter ‘X’. 
Their instruction is to respond by pressing the corresponding letter on the keyboard, unless they hear 
a tone, which is presented after the letter is shown. The trials can therefore either be go or stop trials. 
In a go trial the letter is presented on the screen until the participant responds. In a stop trial a tone is 
presented a short time after the letter is shown. The majority of trials are go trials, so the dominant 
response is to respond. The participant has to inhibit that response on the presentation of the tone. 
 
The interval between the presentation of the letter and the presentation of the tone in the stop trials is 
varied by the accuracy of the participant. If the participant correctly inhibits their response in a stop 
trial, the interval between letter and tone presentation is increased in the next stop trial. If the 
participant incorrectly responds, that interval is decreased. Therefore the interval will initially vary, but 
will eventually oscillate around the interval at which the participant successfully inhibits 50% of the 
time on the stop trials. 
 
The stop trials in a stop-signal task require participants to inhibit an already activated motor response 
(Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian & Robbins, 2003), as the stop-signal is given shortly after the 
stimuli (or go signal) is presented (the go signal needs to be converted into a no go signal), which is 
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 the definition of response inhibition. Any errors made would be due to not being able to stop the 
dominant response. Therefore the theoretical construct underlying this task may be response 
inhibition. 
 
Cognitive Inhibition 
This was based on the idea of cognitive inhibition being used at the stage at which the information to 
be processed has entered working memory (whether relevantly or irrelevantly), The choice of tasks to 
measure this potential latent variable were a cued recall task (Tolan & Tehan, 1999), a Simon task 
(Peterson, Kane, Alexander, Lacadie, Skudlarski, Leung, May & Gore, 2002), and a shape-matching 
task (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996). The choice of tasks was also informed by those used by 
Friedman & Miyake (2004).  
 
Cued Recall task 
For the cued recall task participants were required to recall a target word from the second of two lists 
of four words when prompted by a cue word. In interference trials, there was a foil word in the first list 
which was also a (better) match to the cue word – therefore to respond to the cue word correctly with 
the target word, participants need to inhibit the irrelevant foil word (or deal with the interference caused 
by the irrelevant information of the foil word).  
 
More specifically, the cued recall task presented participants with two lists of words, from which they 
were then cued to recall a word at the end of each trial (after a distraction task). The first list of words 
was read aloud, and the second set silently, followed by a distraction task. The participants were 
instructed to recall the relevant cued word from the most recent (therefore silently read) block. In the 
experimental trials the cue referred to the target word in the silent block, but also to an intrusion word 
in the (first) aloud block. The intrusion word was always a more common example of the cue category 
than the target word.  
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 The presentation modality of the two word list may have an affect on recall ability. The ‘aloud’ and then 
‘silent’ modality of the two lists should result in the maximum interference (Tolan & Tehan, 1999). 
There was also a distraction task between the final list and the cue (and recall position), which may 
have had an effect on the two word lists. The original paper suggests that short-term recall (as 
measured by this task) relies on phonological codes. The data suggests that input through auditory 
representations (rather than through visual pathways, as in the silent condition for the second word 
list) results in stronger phonological representations. This suggests that the phonological 
representation of the foil survives distracter activity when the foil is read aloud (as compared to their 
conditions where the foil was sometimes read silently), resulting in greater interference. The (verbal) 
distracter task resulted in increased degradation of the phonological traces of both the target and foil 
words, increasing interference for both. Much literature would suggest that the inhibitory construct 
tapped by this task is therefore resistance to proactive interference (from the foil word; Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004), also termed cognitive inhibition (Nigg, 2000).   
 
However, a more recent study investigated the use of controlled and automatic processes in a cued 
recall task. The proactive interference between the foil and target words was said to be at an 
automatic level, and that this could be resolved using an automatic process (an age invariant process) 
but also with a controlled process that was used by younger participants (as in this sample). The 
nature of the controlled process is not clear, but may involve the selection of the target item, potentially 
through the suppression of the foil item (Ikier, Yang & Hasher, 2008). This may rely on response 
selection. 
 
Simon task 
In the Simon task participants were instructed to respond to the orientation (either left or right) of an 
arrow stimulus, not to the spatial position (the arrow was presented on either the left or the right of a 
central fixation point). The participants needed to maintain the task requirement of responding to the 
arrow orientation, and ignore / inhibit any interference from the irrelevant information from the arrow 
position. Response inhibition may be required to stop any response to arrow position before arrow 
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 direction can be processed. However, there should be a level of cognitive inhibition required in order to 
maintain focus on processing arrow direction and to (cognitively) ignore processing the arrow position 
(ignoring/inhibiting irrelevant information). 
 
Studies have indicated that the functions associated with the resolving of the interference between 
irrelevant and task-relevant features are varied in nature. Sensory processing and response 
processing regions are both involved in a network of regions across the brain (Peterson et al., 2002), 
so therefore there may be a role for both dealing with cognitive interference and for response 
inhibition. Other studies have found that the mechanisms underlying cognitive interference in the 
Simon task and response inhibition in the stop-signal task may be similar (Verbruggen, Liefooghe, 
Notebaert & Vandierendonck, 2005). It has been suggested that in the Simon task, the irrelevant 
features automatically activate responses through a direct route, whilst the task-relevant features 
activate the correct response through a controlled route. To respond correctly participants must 
actively suppress the incorrect response (Ridderinkhoff cited in Wittfoth, Buck, Fahle & Herrman, 
2006), implying that response inhibition may be required. Response selection may also play a role in 
this task. It has been cited primarily as a function required by the go / no go task (Rubia et al., 2000), 
but is based on the participant having a priori knowledge of the (categorical) stimuli. In the Simon task, 
the instructions state which domain the participant should attend to, and also which one they should 
ignore. This could be said to be analogous to the go / no go task conditions of go and no go.   
 
Shape Matching task 
The shape-matching task required participants to judge if a white and a green shape matched, or 
whether they did not. For half of these trials, a red shape was also present, superimposed on top of 
the green shape. The red shape therefore acted as a distracter to the main green shape. The 
participant needed to deal with any interference from the red distracter shape in order to correctly 
respond with the matching decision between the green and white shape. The shape-matching task 
aimed to measure resistance to distracters and resistance to inappropriate responses. This was 
achieved by presenting participants with a matching decision to make on a pair of shapes (the 
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 decision was whether a green shape matched the white target shape). Half the trials also presented a 
third (red) shape superimposed on one of the pair, acting as a distracter. The distracter shape 
matched the target shape when the green shape did not. In these trials participants needed to process 
the green shape whilst ignoring the red distracter shape. They may have also needed to deal with any 
ongoing interference from the distracter shape, which would require cognitive inhibition. This was 
anticipated to be harder to deal with when the distracter shape matched the target than when it did 
not.  
 
Inhibition has been linked to processing distracter shapes (in ignoring them), but in anti-saccade tasks 
where they were presented prior to the critical trial (Crawford, Hill & Higham, 2005), but there is some 
support for the role of inhibition in the suppression of inappropriate processes by a distracter, and also 
in actively keeping distracters from interfering with target shapes (Endo, Saiki & Sato, 2001). 
Therefore there may be an element of active suppression of interference, which could be analogous to 
cognitive interference, but also an element of suppression of incorrect responses due to the distracter, 
which is more characteristic of response inhibition. Response selection may also be involved in order 
to determine the particular shape to attend to or process. 
 
Summary 
The response inhibition tasks all fall into the behavioural / control of motor interference categories of 
Nigg, Harnishfeger and Dempster respectively. The cognitive inhibition tasks do not fall as neatly into 
one category. The Simon and shape-matching tasks could be classified as requiring interference 
control / resistance to interference / control of perceptual interference, which, in Friedman & Miyake’s 
study, was collapsed with the response inhibition factor to form a response-distracter inhibition factor. 
The cued recall task fits into the cognitive inhibition category of Nigg and Harnishfeger, and the control 
of verbal-linguistic interference of Dempster. There is therefore some ambiguity about the exact 
classification of the cognitive inhibition tasks from this battery. The deciding element on this 
classification was the point at which the inhibitory process was thought to occur. In the Simon and 
shape-matching tasks it was thought that the participants would deal with any interference (from 
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 position and distracter respectively) before they responded, thereby making the point at which they 
dealt with this interference not at the point of motor response or behavioural response, so not 
response inhibition either. Therefore they were classed together with the cued recall task as cognitive 
inhibition tasks. The cued recall task, the most typical cognitive inhibition task, may tap a process by 
which the utterance of the foil word needs to be inhibited at the point of recall. If this is the case, then 
the process would be similar to that of response inhibition, and so would load onto the same latent 
variable as the other tasks, as is the case.  
 
This means that even though all of these tasks are proposed to require either response inhibition or 
cognitive inhibition as their primary resource, they all almost certainly require other resources in 
addition to either response or cognitive inhibition, and may require both response and cognitive 
inhibition in differing amounts. They are therefore multi-component tasks, as are most executive 
function tasks, and this may mean that their current classification may not be the optimum one. The 
executive function(s) that they require will also depend on the measures that are used in the modelling 
stage. The patterns of covariance may suggest alternate classifications using different theoretical 
constructs to response inhibition and cognitive inhibition, such as response selection (as required by 
the go / no go tasks), and latent variable analysis allows this flexibility in modifying a model to best fit 
the existing data (whilst maintaining a sound theoretical basis). 
 
Overview 
 
Executive function has been related to theory of mind in both developmental literature and in clinical 
studies. The developmental literature suggests that inhibition and working memory are linked to later 
theory of mind performance, especially in false belief tasks. This literature also found that tasks that 
tapped a construct termed as conflict inhibition, perhaps due to their additional requirements for 
working memory, were the best predictors of later false belief performance. However, the inhibitory 
constructs that relate to ToM in the developmental literature are likely to be too easy for adult 
participants. Therefore the adult literature on inhibition and executive function was examined. 
Individual differences approaches using SEM have started to be used in these studies as a way of 
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 using statistically pure measures of the theoretical constructs of interest (and hence avoiding 
measurement error). Therefore this approach was used in the current study to enable pure measures 
of executive function and theory of mind to be used to estimate potential relationships between the 
two. The classifications of inhibitory control in the adult literature are varied, but there is consensus on 
the notion of response inhibition. Cognitive inhibition has also been defined as the inhibition of task-
irrelevant stimuli from working memory (Harnishfeger, 1995). Conceptually this seems similar to the 
processes involved in conflict inhibition tasks in the developmental literature, as there are elements of 
working memory and inhibitory control involved. Therefore the two components, the established 
construct of response inhibition and the construct of cognitive inhibition that appears conceptually 
similar to the construct of conflict inhibition that was related to false belief performance in children 
were chosen for the individual differences model. 
 
Tasks were chosen that tapped these two constructs. Comparisons were made with the more 
established classifications to inform the choice of these tasks, and decisions were made based on the 
conceptual nature of the tasks, as well as any existing literature on the tasks themselves. In all cases 
the executive tasks were designed for the current study, but were based on tasks used in existing 
literature. 
 
The relationship between the executive tasks was investigated using SEM (with a maximum likelihood 
method). This allowed the identification of a reliable and valid inhibitory factor structure. The ToM 
measured indicators were then examined and used to create specific latent variables. The 
relationships between the inhibitory factors and these ToM latent variables were then investigated 
using SEM. The validity of these relationships was then tested by looking at any differences in 
performance in high and low ability inhibitory control groups (from the same individual differences 
sample). This would also show if good inhibitory control resulted in ‘perfect’ ToM. As the individual 
differences model can not show whether any relationships found are indicative of inhibitory control 
actually being necessary for ToM (it only shows that there is a potentially non-causal relationship), a 
dual-task study was then used. This would show whether inhibitory control is necessary for ToM by 
utilising an inhibitory control secondary task with the same two (primary) ToM tasks from the individual 
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differences model. The pattern of results could also show whether inhibitory control was involved in 
the specific aspect of taking a perspective, a finding that could show evidence of a cognitively efficient 
aspect of ToM (compared to ToM that has been found to be related to executive function in 
developmental, adult and clinical samples). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3. Method for individual differences study 
The individual differences study consisted of eight separate tasks that participants completed over two 
separate sessions, with four tasks in each. The three tasks defined as requiring cognitive inhibition are 
detailed first, followed by the three requiring response inhibition. This is according to the initial 
definition of the tasks. The methodologies of the two ToM target tasks follow together with the task 
order and the rationale for that order. 
 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty-four university student participants took part in the study for course credits or 
the equivalent cash payment. Participant age ranged from 17 to 44, with a mean of 21.8 years and a 
standard deviation of 4.4 years. Written consent was gained from all participants. Thirty-one were 
male, and 123 were female, and 147 were right-handed and seven left-handed (two of whom used 
their right hand normally). 
 
Apparatus 
All the experiments were designed and presented on a 15-inch Samsung SyncMaster 793s monitor 
connected to a 3.00 GHz Pentium based desktop PC using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider, Eschmann & 
Zuccolotto, 2002) or DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003). A standard 102 keyboard was also used for 
responses. A response sheet and pen were used to record the data from the cued recall task. 
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 Cognitive Inhibition tasks 
Cued Recall Task Methodology 
Design 
The cued recall task, based on the study of Tolan & Tehan (1999), presented the participant with 
blocks of four serially presented words shown at a rate of one word per second. A distracter task was 
then presented: this was a magnitude judgement task consisting of eight serially presented two digit 
numbers (presented at a rate of one per second) about which the participant had to judge aloud 
whether they were above or below 50. After the distracter task, a cue word was presented, and 
participants were asked to recall one of the words from a block. This could be from the only block of 
the trial (filler trials) or from the second block of two (where the first block acted as a distracter in 
experimental trials, but did not in control trials). 
 
Block 1 (read aloud): 
    
Time 
Block 2 (read silently): 
    
Distracter task 
Cue: 
 
Figure 3.1: Cued Recall experimental trial (for the purposes of illustration, the blue border indicates foil word, and the 
red border indicates target word; these borders were not present in experimental stimuli) 
 
The critical words in a trial were exemplars of a category, and the cue word provided a label for that 
category. In the experimental trials there was both a target word and a foil word from the same word 
category. The cue to recall therefore related to both the target and the foil words. The target word was 
in the second block, while the foil word was in the first block. The foil was always the more common 
instance of that word category (see Figure 3.1: foil = blue border, target = red border). All the words 
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 used are shown in Appendix A. Therefore the correct response is to recall the target word, and to 
inhibit the more common foil word (Tolan & Tehan, 1999). In the control trials, there was no foil 
present in the first block to interfere with the recall of the target. 
 
The experiment consisted of 10 one block filler trials and 40 two block trials. In creating the trials for 
each subject, the target and foil were first randomly assigned to the different running versions (filler, 
control and interference trials). In both the two block trial types (20 interference and 20 control) the 
target and foil were placed within the randomly selected filler words to create two four-word blocks. For 
the 20 control trials the interfering foil was replaced by a filler item, so that the target was the only 
instance of the category in the list. On the interference trials, foil and target always appeared in the 
same serial position (on half the trials in position 2 and on the other half in position 3) in their 
respective blocks. For the control trials the target word was placed in the second block, position 2 in 
half the trials and second block, position 3 in half the trials. The ALOUD block always came before the 
SILENT block in order to increase interference in recalling the target word. This was followed by the 
distracter task and then the cue word. Trials were presented in a pseudo-random order with the 
constraint that there were no more than three of the same type of trial in a row, and that the blocks 
could not start with an interference trial. 
 
Procedure 
This task was presented using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider et al., 2002). Participants were instructed to 
remember only the most recent block, but were not told if the trials were two block or one block trials. 
They followed an on-screen instruction on how to read it (ALOUD or SILENT). Before the first block’s 
reading instruction (ALOUD) appeared on screen, a READY prompt was shown on-screen for two 
seconds. The one-block trials were read ALOUD, the first block of the two block trials was read 
ALOUD, and the second block of the two block trials was read as SILENT. The distraction task was 
given before the cue was shown. After the distraction task, the cue was presented on-screen for five 
seconds, during which time they had to recall the correct item. 
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 The dependent measure was the number of correct control trials minus the number of correct 
interference trials. This was chosen because the number of correct control trials was taken to be the 
measure of the participants’ general recall ability (dealing with the interference caused by the mixed 
(ALOUD and SILENT) presentation modality, and the additional interference caused by the verbal 
modality of the distracter task). The interference trials additionally had pro-active interference from the 
foil word in the first block. The measure of participants’ ability to deal with this pro-active interference 
alone was therefore the difference between their performance on control and interference trials. The 
number of omissions in either trial type was not taken into account by this measure, and this simplified 
interpretation of the measure because omissions have more than one interpretation. In an interference 
trial an omission could be due to the participant not knowing the target or foil word, or due to them not 
knowing the target word but knowing the foil word and being unwilling to say it. The control trial 
omissions are more likely to be due to forgetting the target word, though there is still the potential for 
not responding due to recall of a knowingly incorrect filler word. Due to these potential ambiguities in 
the reasons for omissions, it was decided to omit them from the measure. 
 
Simon Task Methodology 
Design 
The original findings on the Simon effect were published by Simon and Wolf (1963). The current task 
was based on the experiment presented by Peterson et al. (2002). In this task, the participant was 
shown horizontally-orientated arrows (left or right), presented on the left or right of central fixation point 
on a screen. Participants were instructed to respond left or right, according to the orientation of the 
arrows, not their position. The arrow position is visually more salient than the arrow orientation. 
Therefore responding to the orientation requires the inhibition of any response to the position. The 
majority of trials were congruent (left-pointing arrow appeared on the left of the screen, right-pointing 
arrow appeared on the right of the screen), whilst a minority were incongruent. 
 
The task consisted of four blocks of 102 trials each, totalling 408 trials overall. There were equal 
amounts of left and right arrows. In terms of trial types, there were a total of 328 congruent trials and 
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 80 incongruent trials. In each block there were 20 incongruent trials (equal left and right) and 82 
incongruent trials (equal left and right). The order of the incongruent and congruent trials was fixed in a 
pseudo-random sequence. The incongruent trials were balanced in terms of the direction of the arrow 
in the trial immediately preceding (half the incongruent trials were preceded by an arrow of the same 
orientation, but in a congruent position, and half were preceded by an arrow of the opposite 
orientation, in the congruent position). There were also no more than three arrows of the same 
orientation in a row (regardless of congruency).  
Procedure 
This task was presented using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider et al., 2002). Participants were instructed to 
respond to the orientation of the arrow (left or right) and to ignore the position of the arrow. The trials 
began with a fixation point on-screen for 200ms, followed by the arrow for a maximum of 1300ms, or 
until a response was made, upon which time the fixation point was presented again (to start the next 
trial). 
 
Other studies (Kumada & Humphreys, 2002; Peterson et al., 2002) investigating the Simon effect have 
compared the RTs on the congruent and incongruent trials as a basis for their results, but as this study 
is using an individual differences approach, a single measure was needed. The difference between 
incongruent and congruent trials was taken to be a measure of any inhibitory processing cost present 
only in the incongruent trials (any processing cost common to the incongruent and congruent trials 
would be accounted for). 
 
Shape-Matching Task Methodology 
Design 
The experiment of DeSchepper and Treisman (1996) was used as the basis for this task. Participants 
were shown a green-outlined shape (acting as a target) and a white-outlined shape, presented on a 
black screen. The participant had to decide whether the white shape matched the target green shape 
(see Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 & 3.5). 
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Figure 3.2: No distracter, Match trial 
 
Figure 3.3: Distracter, Match trial 
 
Figure 3.4: No distracter, No Match trial 
 
Figure 3.5: Distracter, No Match trial 
 
 
In the experimental trials, a red-outlined shape is also presented directly on top of the green target, 
thereby partially occluding it. The red shape acted as a distracter (from the target shape). Any 
processes involving the distracter shape needed to be inhibited in order to correctly match the green 
and target shapes. 
 
The shapes used were taken from DeSchepper and Treisman (1996), and consisted of eight random 
shapes. There were eight green shapes, eight red shapes and eight white shapes (see Appendix A). 
The number of times each type of shape occurred was balanced across the task. There were a total of 
112 trials, 56 distracter trials and 56 no-distracter trials. Of the distracter trials, 28 were matching trials 
(green shape = white shape, correct response = yes; Figure 3.3) and 28 were non-matching trials (red 
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 shape = white shape, correct response = no; Figure 3.5). For the no-distracter trials, half were 
matching trials (Figure 3.2) and half were non-matching trials (Figure 3.4). The task was split into four 
blocks of 28 trials, of which half were distracter trials (half of which were matching, half non-matching), 
and half were non-distracter trials (half matching, half non-matching). The constraints were that no 
block began with a matching trial, and there were never more than three of any trial type in a row. 
There were also no more than three trials in a row in which the same type of shape was presented (in 
any colour). 
 
Procedure 
This task was presented using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider et al., 2002). Participants were instructed to 
decide whether the green (target) shape matched the white shape. They were told to ignore the red 
(distracter) shape when it was present. Each trial had the following procedure: the participants were 
presented with a READY prompt to which they had to respond to in order to proceed. A blank screen 
was then shown for 1100ms, followed by a fixation point for another 500ms. The shapes were then 
presented until the participant responded. Then another blank screen was shown for 100ms, upon 
which the READY prompt appeared for the start of the next trial. The measure used was the difference 
in reaction times between the distracter no-match (Figure 3.5) and the no distracter match (Figure 3.2) 
conditions. This was because in the distracter no match condition, the distracter matched the white 
shape, thus increasing potential interference for the condition. The distracter match condition was 
considered to be the simplest condition, with the least potential interference. Therefore the difference 
in response time between these conditions should give a measure of the maximum interference 
caused by the distracter shape. The use of a response time difference between conditions as a 
measure is similar to that used by both DeSchepper and Triesman (1996) and Friedman and Miyake 
(2004). 
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 Response Inhibition tasks 
Go / No Go Task 
Design 
The task was based on the experiment by Wager et al. (2005). Participants were shown serially 
presented letters on-screen that they were required to respond to by pressing the spacebar (go trials). 
This was the requirement for all letters except for the letter K (which was a no go trial).  
 
The experiment consisted of eight blocks of 65 experimental trials (each block also had an additional 
five trials at the start that were eliminated in analyses as practice trials – this was an attempt to avoid 
any possible learning effects at the start of each block). There were either eight or 10 no go (K) trials in 
each block, and hence 57 or 55 go trials in each block. Overall there were 72 no go trials, and 448 go 
trials. The low percentage (13.85%) of no go trials should accentuate the dominant tendency to 
respond to all trials, so increasing the likelihood of errors in responses to the no go trials. No letter was 
preceded by itself and no block could start with a no go trial.  
 
Procedure 
This task was presented using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider et al., 2002). Participants viewed a series of 
letters presented on a computer screen to which they had to respond to (by pressing the spacebar). 
They were instructed to respond to all letters except for the letter K. If the participant responded 
incorrectly to the letter K, a tone would be heard. Each trial consisted of an initial fixation cross for 
250ms, followed by a letter. Each letter remained on-screen for 500ms, or until the participant 
responded.  
 
The standard measure used in the task was the number of times that the participants incorrectly 
responded when the letter K was presented on-screen (the false alarm rate, or FAR). This measured 
the participants’ ability to inhibit the dominant (go) response when shown a no go (K) trial. 
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 Go / No Go Picture Methodology 
Design 
This task was based on the study of Schmitt et al. (2000). Participants were shown images of either 
birds or mammals. If the image was a bird, the participant was instructed to respond by pressing the Q 
key; if the image was a mammal they were instructed to respond by pressing the P key. The go / no go 
decision to respond or not was based on the initial letter of the name of the animal: if the name began 
with a consonant, the participant was instructed to respond, and if it began with a vowel, they were 
instructed not to respond. The assumption was that when the image is shown to a participant, the 
semantic information (the bird or mammal category) was available before the phonological or 
orthographical information (the initial letter). The Q / P response would then be available before the 
point of deciding to respond (go) or not (no go), and so the decision to respond or not would be based 
on the initial letter of the name of the animal in the image (van Turrenout et al., 1997). As the majority 
of the animal’s names began with a consonant, to which participants had been instructed to respond, 
the dominant response was to respond. Therefore when an image whose initial letter was a vowel was 
presented, to which they had been instructed to not respond, participants had to inhibit that dominant 
response, which required response inhibition. The possible images were as in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1  
Image Types 
Image Consonant / Vowel Correct Response Trial Type 
Consonant P Go Mammal 
Vowel None No go 
Consonant Q Go Bird Vowel None No go 
 
The task was composed of eight blocks of either 22 or 23 trials (a total of 180 trials). In a block four or 
five trials were no go trials, and the rest go trials. Overall (and as much as possible within blocks) the 
numbers of bird images and mammal images were balanced: there were a total of 45 bird images and 
45 mammal images. Of the 45 bird images, 36 began with consonants, and nine began with vowels. 
The same was true of the 45 mammal images. Images were repeated twice within the experiment (but 
never in the same block). There were no more than three trials in a row of the same image type (bird 
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 or mammal). The initial three trials in each block were removed from the actual analyses as practice 
trials as an attempt to lessen any learning effect. The images used can be seen in Appendix A. 
 
Procedure 
This task was presented using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider et al., 2002). The participants were shown 
(serially) all the images of birds and mammals, together with their names, at the start of the 
experiment (each image remained on-screen until the participant pressed a key). They were then 
shown the images again, in a different order, for 3000ms, in which time they were instructed to name 
each image. This was done in order for errors made in the actual experiment to be attributable to 
inhibition errors rather than due to simply not knowing the names of the animals (pilot work1 had 
already established that most people were familiar with the mammals and birds used). During the 
experiment the images were presented on-screen for 750ms, or until the participant responded. If the 
participant responded incorrectly (by responding to a mammal as a bird, or to a bird as a mammal, or 
by responding at all to an image whose name began with a vowel), then a tone was heard. The 
measure taken was the false alarm rate (as in the normal go / no go task) of response to no go trials 
(images beginning with a vowel). 
 
Stop-Signal Task 
Design 
The task was based on the task of Schachar et al. (2004). The procedure consisted of presenting 
stimuli to the participant, who had to respond by pressing the appropriate key. The main instruction 
was to respond to all trials, apart from those in which a tone was presented at an interval (delay) after 
the stimuli was shown. For these trials the instruction was not to respond. 
 
                                                 
1 28 participants were tested on the battery of executive function tasks. As part of this, they were 
asked to rate the familiarity of the names of the animals they were shown in the go / no go (picture) 
task. 
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 The stimuli were X and O, and the response was to press the X (for X) or O (for O) key in response. 
The normal response trials had no tone, and are referred to as go trials. The trials that contained a 
tone are referred to as the X or O stimuli stop trials, in that these are the trials in which the participant 
had to inhibit their initiated response to the X or O stimuli. The tone delay (the time between the 
appearance of the stimuli and the presentation of the tone) was varied according to the response to 
the previous stop trial. The initial delay was 250ms, which was increased by 50ms in the next trial if 
the subject correctly inhibited their response on the trial, or was decreased by 50ms in the next trial if 
the subject incorrectly responded to the trial. This was termed a ‘dynamic tracking procedure’ by 
Schachar et al. (2004), in that if the subject was not responding correctly, the tone delay would 
decrease until the subject began correctly (not) responding on stop trials, and would increase if they 
were correctly (not) responding until they made an error and responded on stop trials. This dynamic 
tracking allowed the inhibition demands to be kept relatively constant across the experiment. 
 
The number of X and O stimuli was balanced (in both go and stop trials, and hence overall). Out of a 
total of 256 trials, 64 (25%) were stop trials, and 75% were go trials. The trials were divided into eight 
blocks, each with eight stop trials and 24 go trials.  
 
Procedure 
This task was presented using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider et al., 2002). Each trial proceeded in the 
following way: an initial fixation point was presented for 500ms. The stimulus was then shown on-
screen for a period of 1000ms, or until the participant responded. After the stimulus screen, a blank 
screen was shown for 2000ms, or until the participant responded. This gave a total time of 3000ms for 
the participant to respond. The tone was heard in stop trials at a variable delay after the initial 
presentation of the stimulus. 
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Figure 3.6: Changes in tone delay through trials 
Figure 3.6 is an illustration of how tone delay would initially change in one direction, before reaching a 
stable alternation about the subjects’ mean delay score. 
 
The standard measure used in most stop-signal tasks is that of Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) 
which is calculated by subtracting the median tone delay (of the stop trials) from the median reaction 
time to the go trials, thereby giving:  
SSRT = median Go RT – median Stop RT 
 
Theory of Mind target tasks 
Keysar Task 
Design 
This task modifies the experiment of Keysar et al. (2003) by being created on a computer, with no 
subsequent need for an actual confederate (Apperly, et al., submitted). The participant was shown a 
grid containing several objects. An instructor (a sprite located to behind and to the right of the grid) 
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 gave the participant instructions to move individual objects around the grid. The participant was 
required to follow the instructions by clicking on the appropriate object using the mouse provided, and 
then pretending to move it as instructed (Figure 3.7). 
  
Each grid had five slots that were covered on the instructor’s side, so objects located in these covered 
slots were not visible from the instructor’s perspective. In an experimental grid, a critical instruction 
was given by the instructor that could refer to a target object (mutually visible to the participant and 
instructor), or to a competitor object (located in one of the covered slots, and so visible only to the 
participant). In order to choose the correct (target) object, the participant needed to consider the 
instructor’s perspective. The remaining objects in the grid were unrelated. In the equivalent control 
grids, the competitor object was replaced by another unrelated object. 
 
There were two separate types of experimental trials. In ambiguous experimental trials, the object 
referred to in the critical instruction could either be the target object or the competitor object (‘mouse’ 
could refer to a mouse or a computer mouse). In these trials the instruction given by the instructor 
could refer to both competitor and target objects, which could prompt the participant to notice the 
ambiguity, and then, perhaps, to solve it by taking into account the instructor’s perspective. By failing 
these trials participants are still failing to take into account the instructor’s perspective and so failing to 
use ToM. 
 
In relational experimental trials the object was defined by its size or position that differed for the 
participant and the instructor. This was done by having three objects of differing sizes or positions 
visible to the participant, only two of which were visible to the instructor. Therefore the third object 
visible only to the participant was always the competitor object (Figure 3.7). In the relational trials, the 
competitor object fitted the instructions best if the participant did not take into account the instructor’s 
perspective. In order to follow the instruction correctly, participants needed to consider the instructors 
perspective. Any errors made should be attributable to the participant not taking into account the point 
of view and knowledge of the instructor, and hence not using and relying on their ToM (for example 
moving the golf ball rather than the tennis ball in Figure 3.7).  
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 There were a total of 32 grids, each with four x four slots, five of which were occluded from the point of 
view of the instructor. The remaining 11 slots were visible to both the participant and the instructor. 
There were four different patterns of occluded slots in the grid, and every grid contained eight items. 
Half the grids were experimental, and these all had an equivalent control grid. The critical instruction 
was the same for equivalent grids. There were a total of 105 instructions across the 32 grids. The 
number of instructions (including critical) for each grid varied between three and five, and the position 
of the critical instruction also varied, between first and fourth. The number of instructions and the 
position of the critical instruction were identical for equivalent experimental and control grids. No more 
than two experimental or control grids were presented in a row (and then were of different slot 
patterns). 
 
Procedure 
This task was presented using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider et al., 2002). The participants were instructed to 
follow the instructions of the instructor in moving objects around each grid, and were told that the 
instructor did not know what was behind in the covered slots (instructions are in Appendix A). This was 
shown by an example grid viewed from both the participants’ view, and also from the instructor’s view. 
As they had been shown an example of the instructor’s view, they had the explicit knowledge that the 
instructor had a different perspective to their own. Therefore, any mistakes in the experimental 
conditions should be attributable to not taking the instructor’s perspective into account when 
interpreting his utterance and choosing which object to move. The measures used in the task were the 
number of errors made in relational trials and the number of errors made in ambiguous trials. 
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 Competitor item: golf ball (experimental grid)   Control item (control grid) 
                           
   
 
   Target item (tennis ball) 
Figure 3.7: Example grid for a relational grid of the Keysar task 
Critical instruction: Move the small ball down one slot 
In the experimental grid, the smallest ball from the participant’s viewpoint is the competitor item (golf 
ball), but the target item (the smallest ball from the director’s viewpoint) is the tennis ball. 
 
In the control grid, the smallest ball from the participant viewpoint is the target item (tennis ball), which 
is the same as for the director. 
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 Visual Perspective task 
Design 
This task investigated ToM processing (Samson et al., submitted). Participants saw an image of a 
room, with an avatar standing in the center. Red circles were pinned on the walls (stimuli were created 
using the 3D animation program Poser 6, © Curious Lab). The circles were pinned on the left or the 
right wall (with a total of zero to three circles) and the avatar faced either the left or the right wall. In 
half of the trials the avatar and the participants could see the same amount of circles (consistent 
perspective condition, see Figure 3.8) and on the other half of the trials they saw a different amount of 
circles (inconsistent perspective condition, see Figure 3.9). Female participants were presented with a 
female avatar and male participants were presented with a male avatar.     
  
Figure 3.8: Consistent perspective  Figure 3.9: Inconsistent perspective 
There was a total of 96 matching trials: 48 trials in which participants were asked to verify their own 
perspective (with 24 consistent perspective trials and 24 inconsistent perspective trials) and 48 trials in 
which participants were asked verify the avatar’s perspective (with 24 consistent perspective trials and 
24 inconsistent perspective trials). In addition to these 96 test trials, 96 mismatching filler trials were 
included (with the same distribution as for test trials) as well as 16 additional anti-strategy filler trials 
(eight matching and eight mismatching in which no circles were pinned on the wall). The 208 items 
were split into four blocks of 52 items 
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 Procedure 
This task was presented with DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003). Participants were cued with a verbal 
perspective description that informed them which perspective to take (“you” versus “he”/”she”) and 
which perspective content to verify (i.e. a number between zero and three) before being shown the 
image. They were then asked to decide whether the cue information matched the relevant content 
shown in the image. In half of the trials, the cue matched the image and on the other half the cue did 
not match the image. An initial fixation cross was on-screen for 750ms, followed by the cues, also on-
screen for 750ms. The gap in between fixation and cues was 500ms. The following picture remained 
on-screen until the participant responded. If no response was received within 2000ms of the picture 
being on-screen, the trial was recorded as no response. 
 . 
It was expected that the processing of either perspective (avatar or self) would be affected by 
interference from the other perspective – that participants would be unable to stop processing the 
irrelevant perspective (Samson et al., submitted). Therefore there were two measures for this task. 
The first was the difference in reaction time between the consistent and inconsistent conditions for the 
self perspective trials. This gave a measure of the degree of interference of the avatar’s perspective to 
the processing of the self perspective. The second measure was the difference in reaction time 
between the consistent and inconsistent conditions for the other perspective. This gave a measure of 
the degree of interference of the self perspective to the processing of the other perspective. 
 
Task order 
The order of the tasks was fixed so that participants were exposed to identical stimulus contexts, 
where the context includes both the actual stimuli, but also the order in which they were presented. 
This is standard practice in individual differences research (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 
2004; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah & Hegarty, 
2001). This is because the correlations between tasks in one task order may not be the same as in a 
different task order, so calculating the overall correlation from these values may result in a different 
value than either of the sub-correlations. Not counter-balancing the task orders in an individual-
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 differences study avoids this problem (though the task order chosen may have different correlation 
values compared to an alternative task order). 
 
The task order was also constrained by there being no more than two of each type of task (cognitive 
inhibition, response inhibition, theory of mind) in a row. This was because of the possibility that there is 
a limited, finite pool of resource for executive components, especially for inhibition (Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000), so if several of the same type of task were completed one after another, the final 
task may be affected by the lack of response inhibition capability left to the participant, thereby not 
giving a true measure of their actual response inhibition capacity. Therefore the overall task order was 
as follows: 
 
Go / No Go Task (response inhibition) 
 
Simon Task (cognitive inhibition) 
 
Visual Perspective Task (ToM) 
  
Shape-Matching Task (cognitive inhibition) 
 
Go / No Go Task (response inhibition)* 
 
Stop-signal Task (response inhibition) 
 
Keysar Task (ToM) 
 
Go / No Go (picture) Task (response inhibition) 
 
Cued Recall Task (cognitive inhibition) 
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* This was a repeat of the first task in the session. This is being included to compare performance at 
the start to the end of the session, to see the effect of a.) fatigue on performance, and also b.) the 
possibility of the reduction in the resource of self-control affecting performance by the end of the 
session. The varying changes in performance for each participant can be compared to see if the effect 
over the session is a common one or not.  
 
The tasks were split into two sessions. The first session lasted for approximately 70 minutes and 
consisted of the Go / No Go, Simon, Visual-Perspective and Shape-Matching tasks, as well as the 
repeat of the Go / No Go task. The second session lasted for approximately 90 minutes and consisted 
of the Stop-Signal, Keysar, Go / No Go (picture) and Cued Recall tasks. There were breaks within 
each task and between each task, so that participants were not tested continuously for the period of 
the sessions. Participants did the sessions on the same day (with a break between them) or on 
separate days (maximum gap between sessions was three weeks).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. Individual Task Results 
Initial data screening 
The data screening process consisted of several steps. The following steps were adapted from those 
used by Friedman and Miyake (2004) and Oberauer (2005) in order to reduce the effect of any 
extreme response time values on the mean.  
 
The critical dependent variables of the various tasks were calculated, and any values more than three 
standard deviations above or below the task mean were replaced by the cut-off value (of three 
standard deviations above or below the mean). All pairwise plots were then examined for nonlinearity 
and heteroscedasticity. The distributions of the critical dependent variables were then checked, as 
were univariate outliers, and any transformations were carried out. Checks for multivariate outliers 
were then done, and finally the variance of each variable was examined and modified as per Kline 
(2005). Each task required different calculations for its critical dependent variable, which are all 
detailed below. The reliability of all the critical measures was calculated by adjusting split-half 
correlations using the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula (Salthouse et al., 2006). Each task was first 
analysed individually to establish that the expected effects were observed. 
 
Inhibitory control tasks 
 
Simon task 
The data were trimmed by condition for each participant individually, looking at correct responses only 
(5.3% were incorrect responses). Response time values that were more than three standard 
deviations away from the condition mean for a participant were replaced by the cut-off value (of three 
standard deviations from the condition mean). A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was used to 
examine the data. The factors were position (left or right on screen) and orientation (left or right). The 
measure was the mean response time for each condition. 
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 There was no effect of the position of the arrow on the response time of participants (F (1, 152) = 0.77, p 
= 0.38, ηp2 = 0.01), whilst there was a significant effect of orientation (F (1, 152) = 36.34, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 
0.19). The response times indicate that responses to a left orientated arrow were significantly slower 
than to right orientated arrow (left = 529.49ms > right = 518.76ms). This can be explained by there 
being 146 right-handed participants, as compared to only seven left-handed participants, as 
participants responded with both hands. If handedness was included as a covariate, the effect size of 
orientation was reduced (F (1, 151) = 4.53, p = 0.04, ηp2 = 0.03), but there was also a main effect of 
position (F (1, 151) = 4.23, p = 0.04, ηp2 = 0.03). This suggests that the majority of right-handed 
participants resulted in the faster response times to the right orientated arrows. 
 
There was a significant interaction between position and orientation (F (1, 152) = 567.16, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 
0.79), as shown in Figure 4.1. Further analyses (2 –way ANOVAs) were conducted to examine the 
nature of the interaction. 
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Figure 4.1: Mean response times (and standard error) to differing positions and orientations of arrow  
 
At position = left, there was a significant difference between the response time to the left and right 
orientated arrows (F (1, 152) = 423.14, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.74), with the responses to the left orientated 
arrow being significantly faster than the responses to the right orientated arrow (left = 473.61ms < right 
= 576.44). At position = right, there was a significant difference between the response time to the left 
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 and right orientated arrows (F (1, 152) = 574.94, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.79), with the responses to the left 
orientated arrow being significantly slower than the responses to the right orientated arrow (left = 
585.12ms > right = 461.29ms).  
 
When the arrow orientation was left, there was a significant difference in response time between left 
position and right position (F (1, 152) = 521.34, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.77), with the responses to the arrows in 
the left position being significantly faster than to those in the right position. In the right arrow 
orientation condition, there was also a significant difference between arrow positions (F (1, 152) = 
445.31, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.75), this time with the response to arrows in the left position being 
significantly slower than the response to those in the right position. The Simon effect and these 
interactions are shown in Figure 4.1.The pattern of errors showed a similar effect (proportion of errors 
for left (position) – left (orientation) = 0.04, for right – right = 0.03, for left – right = 0.14, for right – left = 
0.13) so showing no evidence of a speed – accuracy trade-off. 
      
This pattern of results clearly demonstrates the Simon effect, focusing on the ability to select between 
competing stimuli. The interference effect is caused when the irrelevant features of a task are 
inconsistent with the task-relevant ones. In this version the irrelevant feature of the stimuli was the 
spatial location, and the task-relevant feature was the orientation of the arrow stimuli. In this task, 
there was better performance when the arrow direction is congruent with the position of the arrow (left 
orientated arrow in the left position; right orientated arrow in the right position). When the arrow 
direction and arrow position are incongruent, there is an increase in response time (to get to the 
correct response). This is also due to the competition between the (overlearned) dominant response of 
the position of the arrow guiding the response, and the actual response required by the task, which is 
guided by the arrow direction. 
 
The critical dependent variable of the Simon task was the difference between the mean response 
times to incongruent stimuli and congruent stimuli. The reliability of this measure was satisfactory 
(Table 4.3). This was taken to measure the interference between the dominant response and correct 
response to the incongruent stimuli, interference that should require inhibitory control to resolve. Any 
values more than three standard deviations away from the mean were replaced by the cut-off value (of 
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 three standard deviations above or below the mean).The distribution was examined, and was found to 
be skewed, with one outlier (Table 4.3). The Simon task was square root transformed (plus a constant 
of 19.87 in order to remove negative values), resulting in a normal distribution (Table 4.4). 
 
 
 
Shape-matching 
 
The data were trimmed by condition for each participant individually, looking at correct responses only 
(5.1% of the responses were incorrect). Response time values that were more than three standard 
deviations away from the condition mean for a participant were replaced by the cut-off value (of three 
standard deviations from the condition mean). A 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was used to 
examine the data. The factors were distracter (present or not) and match (did the target match the 
green shape, yes or no) and the measure was the mean response time for each condition. 
 
There was an effect of distracter (F (1, 152) = 132.48, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.45). If the distracter shape was 
present, the response time was significantly longer than when the distracter shape was not present 
(distracter = 1296.10ms > no distracter = 973.07ms). There was also an effect of match (F (1, 152) = 
28.83, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.16). Participants took significantly longer to respond to trials in which the green 
shape did not match the white shape than to trials in which the green shape did match the white shape 
(match = 1093.12ms < no match = 1176.05ms). There was a marginal interaction between distraction 
and matching (F (1, 152) = 3.54, p = 0.06, ηp2 = 0.02), as can be noted in Figure 4.2. The errors are 
similar for all conditions (proportion of errors in distracter no match condition = 0.07, in distracter 
match condition = 0.05, in no distracter no match condition = 0.04, in no distracter match condition = 
0.04), indicating that there was no particular trade-off between speed and accuracy. 
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Figure 4.2: Mean response time (and standard error) to process green and target shapes by condition 
 
 
The presence of the distracter shape interferes with the processing of the green shape (in matching 
the white target shape). The (marginally) increased response time to the non-matching trials in the 
distracter condition can be put down to the fact that when the green and white shapes do not match, 
the distracter shape does match the white target shape. Therefore the participant must stop any 
potential matching response caused by the distracter and target shapes matching, as well as judging 
that the green shape does not match the white shape. In the no distracter condition, the matching 
trials are also easier to respond to (in terms of response time) than the non-matching trials.   
 
The critical dependent variable was chosen to be the difference in mean response time between the 
distracter no-match condition and the no distracter match condition. The distracter no-match condition 
appeared to have the largest amount of interference from the distracter shape, as this shape matched 
the target. The no distracter match condition had the least amount of interference, and gives a 
baseline measure of the response time to the simple matching process. The difference between these 
conditions is therefore a measure of the interference caused by the distracter shape only, which 
should require inhibitory control. The reliability of this measure was adequate (Table 4.3). Any values 
more than three standard deviations away from the mean were replaced by the cut-off value (of three 
standard deviations above or below the mean). The distribution of the critical shape matching task 
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 dependent variable was extremely non-normal, with three outliers (Table 4.3). The critical dependent 
variable underwent a log 10 transformation resulting in a normal distribution (Table 4.4). 
 
 
 
Go / No Go 
 
As the data for the go / no go task were errors, they were not trimmed (overall 8.5% of the responses 
were incorrect). The data were analysed using a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, with trial type (go 
v no go) and position (start v end) as repeated measures. The dependent variable was the proportion 
of errors made. 
 
There was a significant effect of trial type (F (1, 153) = 219.78, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.59), with significantly 
higher proportion of errors in the no go condition than in the go condition (no go = 0.27 > go = 0.06). 
There was no difference in the performance of participants in the task carried out at the start of the 
session and the performance in the task carried out at the end of the session (F (1, 153) = 0.01, p = 0.97, 
ηp
2 = 0.01), and there was no interaction between trial type and position (F (1, 153) = 2.28, p = 0.10, ηp2 = 
0.02) (see Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Proportion of responses (and standard error) to no go trials by condition and session 
 
As expected, participants made more errors in the no go condition. This is because of the difficulty in 
inhibiting the dominant response of tapping the spacebar in no go trials, compared to carrying out that 
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 dominant response in go trials. They also had a priori knowledge of the categorical stimuli to which 
they had to respond and of that to which they had to not respond. The dominant response of tapping 
the spacebar in response to 25 of the 26 possible letter stimuli resulted in there being errors in 
inhibiting that dominant response when the letter K was presented. 
 
As there was no difference between participant performance in the first and second sessions, the false 
alarm rate was collapsed over the two sessions. The critical dependent measure was the overall false 
alarm rate for the task. This was the proportion of no go trials that the participants incorrectly 
responded to. The higher this proportion, the less inhibitory control exhibited by the participant 
(inhibitory control is required to inhibit the dominant response of responding). The reliability of this 
measure was excellent (Table 4.3).The distribution of this dependent variable was non-normal, with 
two outliers (Table 4.3). The dependent variable was square-root transformed, resulting in a normal 
distribution (Table 4.4). 
 
 
 
Go / No Go (picture) 
 
As the data for the go / no go (picture) task were errors, they were not trimmed. The data was 
analysed using a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, with trial type (go v no go) and image type 
(mammal v bird) as the factors. The measure was the proportion of errors made in each condition. 
Overall 25.1% of the responses were incorrect. 
 
There was a main effect of trial type (F (1, 150) = 128.51, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.46), with a significantly higher 
proportion of errors in the no go condition than in the go condition (no go = 0.42 > go = 0.21). There 
was a significant effect of image type (F (1, 150) = 43.95, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.23), with proportionally more 
errors made with bird images than with mammal images (bird = 0.34 > mammal = 0.29). There was no 
interaction between trial type and image type (F (1, 150) = 0.70, p = 0.41, ηp2 = 0.01) (Figure 4.4). 
 
To check that both image conditions showed the expected no go effect they were analysed separately. 
For the bird images, there was a significant difference between the error proportion in go and no go 
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 trials (F (1, 150) = 90.85, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.38; no go = 0.44 > go = 0.24), and this was also true for the 
mammal images (F (1, 150) = 106.92, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.42; no go = 0.39 > go = 0.18), so both conditions 
showed the no go effect. 
 
As the aim was to have an overall critical measure (collapsed across bird and mammal images), the 
trial types were also analysed. In the go trials, there was a significant difference between the image 
types (F (1, 150) = 65.64, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.30), with more errors for the bird images compared to the 
mammal images. In the no go trials, there was also a significant difference between image types (F (1, 
150) = 8.28, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.05), again with a higher proportion of errors for the bird images compared 
to the mammal images.  
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Figure 4.4: Go / No Go picture task error proportions (and standard error) by trial and image type 
 
The results of this task showed a similar pattern overall to the go / no go task. Both image types 
showed the same no go effect, but the error proportion of the bird images was significantly higher in 
both the go and no go conditions. 
 
Participants were shown the images to be presented in the task, together with the names, before the 
start of the session. Their immediate recall of these names was also tested (with images without their 
names). Participants accurately identified the majority of the no go images for both birds and 
mammals. The higher proportion of errors for the bird images may be due to the homogeneity of the 
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 bird images compared to the mammal images. However, the mammal and bird image no go error 
proportions were significantly correlated (see Table 4.1). 
 
The aim was always to have an overall critical measure for this task (including both mammal and bird 
data to avoid losing half of the data) and the significant correlation and the similar no go effects 
suggested that the processes in the bird and mammal conditions were similar. Therefore the critical 
dependent variable, the false alarm rate (proportion of no go trials to which participants responded to) 
was collapsed over the bird and mammal no go trials.  This false alarm rate should give an indication 
of the level of inhibitory control of a participant, as the higher the rate is, the more (incorrect) 
responses the participant made to no go trials, indicative of low inhibitory control. The reliability of this 
measure was satisfactory, as was the distribution (Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.1  
Intercorrelations of Go / No Go (picture) Task Conditions 
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1: Go: Bird -    
2: Go: Mammal       .77(**) -   
3: No Go: Bird .05 .15 -  
4: No Go: Mammal     .20(*)     .18(*) .60(**) - 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
Stop-Signal 
 
The stop-signal task was not initially trimmed as in the data screening above, although it uses 
response time as a measure (1.7% of the go responses were incorrect, 41% of the stop responses 
were incorrect). This was in order to maximise the differences between the participants (as in 
Schachar et al., 2004; Aron et al., 2003), as trimming the data would remove the outermost data points 
of any participants who were able to successfully inhibit their responses to stop trials to a greater 
extent than the majority of the sample (the same applies to those participants who found it more 
difficult to inhibit their responses to stop trials).  
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 The critical dependent variable then calculated was the mean response time to the go trials (correct 
response only) minus the mean response time to the stop trials. The mean stop signal response time 
(SSRT) values of the participants was similar to that found in previous literature (225ms compared 
with 189ms in Aron et al. (2003)). The higher the stop signal response time, the less the inhibitory 
control exhibited by the participant. The reliability of this measure was excellent (Table 4.3). 
 
The distribution of SSRT was extremely non-normal (Table 4.3). In order to normalise the distribution 
the times above three standard deviations were replaced by the highest value below three standard 
deviations plus one (for the lowest above three standard deviations, plus two for the second lowest, 
etc.). This was done as described above in three waves – twice for values above three standard 
deviations, and once for values below three standard deviations (the mean SSRT after this trimming 
was 212ms). These procedures are as described in Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). This resulted in the 
distribution being reasonably normal (Table 4.4). 
 
 
 
Cued Recall 
 
As the data analysed for the cued recall task were the number of correct trials, they were not trimmed 
(9.5% of the responses were incorrect). The two trial types analysed in the cued recall task were 
control and interference trials. In both trials participants were cued to recall a target word from a list 
(the second of two). In interference trial a foil word was also present (in the first list of the two). The 
first list of words was always read aloud, and the second set was always read silently. The 
performance of the participants was analysed with a repeated-measures ANOVA (correct control v 
correct interference). Before the analysis was carried out, missing values for two participants1 on task 
were estimated through imputation and regression estimation procedures. The result of the 
estimations from these two procedures did not differ significantly, so the estimates from the imputation 
method using the program NORM (Schafer, 1999) were used. 
                                                 
1 These participants failed to complete the cued recall task due to time constraints (arrived late to 
session). 
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 Participants were more accurate in the control condition than in the interference condition (F (1, 148) = 
220.32, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.60; control = 10.13 > interference = 6.75). This effect is probably due to the 
effect of the foil word in the interference trials affecting recall of the target word, as expected. The 
critical dependent variable was calculated as the difference between the number of correct control 
trials and the number of correct interference trials. The mixed modality of the presentation and 
distracter task were common to both trials, so this dependent variable should remove any contribution 
from that. The dependent variable should therefore only measure the level of interference caused by 
the foil word in recalling the target word, interference which should be mediated by inhibitory control. 
The distribution of the critical dependent measure was normal (Table 4.3), so no transformations were 
required. However, the reliability calculated for this difference measure was too low to be used in a 
structural equation modelling analysis (Table 4.3). Therefore an alternate critical measure was used. 
Implementing the regression method (as in Friedman & Miyake, 2004), the component scores of the 
measure (the proportion of correct interference trials and the proportion of correct control trials), which 
had reasonable reliability (see Table 4.3) were used (the distribution of the component scores were 
also satisfactory). In the modelling stage, an additional latent variable that underlay both the correct 
control trial measure and the correct interference trial measure was included. This allows the common 
variance of the two component scores (interference due to the mixed modality of presentation and the 
distracter task) to be factored out, leaving only the interference caused by the foil word in the 
interference trial measure (therefore only the proactive interference or cognitive inhibition effect which 
is of interest)2.   
 
Theory of Mind tasks 
 
Keysar 
 
For the response time analyses, the data were trimmed by condition for each participant individually, 
looking at correct responses only (12.5% were incorrect responses to the competitor item, 1.4% were 
responses to another object). Response time values that were more than three standard deviations 
                                                 
2 An alternative method of factoring out the common variance is shown in Appendix B. The SEM 
modelling gave similar results using either method. 
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 away from the condition mean for a participant were replaced by the cut-off value (of three standard 
deviations from the condition mean). The data were analysed using a 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA, trial type (control v experimental) and condition (ambiguous v relational). Response time was 
looked at first, with correct responses only used. There was no effect of trial type (F (1, 143) = 0.75, p = 
0.39, ηp2 = 0.01), with the response times to control and experimental trials being comparable. There 
was an effect of condition (F (1, 143) = 686.24, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.60), with the response time to 
ambiguous trials being significantly faster than to relational trials (ambiguous = 2849.84ms < 
Relational = 3295.67ms). 
 
There was a significant interaction between trial type and condition (F (1, 143) = 7.17, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 
0.05), that was investigated further with separate 2-way ANOVAs. 
 
For the ambiguous trials there was a marginal difference between control and experimental conditions 
(F (1, 150) = 2.75, p = 0.10, ηp2 = 0.02), with the response time to control trials being slightly faster than 
to experimental trials, and the opposite pattern was shown for relational trials (a marginal difference 
between control and experimental conditions: F (1, 143) = 3.56, p = 0.06, ηp2 = 0.02). 
 
In the control condition there was a significant difference in trial type (F (1, 150) = 198.90, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 
0.57), with the response time to ambiguous trials being faster than the response time to relational 
trials. In the experimental condition, there was also a significant difference in trial type (F (1, 143) = 
68.28, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.32), again with the response time to the ambiguous trials being faster than the 
response time to the relational trials. These differences can be seen in Figure 4.5. These findings, 
compared against the error findings described below, show no indication of a speed-accuracy trade-
off. 
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Figure 4.5: Mean response times (and standard error) in Keysar task by condition and trial type 
 
  
The error rate was then examined with a series of t-tests, as no errors made in the control conditions 
(error data were not trimmed). 
 
A one-sample t-test (with a theoretical value of zero) showed that significantly more errors than zero 
were made in the experimental condition (t (149) =13.90, p ≤ 0.01, with a mean difference of 4.03). A 
paired-sample t-test showed there was also an effect of condition in the experimental trials (t (149) = 
9.28, p ≤ 0.01), with significantly more errors in the relational condition than in the ambiguous 
condition (ambiguous = 1.21 < relational = 2.82). 
  
For the ambiguous trials there were significantly more errors than zero (t (149) = 12.25, p ≤ 0.01, with 
a mean difference of 1.21). There were significantly more errors than zero in the relational trials (t 
(149) = 12.97, p ≤ 0.01, with a mean difference of 2.82). These differences can be seen in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6: Mean number of errors (and standard error) in Keysar task by condition and trial type 
 
The control condition was expected to have no errors and a faster response time due to there being 
no competing item for the item description given by the instructor. The relational trials were slower and 
resulted in more errors than the ambiguous trials. This may be due to there being more items that the 
participant is cued to in the relational trials (for example in the experimental grid where the critical 
instruction is ‘move the small ball…’, there are three different sized balls present) compared to in the 
ambiguous trials (where in an experimental grid, where the critical instruction is ‘move the mouse…’, 
there is a computer mouse and a mouse, so there are only two potential items). The additional item 
that the participant must consider in relational trials may explain the increased response times, and 
perhaps the increased error rate. 
 
The critical dependent variables for the Keysar task were the error rates of the relational and 
ambiguous trials. These were expected to measure the participants’ failure to use their theory of mind. 
The reliability of the relational errors was satisfactory, whilst that of the ambiguous trials was adequate 
(Table 4.3). Both the distributions of the dependent variables were skewed (Table 4.3), and they were 
both square root transformed (ambiguous with a constant of one to remove negative values). This 
resulted in adequately normal distributions for both dependent variables (Table 4.4). 
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 Visual Perspective 
 
Data trimming was conducted on correct responses only on the matching trials (4.78% of the data 
were incorrect responses). Response times that were 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean 
were eliminated (2.04% of the data; this was in line with the original procedure of data cleaning in 
Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite & Andrews, 2007) and so were response omissions due to the timeout 
procedure (responses over 2000ms; 0.47% of the data). The data were analysed using a 2 x 2 
repeated-measures ANOVA, with consistency (consistent v inconsistent) and perspective (self v other) 
as the factors. The measure first investigated was response time in each of the conditions. 
 
There was a main effect of consistency (F (1, 153) = 324.16, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.68), with the response time 
in the inconsistent condition significantly higher than that in the consistent condition (consistent = 
628.49ms < inconsistent = 724.42ms). There was no effect of perspective (F (1, 153) = 2.02, p = 0.16, 
ηp
2 = 0.01). There was a significant interaction between consistency and perspective (F (1, 153) = 60.15, 
p ≤ 0.001, ηp2 = 0.28) that was investigated further using separate 2-way ANOVAs. 
There was a significant difference between the consistent and inconsistent conditions in the other 
perspective condition (F (1, 153) = 274.66, p ≤ 0. 01, ηp2 = 0.64), with the inconsistent condition being 
significantly slower in response times compared to the consistent condition. For the self perspective 
condition, there was also a significant difference between consistent and inconsistent conditions (F (1, 
153) = 122.99, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.45), again with the inconsistent condition significantly slower in 
response time compared to the consistent condition.  
 
In the consistent condition, the other perspective trials were significantly faster than the self 
perspective trials (F (1, 153) = 61.56, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.29). In the inconsistent condition, the opposite 
pattern was shown, and the self perspective trials were significantly faster than the other perspective 
trials (F (1, 153) = 8.98, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.055). The differences in effect size can be seen in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7: Visual perspective mean response times (and standard error) by condition and trial 
 
 
The errors (not trimmed) in each condition were examined using an identical 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA. There was a main effect of consistency (F (1, 153) = 192.52, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.56), with more 
errors in the inconsistent condition than in the consistent condition (consistent = 0.53 < inconsistent = 
2.20). There was again no effect of perspective (F (1, 153) = 0.68, p = 0.41, ηp2 = 0.00). 
  
There was a significant interaction between consistency and perspective (F (1, 153) = 11.30, p ≤ 0.01, 
ηp
2 = 0.07) that was investigated further using separate 2-way ANOVAs. 
 
For other perspective trials there was a significant difference between consistent and inconsistent 
conditions (F (1, 153) = 169.33, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.53), with more errors in the inconsistent condition. For 
the self perspective trials there was also a significant difference between consistent and inconsistent 
conditions (F (1, 153) = 73.39, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.32), again with more errors in the inconsistent condition.  
Mirroring the response time analyses, the consistent condition showed significantly more errors in the 
self perspective trials as compared to the other perspective trials (F (1, 153) = 7.72, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.05). 
The inconsistent condition for errors also showed the same pattern as that for the response times, with 
significantly more errors in the other perspective trials than in the self perspective trials (F (1, 153) = 5.05, 
p = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.03). These effects and interactions can be seen in Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8: Visual perspective error proportions (and standard error) by condition and trial 
 
There was no difference in either response time or error rate between the participants taking their own 
perspective (self condition) or taking the avatar’s perspective (other condition), indicating that in 
general there was no difficulty in taking one perspective over another. Other perspective trials show 
higher response times and error rates than self perspective trials, possibly due to greater interference 
of the self perspective in the inconsistent trials only.  
 
The critical dependent variables for the task were calculated as the differences between the 
inconsistent and consistent mean response times for other and self trials separately. These were 
taken to be measures of the interference caused by the alternate perspective when focusing on the 
given perspective (any common process to the consistent and inconsistent trials would be eliminated, 
leaving the remaining response time as a measure of interference). For this reason the difference 
between inconsistent and consistent trials for the other condition was termed egocentric interference 
(target perspective was the avatar perspective, the interference from self perspective), and the 
difference for the self trials was termed altercentric interference (the target perspective was the self 
perspective, the interference from avatar perspective). The reliability of the egocentric interference 
measure was satisfactory, and that of the altercentric interference measure was adequate (Table 4.3). 
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 The distribution of the egocentric interference effect was non-normal (Table 4.3), and was square-root 
transformed (with a constant of 60.89 to remove negative values), resulting in a relatively normal 
distribution (Table 4.4). The distribution of the altercentric interference effect was relatively normal, so 
was not transformed (Table 4.3). 
 
Final data screening 
After the initial data screening measures for each individual task, and once the critical dependent 
variables had been calculated, all pairwise plots were examined for nonlinearity and 
heteroscedasticity. These were all satisfactory. Table 4.2 shows the initial descriptive statistics for the 
critical dependent variables of each task used in the individual differences model. Table 4.3 shows the 
initial distribution statistics for the critical dependent variables of each task, together with outlying 
cases. Tasks were transformed as necessary (as detailed in the individual task summaries). 
 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Measures Used in the Individual Differences Model (with condition 
comparisons for Go / No Go tasks) 
 
Measure M SD Min Max 
Cued Recall (correct) 
Control  
Interference 
 
10.13 
6.74 
 
3.47 
3.30 
 
0 
0 
 
18 
15 
Simon interference effect (ms) 114.43 58.03 7.10 343.48 
Shape-Matching interference effect (ms) 405.96 399.60 -406 3288.23 
Go / No Go (FAR) 
Go trials 
No Go trials 
 
0.06 
0.27 
 
0.07 
0.14 
 
0 
0.01 
 
0.71 
0.82 
Go / No Go (picture) (FAR) 
Go Bird 
Go Animal 
No Go Bird 
No Go Animal 
 
0.24 
0.17 
0.44 
0.39 
 
0.15 
0.14 
0.21 
0.24 
 
0.03 
0.01 
0 
0 
 
0.89 
0.93 
1 
1 
Stop-Signal (SSRT) 225.72 244.86 -277.94 1721.11 
Keysar (errors) 
Ambiguous 
Relational 
 
1.18 
2.75 
 
1.21 
2.7 
 
0 
0 
 
5 
8 
Visual Perspective interference effect (ms) 
Egocentric 
Altercentric 
 
128.82 
63.05 
 
96.46 
70.55 
 
-59.89 
-105.94
 
482.14 
295.06 
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 Table 4.3  
Initial Distribution Statistics 
Task Shapiro-Wilk 
Skewness 
(<2) 
Kurtosis 
(<3) 
Outliers 
(case) Reliability 
Cued Recall (Difference) NS 0.73 -0.38 - 0.12 
Cued Recall (interference) Significant 1.07 -0.99 - 0.66 
Cued Recall (control) NS 0.18 -0.43 3 0.71 
Simon Significant 3.75 2.29 15 0.92 
SM Significant 20.17 56.06 95, 96, 138 0.63 
GNG Significant 4.96 5.03 135, 137 0.94 
GNG_P NS 1.79 -0.53 - 0.75 
SS* Significant -1.17 5.18 
8, 16, 26 
39, 71, 79, 
89, 109, 
137, 148 
0.99 
Keysar (Amb.) Significant 4.05 -0.71 133, 149 0.53 
Keysar (Rel.) Significant 3.16 -2.73  0.85 
Visual Perspective 
(egocentric interference) Significant 5.49 3.75 93, 98 0.64 
Visual Perspective 
(altercentric interference) NS 1.89 0.35 10 0.43 
 
NB. Shapiro-Wilk = normality test, should be non-significant; Skewness and kurtosis = distribution statistics, less 
than 2 and 3 respectively; reliability should ideally be more than 0.7 
 
Once the critical dependent variables were transformed to remove univariate outliers, data were then 
checked for multivariate outliers. One case (number 137) was identified through inspection of 
Mahalanobis distances. This case varied significantly from the rest of the sample on the Simon task, 
the stop-signal task and the go / no go task. The variance values are also shown (an assumption of 
structural equation modelling is that variances of the measured indicators are within a 10:1 ratio (Kline, 
2005)). The initial task scores were modified as per the amendment column, resulting in the final 
variance values in the final column of Table 4.4, together with the distribution statistics.  
 
Table 4.4  
Distribution Statistics After Transformations:  
Task Shapiro-Wilk 
Skewness 
(<2) 
Kurtosis 
(<3) Variance Amendment 
Adjusted 
Variance 
Cued Recall 
(interference) Significant 1.075 -1.041 0.027 *15 6.13 
Cued Recall 
(control) NS 0.16 -0.47 0.030 *15 6.77 
Simon NS 0.769 0.187 6.94 *1 6.94 
SM NS 0.563 3.159 0.10 * 10 9.28 
GNG NS -1.151 1.159 0.02 * 17 5.82 
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Task Shapiro-Wilk 
Skewness 
(<2) 
Kurtosis 
(<3) Variance Amendment 
Adjusted 
Variance 
GNG_P NS 1.869 -0.448 0.04 * 12 5.86 
SS Significant -1.543 5.428 12302.11 / 35 9.69 
Keysar 
(Amb.) Significant 2.08 -2.29 0.159 * 8 10.16 
Keysar (Rel.) Significant -0.53 -3.07 0.908 * 3 8.17 
Visual 
Perspective 
(egocentric 
interference) 
Significant 0.035 3.33 12.485 * 1 12.49 
Visual 
Perspective 
(altercentric 
interference) 
NS 1.89 0.35 4921.434 / 22 10.17 
 
NB. variances need to be within 10:1 ratio, arrived at by multiplication or division by value in Amendment column 
 
 
The critical dependent variables met all the criteria for inclusion in structural equation modelling 
analyses (Blunch, 2008; Kline, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. Executive Function factor classifications 
 
Chapter 2 established that response inhibition is proposed to underlie both go / no go tasks, the stop – 
signal task, and potentially also the Simon task, and the shape – matching task. Response selection 
may underlie all the tasks, but the extent to which this is the case is expected to vary. Cognitive 
inhibition is expected to be linked to the Simon, shape – matching and cued recall task. Latent variable 
analyses will allow the confirmation or refutation of these potential subdivisions. 
 
Potential factors and models 
As described in Chapter 2, the go / no go tasks are both expected to rely more on response selection 
than response inhibition, but the stop – signal task may rely on both to a more equal extent. The 
remaining tasks are less well established executive function tasks, and so the possible layout of their 
core factors is less clear cut. The fact that response selection is expected to be a factor in all of the 
tasks may mean that it is less distinguishable from the other two proposed factors, as the tasks that 
those factors tap are more independent. Using structural equation modelling will allow the elucidation 
of this structure, and provide evidence for the diverse or distinct nature of inhibition factors in executive 
function.  
 
Another potential construct that may be present in the tasks but that will not be assessed directly by 
this model is working memory. The cued recall and go / no go (picture) tasks may rely on working 
memory as well as inhibition factors, but the dependent variables are aimed towards measuring 
inhibitory control only. Unexplained variance in the model (as denoted by any covariance between 
error terms of measured task indicators) may be attributable to working memory. 
 
The first model tested was the simplest one factor model. As the most parsimonious model this would 
be the optimum choice if more complex models did not have significantly better fits. The response and 
cognitive inhibition two factor model was then tested. This model consisted of the go / no go tasks and 
the stop-signal task loading on the response inhibition latent variable (as these are the established 
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 response inhibition tasks), and the cued recall, Simon and shape-matching tasks loading on the 
cognitive inhibition latent variable (as in Chapter 2, these tasks all require some level of cognitive 
inhibition, cognitive interference or resistance to proactive interference).   
 
A potential two factor model of response inhibition and response selection was also analysed. This 
alternate classification resulted in tasks loading on different latent variables than they did in the 
previous model (some moved from response inhibition to response selection, some from cognitive 
inhibition to response inhibition). The tasks loading on the response selection latent variable were 
proposed to tap that factor above and beyond any other construct (these were the go / no go tasks 
and cued recall task). The other tasks (stop-signal, Simon and shape-matching tasks) were 
considered to tap response inhibition when response selection was the other latent variable. This was 
because even though tasks were designed to tap only one construct as much as possible, they almost 
certainly tapped several contrasting constructs (see Chapter 2). This meant that seemingly 
incompatible models could be tested. Both models were allowed to be adjusted, dependent on the 
modification statistics. In all cases these amendments (adding or removing paths from measures to 
latent variables; redefinition of latent variables) were informed by theoretical considerations. The 
dependent variables for the inhibitory tasks are listed below in Table 5.1.  
 
Model statistics 
The program AMOS (Arbuckle, 2006) was used to calculate maximum likelihood estimation (based on 
the covariance matrix of the critical measures). Several different model fit statistics were used to 
evaluate the structural and factor models. The chi-square statistic is the most commonly used fit 
statistic (CMIN; which is a ‘badness of fit’ statistic). This measures the differences between the 
covariances in the experimental model and those in the observed data. If the experimental model has 
similar covariances to the observed values, then the chi-square statistic will be small, indicating no 
significant difference between observed and predicted covariances. The comparative fit index (CFI) 
which compares the experimental model with a baseline independence model with zero covariances 
was also included. CFI values of close to 1.0 (and above 0.9) are indicative of good fit, as this means 
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 that the model is better than a baseline model of no covariances (a low value indicates the current 
model is no better than a zero covariance model). The root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) is a statistic which corrects for model complexity. RMSEA provides a lower and higher value 
bounding the central value. A lower bound value of less than 0.05 suggests that the directional null 
hypothesis (that the experimental model has close approximate fit in the population) can not be 
rejected. A higher bound value that does not exceed a cut-off value that indicates poor fit (for example 
0.10) means that the null hypothesis that the fit of the experimental model in the population is as bad 
or worse can be rejected. RMSEA therefore tests the hypotheses of good approximate fit and of poor 
approximate fit. An incremental fit index, the Bentler-Bonett normed fit index (NFI) was also used. NFI 
values of over 0.9 indicate a good fitting model, again as compared to zero meaning the model is the 
same as a baseline zero covariance model. The Akaike information criterion index was used to 
compare non-hierarchical models (models that are not nested in one another). The Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) statistic uses an information theory approach to data analysis that combines estimation 
and model selection under a single conceptual framework (Kline, 2005). It is a predictive fit index (but 
is also parsimony-adjusted to favour simpler models). The model with relatively better fit and fewer 
parameters compared to other models is more likely to be replicable using different samples, and this 
model will have the lowest AIC value, and so be preferred. 
 
Different models were tested (as detailed below) on theoretical grounds, and were compared using 
chi-square difference tests (calculated by AMOS if they were nested models). This test indicated 
whether removing or adding a path to a model (reducing or increasing complexity) significantly 
affected the model fit (by comparing the chi-square values of the models). If, when removing a path, 
the chi-square difference was not significant, then the path removed was not integral to the model and 
so did not affect the model fit. If, when adding a path, the chi-square difference was significant, the 
path added significantly improved the model fit. The standardised residual covariance matrix was used 
to see if there were any relationships between the inhibitory tasks that were not explained or 
accounted for by the (current) model. Paths would only be added or removed if there were strong 
theoretical grounds for doing so. All analyses used an alpha level of 0.05. 
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 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1  
Dependent Variables for Inhibitory Tasks 
Task Dependent variable 
Simon Congruent trial RT – Incongruent trial RT (correct only) 
Shape Matching Distracter present, No Match trial RT – No Distracter, Match trial RT (correct only) 
Cued Recall Proportion of correct interference trials (shared effect with control trials factored out). 
Go / No Go False Alarm Rate of no go trials (proportion of errors in no go trials) 
Go / No Go (picture) False Alarm Rate of no go trials (proportion of errors in no go trials) 
Stop Signal Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT; Go trial RT (correct only) – Stop trial RT) 
   
 
An initial correlation matrix of the inhibition tasks is shown below (after data screening, transformation 
and variance adjustment) in Table 5.2. The correlations give an indication of possible task groupings. 
As the matrix shows, there are significant correlations between the some of the proposed response 
inhibition tasks (in red), but not between the cognitive inhibition tasks (apart from the cued recall tasks; 
in blue). There are correlations between the shape-matching, cued recall, Simon, go / no go, go / no 
go (picture) and stop-signal tasks. The significant correlations, albeit with low magnitudes (which is 
normal for the type of study; Friedman & Miyake, 2004), give some indication that there are identifiable 
factors in the battery of tasks. 
  
Table 5.2  
Pearson Inter-correlation Coefficients for Inhibitory Tasks1  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1: Simon --        
2: Shape - Matching 0.01 --       
3: Cued Recall -0.10 -0.00 --      
4: Cued Recall (int.) -0.01 -0.08 -0.29(**) --     
5: Cued Recall (control) -0.09 -0.01 0.35(**) 0.66(**) --    
6: Go / No Go 0.16(*) -0.04 -0.23(**) 0.05 -0.01 --   
7: Go / No Go (picture) 0.01 0.13 -0.16 -0.11 -0.23(**) 0.23(**) --  
8: Stop-Signal 0.06 0.17(*) 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.17(*) 0.13 -- 
 
Note:  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  
By including a latent variable that is tapped by both the cued recall measures and represents that 
common variance, that common variance can be factored out and accounted for (see Chapter 4). A 
                                                 
1 The numbers in the header row correspond to the numbers of the tasks in left-hand column. 
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 path is then included from the EF latent variable to the interference measure (the alternative method of 
doing this is shown in Appendix B, together with the alternate EF-ToM models). The abbreviations of 
the tasks and arrows in the models are as follows (all error variances for the models in this chapter are 
shown in Appendix B): 
GNG Go / No Go task 
GNG (P) Go / No Go (picture) task 
SS Stop-signal task 
Simon Simon task 
SM Shape-matching 
CR (int.) Cued Recall interference measure 
CR (cont.) Cued Recall control measure 
e Error variances 
→ Parameter (direct path) 
↔ Parameter (covariance) 
 
Executive Function factor models 
Model One (inhibition) 
The most parsimonious one factor model was first tested (Figure 5.1): 
 
 
 
Inhibitory 
Control 
e e
e
e e e e
Simon SM CR (int.) 
CR (cont.) 
SS GNG GNG (P) 
CR 
common 
variance 
Figure 5.1: One factor inhibition model 
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 Table 5.3 shows that all of the parameter estimates are not significantly different from zero (though the 
go / no go picture task approaches significance), suggesting that there is not one common factor or 
theoretical construct underlying all the inhibition tasks. The variance of the latent variable (of inhibition) 
is also not significantly different from zero. Model fit statistics for all models are shown in Table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.3  
Parameter Estimates for One Factor Inhibition Model 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimatea S.E.
b pc Standardised Estimated 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go (P) 0.98 0.52 0.06 0.35 
Go / No Go 1.90 1.16 0.10 0.67 
Stop Signal 1.00   0.27 
CR int. (to IC) 0.46 0.31 0.14 0.16 
CR int. (to res.) 1.00   0.84 
CR con. (to res.) 1.00   0.81 
Simon 0.65 0.43 0.13 0.22 
Shape Matching 0.17 0.41 0.68 0.05 
     
Variance 
Inhibition 0.72 1.12 0.26  
CR residual 4.36 0.64 <0.01  
 
a
When the inhibition latent variable goes up by 1, the task changes by this value 
b
Approximate standard error of the estimate 
c
Whether the estimate of the task is significantly different from zero 
d
When the inhibition latent variable goes up by 1 standard deviation, the task changes by this value of standard deviations. 
 
 
Model Two (response and cognitive inhibition) 
A possible factor structure suggested by the literature (response and cognitive inhibition) was also 
analysed (Figure 5.2). There was expected to be some common variance between the two latent 
variables, so they were allowed to covary in the model. 
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Figure 5.2: Two factor (response and cognitive inhibition) model 
 
 
As Table 5.4 shows, both latent variables variances are not significantly different from zero, and the 
variance for the cognitive inhibition variable is extremely low. None of the task parameters to the 
cognitive variable or the response variable are significantly different from zero. The high correlation 
between the two variables (< 0.7) suggests that they are not separable variables (although the path 
estimate is not significantly different from zero, due to the high standard error value compared to the 
unstandardised estimate). 
 
Table 5.4  
Parameter Estimates for Two Factor Inhibition Model 
Parameters UnstandardisedEstimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response 2.11 1.40 0.13 0.71 
Go / No Go (P) →Response 0.99 0.53 0.06 0.33 
Stop Signal → Response 1.00   0.26 
CR int. → Cognitive 0.69 0.51 0.17 0.19 
CR int. → Residual 1.00   0.84 
CR control → Residual 1.00   0.81 
Simon → Cognitive 1.00   0.28 
 
Response 
Inhibition 
e e
e
e e e e
Simon SM CR (int.) 
CR (cont.) 
SS GNG (P) GNG 
 
Cognitive 
Inhibition 
CR 
common 
variance 
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Table 5.4 continued     
Parameters UnstandardisedEstimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Shape Matching → Cognitive 0.16 .581 0.27 0.04 
     
Variances and covariances 
Response 0.65 0.61 0.29  
Cognitive 0.50 0.65 0.45  
Residual 4.36 0.64 <0.01  
Response ↔ Cognitive 0.43 0.34 0.20 0.76 
 
 
Model Three (response inhibition and selection) 
A provisional division of the tasks into response inhibition and response selection was examined next 
(Figure 5.3). The tasks tap different underlying constructs than in the previous model, for reasons 
detailed in Chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter. 
  
 
 
Response 
Inhibition 
e ee e e e
GNG GNG (P) CR (int.) 
CR (cont.) 
SS SM Simon 
 
Response 
Selection 
CR 
common 
variance 
e
Figure 5.3: Two factor model (response inhibition and selection) 
 
This solution shows that the variances of the two latent variables (response inhibition and response 
selection) are not significantly different from zero, and none of the path coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. Therefore the choice to test an alternate model holds (Table 5.5). 
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 Table 5.5  
Path Estimates for Response Inhibition and Selection model 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response Selection 1.00   0.78 
Go / No Go (P) →Response Selection 0.38 0.53 0.47 0.30 
CR int. → Response Selection 0.19 0.27 0.47 0.15 
CR int. → Residual 1.00   0.84 
CR control → Residual 1.00   0.80 
Stop-Signal → Response Inhibition 1.00   0.33 
Simon → Response Inhibition 0.48 0.45 0.29 0.20 
Shape Matching → Response Inhibition 1.52 2.14 0.48 0.51 
     
Variances and covariances 
Response Inhibition 1.03 1.57 0.51  
Response Selection 3.54 4.87 0.47  
Residual 4.34 0.64 <0.01  
 
 
 
Model Four (response inhibition and selection; amended) 
An alternate configuration of response inhibition and selection tasks was then chosen. As can be seen 
in the initial one factor model (Table 5.3), the shape matching task had the lowest unstandardised and 
standardised parameter estimate (as well as the highest p-value), suggesting that this task tapped a 
separate construct to the other tasks. Therefore a two factor model with the shape matching task 
loading onto one latent variable was analysed (Figure 5.4). 
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Response 
Inhibition 
e e
e
e e e e
GNG GNG (P) CR (int.) 
CR (cont.) 
Simon SS SM 
 
Response 
Selection 
CR 
common 
variance 
Figure 5.4: Two factor model (shape matching factor)2  
 
In order to identify this model, the variance of the shape matching error term was fixed. When a latent 
variable has only one indicator, the unstandardised path estimate of that indicator is fixed to one. 
However, this still does not allow the model to be identified as there is still one unidentified parameter 
that needs to be constrained, in this case the error variance of the indicator. This needs to be 
constrained to a set value in order for the model to be identified. As the reliability of the shape-
matching task is known (0.63), the error variance can be estimated using the following formula: (1 - 
reliability) * (standard deviation)2 (Garson, 2008). This gives the value of the error variance as 3.53. 
The initial model gave the following parameter estimates, shown in Table 5.6. The parameter 
estimates are still relatively low, and the p-values are again not significant, but they are closer to this 
than the previous models. The variance of the response inhibition variable is significantly different from 
zero, while the variance of the response selection variable is closer to significance than any latent 
variable in the previous models. Therefore this was chosen as a suitable starting model for any 
potential theoretically informed amendments. 
 
                                                 
2 The modifications suggested by AMOS are represented by the dashed arrows and correspond to the 
parameters in Table 5.7 and Table 5.9. 
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 Table 5.6  
Parameter Estimates for Initial Model (Figure 5.4) 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response Selection 1.00   0.73 
Go / No Go (P) →Response Selection 0.44 0.28 0.11 0.32 
CR int. → Response Selection 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.15 
CR int. → Residual 1.00   0.84 
CR control → Residual 1.00   0.81 
 Simon → Response Selection 0.30 0.22 0.17 0.21 
Stop Signal → Response Selection 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.25 
Shape Matching → Response Inhibition 1.00   0.79 
     
Variances and covariances 
Response Selection 3.10 1.94 .11  
Response Inhibition 5.69 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.35 0.64 <0.01  
 
 
 
Model 4: response inhibition to stop-signal path added 
The modification indices calculated by AMOS suggested including a path from the stop – signal task to 
the response inhibition variable would significantly improve the fit of the model, and considering the 
theoretical basis for this path (that the stop – signal task requires both response inhibition and 
response selection), the path was added to the model. This resulted in the following set of parameter 
estimates (Table 5.7). Alternatives for this path include a covariance between the error terms of the 
shape matching and the stop – signal tasks or a covariance between the latent variables of response 
inhibition and response selection. These give identical values for the model fit (and equivalent 
parameter estimates). The path between the stop – signal and the response inhibition latent variable 
was chosen as it allowed the variance to be explained by the model (in the case of the alternative 
covariances, the variance they account for is unexplained by the model), and as it is based on the 
theoretical grounding that the stop-signal task taps both response inhibition and response selection. 
This path is shown by the straight dashed arrow in Figure 5.4.  
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 Table 5.7  
Parameter Estimates Including Path From Stop - Signal to Response Inhibition 
Parameters UnstandardisedEstimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response Selection 1.00   0.77 
Go / No Go (P) →Response Selection 0.39 0.26 0.13 0.30 
CR int. → Response Selection 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.15 
CR int. → Residual 1.00   0.84 
CR control. → Residual 1.00   0.80 
 Simon → Response Selection 0.27 0.20 0.18 0.20 
Stop Signal → Response Selection 0.40 0.28 0.16 0.24 
Stop Signal → Response Inhibition 0.28 0.13 0.04 0.22 
Shape Matching → Response Inhibition 1.00   0.79 
     
Variances and covariances 
Response Selection 3.44 2.23 0.12  
Response Inhibition 5.69 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.35 0.64 <0.01  
 
 
 
Model 4: go / no go error term variance constrained to zero 
The error variances of the tasks were all significantly different from zero apart from that of the go / no 
go task. Therefore the error variance of this task was constrained to zero for the next model. This 
resulted in the following set of parameter estimates (Table 5.8)3. 
 
Table 5.8  
Parameter Estimates for Figure 5.4 (Error Variance of Go / No Go Constrained to Zero) 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response Selection 1.00   1.00 
Go / No Go (P) →Response Selection 0.23 0.08 0.01 0.23 
CR int. → Response Selection 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 
CR int. → Residual 1.00   0.84 
CR control → Residual 1.00   0.80 
 Simon → Response Selection 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.16 
Stop Signal → Response Selection 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.17 
     
                                                 
3 This was done in the reverse order to the analyses in Appendix B (here constraining the gng error 
variance to zero, then adding the covariance between CR int. and gng p error terms) due to negative 
error variances appearing when adding the covariance first. 
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Table 5.8 continued     
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Stop Signal → Response Inhibition 0.29 0.13 0.03 0.22 
Shape Matching → Response Inhibition 1.00   0.78 
     
Variances and covariances 
Response Selection 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
Response Inhibition 5.69 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.32 0.64 <0.01  
 
Model 4: covariance added between cued recall and go / no go (picture)  
The modification indices calculated by AMOS further suggested adding a covariance between the 
error terms of the cued recall control trials measure and the go / no go (picture) task. The parameter 
estimates for this model are below (Table 5.9). The covariance indicates that there is some 
unexplained variance common to the cued recall control and go / no go (picture) measure. As both 
tasks are plausibly the two that load most heavily on working memory, it is possible that this is the 
variance in common. This covariance is shown by the curved dashed arrow in Figure 5.4. 
Table 5.9  
Parameter Estimates for Figure 5.4 (Covariance between CR Control and GNG P Errors) 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response Selection 1.00   0.78 
Go / No Go (P) →Response Selection 0.22 0.08 0.01 0.27 
CR int. → Response Selection 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.15 
CR int. → Residual 1.00   0.67 
CR control → Residual 1.00    
 Simon → Response Selection 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.20 
Stop Signal → Response Selection 0.23 0.10 0.02 0.24 
Stop Signal → Response Inhibition 0.28 0.13 0.03 0.22 
Shape Matching → Response Inhibition 1.00   0.79 
     
Variances and covariances 
e3 (gng p) ↔ e7 (cr control) -0.79 0.38 0.04 -0.22 
Response Selection 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
Response Inhibition 5.69 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.21 0.62 <0.01  
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 The final four models4 are nested within each other, and so the model fit statistics can be compared. 
The statistics show that adding the path from the stop-signal task to the response inhibition latent 
variable significantly improved the model fit (Χ2 change = 4.40, df change = 1, p = .04). Constraining 
the error variance of the go / no go task (effectively removing a parameter estimate) did not 
significantly affect the fit of the model (Χ2 change = 0.47, df change = 1, p = .49). Adding the 
covariance between the error terms of the cued recall control and go / no go (picture) tasks also 
significantly improved the model fit (Χ2 change = 4.57, df change = 1, p = .03). The fit of the final model 
can not be compared to the one factor or response inhibition / cognitive inhibition model using a chi-
square difference test, but looking at the AIC statistic shows that the preferred model is the final model 
(with the lowest AIC value). The final model is as Figure 5.4 with the dashed arrows included in the 
model and the error term of the go / no go task fixed to zero.  
 
Table 5.10  
Model Fit Statistics 
Model Χ2 df p NFI CFI AIC RMSEA Low High
One factor 21.70 14 0.09 0.83 0.93 49.70 0.06 0.00 0.11 
Two factor: Response and  
Cognitive Inhibition 21.57 13 0.06 0.83 0.92 51.57 0.07 0.00 0.12 
Two factor: Response 
Inhibition and Selection 24.79 14 0.04 0.81 0.90 52.79 0.07 0.02 0.12 
Two factor (alternate 
response inhibition and 
selection) 
21.78 15 0.11 0.83 0.94 47.78 0.06 0.00 0.10 
Two factor (path from stop 
– signal to response 
inhibition added) 
17.38 14 0.24 0.87 0.96 45.38 0.04 0.00 0.09 
Two factor (gng error 
variance constrained to 0) 17.85 15 0.27 0.86 0.97 43.85 0.04 0.00 0.09 
Two factor (covariance 
between CR int. and go / 
no go (picture) error terms) 
13.28 14 0.51 0.90 1.00 41.28 0.00 0.00 0.08 
 
Chi-square values that are not significant (α = 0.05) indicate a reasonable fit to the data. Values of NFI over 0.9 indicate a 
reasonable fit to the data. Values of CFI close to 1.0 indicate a good fit to the data. Values of RMSEA that have a lower bound 
less than 0.05 and a higher bound less than 0.10 show good approximate fit (and do not show poor approximate fit). The lower 
the AIC value, the more replicable the model (and the better the model fit). Values highlighted in bold meet the statistical criteria. 
                                                 
4 The first of which is Figure 5.4, without the dashed arrows; the second is with the path from response 
inhibition to the stop-signal task added; the third is with the error variance of the go / no go task fixed 
to zero; the fourth is with the covariance between the go / no go picture and cued recall (control) error 
terms added. 
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 Discussion 
One factor model 
The inhibitory control tasks were initially analysed as the measured indicators of a one factor model. 
This was the most parsimonious model, so if this provided a satisfactory fit to the data there was no 
requirement to analyse any further, more complex, models. The overall fit of the one factor model was 
satisfactory, but only the go / no go (picture) measure path coefficient approached being significantly 
different from zero, meaning that the model was poor overall. The following two factor models and 
their task classifications are shown in Figure 5.5. This figure illustrates the task groupings according to 
alternative accounts and the interpretations of the variance coming from each task according to each 
account. 
 
Response inhibition and cognitive inhibition 
The literature also suggested that there were two factors that could be present, with tasks requiring 
either response inhibition or cognitive inhibition. As the two factors were anticipated to have some 
common variance, they were allowed to covary in the model. When the model was analysed, neither 
the cognitive inhibition factor variance or response inhibition factor variance were significantly different 
from zero, and the path coefficients from the tasks to the cognitive inhibition factor were also not 
significantly different from zero. Only the go / no go (picture) task path estimate approached 
significance on the response inhibition factor. The covariance between the two latent variables was not 
significantly different from zero, but the standardised value was above 0.7, suggesting that the two 
variables were not separable (Kline, 2005). The interpretation of these statistics suggests that the 
classification of the inhibitory control tasks into response inhibition (go no / go, go / no go picture, stop 
– signal) and cognitive inhibition (cued recall, shape – matching, Simon) is not supported by the data 
in this study. This does not follow the general classifications of inhibitory control tasks suggested by 
Dempster (1993), Harnishfeger (1995) or Nigg (2000), who all proposed a distinction between 
interference control, cognitive inhibition and response, or behavioural, inhibition. Examining the 
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 statistics suggests that the two factor model of response and cognitive inhibition is no better a fit to the 
data than the one factor model, and considering the added complexity of that model, the more 
parsimonious one factor model should be chosen, as indicated by the AIC values. 
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 Response inhibition and response selection 
As noted, the distinction made between response inhibition and cognitive inhibition is not supported by 
the data from this sample. There has been evidence suggesting that within the classic tasks that tap 
response inhibition (go / no go and stop – signal) there are subdivisions of the resources required 
(Rubia et al., 2001). The go / no go task is said to require response selection, in that the stimuli 
presented to the participant are categorical and are known to them prior to the commencement of the 
task. Therefore the participant can select their response on the basis of what is presented on the 
screen. There is still an element of response inhibition in that the dominant response is to respond to 
the trial, as out of the 26 letters that can be presented as a trial, only one has the no go response. The 
stop – signal task on the other hand, requires response inhibition. This is due to every trial initially 
being presented as a go trial, and only becoming a stop trial on the (possible) presentation of a tone a 
few hundred milliseconds after the letter is shown. For a stop trial the participant will therefore have to 
stop an activated go response, so requiring response inhibition. There is an element of response 
selection in that there are two letters that can be presented (either ‘O’ or ‘X’), so the participant does 
need to select their response on that categorical basis. The classification of the other inhibitory tasks 
on this basis is also possible. 
 
Response selection may underlie all of the inhibitory control tasks, but the extent to which a task 
depends on it as a resource was expected to vary. The stop – signal task was proposed to load on the 
response inhibition latent variable, as were the Simon task and the shape – matching task, whilst the 
go / no go tasks and the cued recall task were proposed to load on the response selection latent 
variable (see Figure 5.5). The Simon task was expected to load on the response inhibition latent 
variable as the dominant (and learned) response is to the position of the arrow, rather than the 
orientation. Therefore to respond to the arrow orientation the (dominant) response to the arrow 
position must be inhibited (at the point of motor response). Alternatively, any interference between 
position and orientation could be resolved at an earlier point (which was then initially classified as 
requiring cognitive inhibition rather than response inhibition) but that underlying process would be 
identical to that of response inhibition. The shape-matching task measure was the difference between 
the response time to the condition in which the distracter shape was present and matched the target 
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 shape and the condition in which there was no distracter shape and the green shape matched the 
target shape. The difference between the two conditions in terms of processing the correct response is 
being able to inhibit any response to the distracter shape matching the target shape. The process of 
matching the green shape and the target shape is the same in both conditions. Therefore the shape-
matching task dependent variable measures the ability of the participant to inhibit the processing of 
the distracter shape, which could either require response / behavioural inhibition in its classical 
definition (stop the active response to the distracter shape at the end of the process), or could require 
dealing with the interference between the distracter and green shapes earlier in the process, using the 
same underlying ability of response inhibition. 
 
For either of these tasks, response selection could also be involved in the choice of which dimension / 
shape to focus on in terms of processing (orientation versus position for the Simon task; distracter 
shape v green shape for shape-matching task), though the type of measure used for the shape-
matching task would suggest that response inhibition is more salient than response selection (as the 
measure focuses on the inhibiting of the distracter shape alone, so the processing or selection of the 
green shape is not part of the measure).    
 
The go / no go tasks were proposed to load onto the response selection factor for the reasons listed 
above. The go / no go (picture) has an additional level of response selection, as the participant needs 
to make a selection based the class of the animal presented (bird or mammal) before then selecting 
whether to respond or not, based on the initial letter of the name of the animal. There will be an 
element of response inhibition in having to inhibit the dominant response of responding (as there are 
only 18 names that began with a vowel compared with 72 that began with a consonant). For the cued 
recall task the participant knew that the word they needed to recall would always be in the second list, 
and so they should have been able to select that target word over the foil word when they needed to 
respond. This would require response selection. 
 
The analysis of this two factor model resulted in the latent variables variances not being significantly 
different from zero. None of the indicator path estimates were significantly different from zero either, 
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 and the model fit statistics suggest that this model provides a poor approximate fit to the data (this 
model had the worst fit statistics of all the models tested). This indicates that this classification of the 
tasks into those that tap either response selection or response inhibition is not supported by the 
current dataset.  
 
Final model and amendments 
The low path coefficient estimates of the shape – matching task in the one factor model pointed 
towards an alternate configuration of the inhibitory control tasks. The shape-matching task appeared 
to tap a different construct to the other tasks in the one factor model. In order to test this approach, the 
shape-matching task was used to estimate a latent variable. As this latent variable had only a single 
indicator, the variance of the error term of the shape-matching task was fixed (in order to estimate the 
path coefficient by identifying the model, in addition to fixing the unstandardised path estimate as 
normal). The error variance was calculated from the reliability value of the shape-matching task. The 
remaining tasks were loading onto the response selection latent variable5 (see Figure 5.5). The Simon 
task was theorised to require response selection in order to select the dimension to respond to, rather 
than having to inhibit the processing of one dimension (position) in order to process the other 
(orientation). The stop-signal tasks requirement for response selection is less clear, but there may 
have been a need for the initial selection of the letter to respond with. The participants also knew what 
to expect (hear a tone, do not respond), so they may have had two concurrent processes that 
competed with each other until the point of the tone or the point of response. It is possible that 
response selection was required to select the process to prioritise. The shape-matching task remained 
on the response inhibition latent variable, as noted above.  
 
The results of this model showed that the response inhibition latent variable’s variance was 
significantly different from zero. The path coefficients of the tasks did not approach being significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that although this model was better in terms of overall fit there were still 
improvements that could be made. The analysis suggested adding a path from the stop-signal task to 
                                                 
5 The latent variable was defined as response selection due to having the go / no go tasks loading on 
it. The statistics show that by the final model the tasks all do tap a common construct. 
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 the response inhibition variable, which had some theoretical grounding, as the stop-signal task is said 
to require both response inhibition and response selection. Alternatives to adding a direct path 
between the stop-signal task and the response inhibition latent variable were adding a covariance 
between the error terms of the stop-signal task and shape-matching task, or adding a covariance 
between the two latent variables. The parameter and factor estimates were identical for all three 
potential choices. The direct path was chosen as this resulted in it contributing to the explained 
variance in the model (the other two, being covariances, represented unexplained variance). This 
resulted in the best fitting model statistically, as well as one that is theoretically grounded.  
 
The modification indices also suggested adding a covariance between the error terms of the cued 
recall (control) task error term and the go / no go (picture) task error term. This indicates that these 
tasks have common variance that is not explained by the current model. These task measures have 
the highest demand for working memory in comparison to the other task measures in the model (none 
of the other tasks require the recall of information). The cued recall (control) measure is the proportion 
of correct control trials, which is affected by the presentation modality and the distraction task only. 
Therefore it would seem only to require working memory, with little interference control that would 
require inhibition. The go / no go (picture) task measure is the proportion of incorrect response to no 
go trials. This requires both inhibition (of the dominant response based on initial letter) and working 
memory (recall of the animal category and the recall of the name of the animal). As working memory 
seems to be common to both tasks, the covariance was added to the model. Adding these two paths 
(the stop-signal to response inhibition direct path, and the covariance) significantly improved the model 
fit. The error variances of the measured indicators were all significantly different from zero, except for 
that of the go / no go task. Therefore this error variance was fixed to zero in the final model. Removing 
this parameter (fixing it to zero) did not significantly affect the model fit. The inhibitory control model 
therefore consisted of the six tasks loading onto two separate latent variables, defined as response 
inhibition and response selection. Tasks loading on the response inhibition latent variable were the 
shape-matching and stop-signal task, and the tasks loading on the response selection latent variable 
were the stop-signal, go / no go, go / no go (picture), cued recall and Simon tasks. 
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An issue to be noted is the low path estimates of some of the measured indicators. This suggests that 
the amount of variance in these indicators that is explained by the underlying inhibitory factors is 
relatively low. These values were still significantly different from zero however, which indicates that the 
inhibitory factors explain a low but significant proportion of the tasks variances. The reliabilities of the 
tasks were all reasonable, which suggests that the measured effects were consistent throughout the 
duration of the tasks. A final issue is that the definitions of the latent variables are constrained by the 
nature of the tasks used, and are hence not definite. The issue of vague interpretations of executive 
functions is a recognised problem in both latent variable analysis and executive function research 
(Miyake et al., 2000). However, the model analyses suggest a clear factor structure. This has been 
interpreted in terms of the existing literature to provide a plausible basis to continue on to examine the 
relationship of these inhibitory factors with ToM. 
 
The final model consists of two inhibition components, defined as response inhibition and response 
selection. Response inhibition underlies the shape-matching task and stop-signal task, and response 
selection underlies the go / no go tasks, the cued recall task, the Simon task and the stop-signal task. 
A covariance between the cued recall (control) task and go / no go (picture) task indicates shared 
unexplained variance that may be attributable to working memory. This provides a novel classification 
of the executive functions underlying these tasks, and does not directly support the inhibitory 
classifications of Nigg (2000), Dempster (1993), or Harnishfeger (1995). There is some support for the 
two factor model found by Friedman and Miyake (2004), though the precise definitions of the factors 
are different. Some of the dissimilarity could be due to the different tasks used (for example, Simon 
and go / no go tasks were used in the current study). The current tasks were also primarily developed 
for this study, whereas more established tasks were used by Friedman and Miyake (2004). This could 
lead to the differences between the current findings and those of earlier studies and theorists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 6. Inhibitory control and theory of mind tasks 
Chapter 5 established two inhibitory components, response inhibition and response selection. The 
relationships between these inhibitory latent variables and ToM were then analysed using structural 
equation modelling. 
Visual perspective task 
 
The two dependent measures used in the model were the differences between the inconsistent and 
consistent response times for the avatar trials and for the self trials. Both differences give a measure 
of the amount of interference caused by the alternate perspective, and hence the difference between 
the inconsistent and consistent avatar trials was termed ‘egocentric interference’ and the difference 
between the inconsistent and consistent self trials was termed ‘altercentric interference’. These two 
effects were proposed to correlate significantly with one another, and this proved to be the case (Table 
6.1). However, as the magnitude of the correlation was relatively small, the measures were treated as 
single indicators of separate latent variables that were then allowed to covary. As the reliability of the 
measures were known (egocentric = 0.63, altercentric = 0.43), their error variance could be estimated 
using the following formula: (1 - reliability) * (standard deviation)2 (Garson, 2008). This gives the error 
variances of the egocentric and altercentric measures as 4.49 and 5.80 respectively. 
 
 
Keysar task 
 
The data showed that participants consistently made errors in the experimental trials that were 
attributable to either not being able to take the instructor’s perspective into account, or not being able 
to use the information gained from taking the instructor’s perspective into account. Results from a 
series of studies by Apperly et al. (submitted) indicate that the participants are not using the 
information gained from taking the instructor’s perspective. The results from these studies, which used 
variations of the study used in the current model, have two potential explanations. Participants may 
take the instructor’s perspective during or after they hear the instruction (using this on-the-fly to ignore 
and identify the incorrect and correct items), or they may use the time before the initial instruction for 
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 each grid to identify and rule out items that the instructor can and can not see, and then hold this 
information in mind whilst then listening to the instructions. Difficulties in both on-the-fly calculating of 
the instructor’s perspective and holding in mind that perspective may explain the propensity of adults 
to make errors in this task, and both of these possible processes may require executive function. A 
third possibility is that the difficulties arise from issues in switching perspectives, rather than from 
having to infer, hold and use information about another perspective. This was investigated by Apperly 
et al. (submitted) through experiments using two instructors with different perspectives (one had the 
same perspective as the participant (the informed instructor), whilst the other was ignorant as in the 
original experiment). The instructions were given by the informed instructor half the time and the 
ignorant instructor half the time. The critical trials were preceded by an instruction by the same 
instructor (no-switch condition) or by the other instructor (switch condition). If switching perspectives 
(due to the instruction from the instructors) caused the errors, more errors should be made in the 
switching condition. The results showed that there was no main effect of switching, suggesting that 
participants have no difficulty in switching perspectives, and hence errors are more likely to be caused 
by issues in inferring, holding and using perspective information. 
 
Within the experimental trials, there were significantly more errors made in relational trials than in the 
ambiguous trials (Apperly et al., submitted). The reason for this may be that the ambiguous instruction 
draws more attention to the perspective difference between the participant and instructor than a 
relational instruction. The increased salience of the perspective difference in the ambiguous trials may 
make the instructors perspective easier to compute on line, and easier to hold the instructors 
perspective in mind. 
 
These two effects were also proposed to correlate significantly with one another due to the similar 
demands of having to infer the instructor’s perspective, hold this in mind and then use the information 
from his perspective, and this proved to be the case (Table 6.1). As the size of the correlation was 
relatively large, the measures could be treated as indicators of a single latent variable1. However, due 
                                                 
1 As the correlation is less than 0.7, the two measures may tap the same construct but the size of the 
correlation suggests that combining them to form a single measure indicator is not necessary or 
desirable. 
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 to the possible differences in processing involved in ambiguous and relational trials, they were treated 
as single indicators of separate latent variables that were also allowed to covary. The error variance of 
the indicator needed to be fixed in order for the model to be identified. As the reliability of the Keysar 
measures are known, the error variance can be estimated using the following formula: (1 - reliability) * 
(standard deviation)2 (Garson, 2008). This gives the values for the error variances of the relational 
measure and ambiguous measure as 1.23 and 4.77 respectively. 
  
Table 6.1  
Pearson Inter-correlation Coefficients for Theory of Mind Measures 
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1: Ambiguous errors (Keysar) --    
2: Relational errors (Keysar)     0.64 (**) --   
3: Egocentric intrusions 0.05 0.06 --  
4: Altercentric interference -0.08 -0.04 0.22 (**) -- 
 
Note:  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
    
 
As Table 6.1 shows, there are no significant correlations between the measures from the visual 
perspective task and the measures from the Keysar task. Both tasks are level-one perspective taking 
tasks, so even though one task appears to be ‘harder’ in terms of task demands (the Keysar task), it 
might have been expected that the pairs of tasks measures would correlate due to similar general 
processes. This is because both tasks require perspective taking, the maintenance of that perspective 
and any information contained in it, and being able to deal with any perspective interference. However, 
the Keysar task has a larger set of items to maintain, and also requires the participant to problem-
solve by integrating perspective information with the instructions given in the task. Both of these 
suggest greater task demands for the Keysar task. The sets of correlation between the measures of 
the Keysar task and the measures of the visual perspective task are all non-significant (the magnitude 
of these correlations are all < 0.09), so one possibility is that these tasks are measuring different 
processes or abilities, perhaps within theory of mind or perhaps two different types or systems of ToM. 
Another possibility is that the greater task demands of the Keysar task cause the low correlation with 
the visual perspective task. As the Keysar task is more difficult, it may recruit different executive 
functions to the visual perspective task, leading to a lack of correlation. 
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 As there is no correlation between the measures from the two tasks in the structural models they will 
be treated as separate. Therefore, there will be four latent variables for the four measured indicators 
with covariances and relationships between the ambiguous and relational error latent variables, and 
also between the egocentric and altercentric latent variables. 
 
The abbreviations of the tasks in the models are as follows (EF tasks as before): 
K (amb.) Ambiguous errors in the Keysar task 
K (rel.)  Relational errors in the Keysar task 
VP_O  Visual perspective trials focusing on avatar perspective 
VP_S  Visual perspective trials focusing on self perspective 
d  Disturbances of latent variables (error terms)    
Structural Equations 
A two-step approach to the modelling was used (Kline, 2005), with a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) model being estimated as the first step to check that the model was identified. This was to 
establish that a more parsimonious structural model would also be identified. This can be seen in 
appendix C. This gave an adequate fit to the data (Table 6.6). The structural (SR) model was identified 
as the second step. The error variances of the ToM latent variables are shown in Appendix B. 
 
 
Saturated model (all paths) 
The initial SR model retained all paths between the inhibitory factors of response inhibition and 
response selection and the ToM target tasks (Figure 6.1). In the initial models the relationships 
between the ToM latent variable pairs (Keysar ambiguous errors – relational errors; Visual perspective 
egocentric interference – altercentric interference) were represented by direct paths between the latent 
variables. This would mean that performance on one of a pair would predict performance on the other, 
in other words, there are similar processes in both measures. An alternative arrangement would be to 
have a covariance between the disturbances of the latent variable pairs. This would represent 
unexplained (by the model) common variance. 
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Figure 6.1: All paths from inhibitory factors 
 
 
The estimates for all the parameters can be seen in Table 6.2. All the path estimates that were not 
significantly different from zero were set to zero in the next model. The estimates of the EF parameter 
estimates have the same values as in Chapter 5. The squared multiple correlation (SMC) values give 
an indication of the amount of variance of the latent variable that is explained by the model (cf. r2). 
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 Table 6.2  
Parameters for All Paths Model 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational ← RI 0.26 0.12 0.03 0.24 
Ambiguous ← RI -0.10 0.11 0.35 -0.11 
Egocentric int. ← RI 0.45 0.15 0.01 0.38 
Altercentric int. ← RI 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.19 
Relational ← RS -0.01 0.01 0.89 -0.01 
Ambiguous ← RS 0.01 0.08 0.87 0.02 
Egocentric int. ← RS 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.16 
Altercentric int. ← RS 0.05 0.11 0.62 0.06 
Rel. → Amb. 0.86 0.09 <0.01 0.982 
Ego. Int. → Alt. Int. 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.35 
 
Variances and covariances 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.68 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.21 0.62 <0.01  
 
Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) 
Relational 0.06    
Ambiguous 0.93    
Ego. Interference 0.17    
Alt. Interference 0.22    
 
 
 
Model 2 (significant paths only) 
The remaining paths, from response inhibition to egocentric interference and from response inhibition 
to relational errors, were both significantly different from zero. The parameter estimates can be seen in  
Table 6.3, and the model itself in Figure 6.2.  
 
                                                 
2 As this estimate is above 0.7, an interpretation is that these two latent variables are in fact the same. 
In order to test this, models with one latent variable for the Keysar task were tested (with ambiguous 
and relational errors as indicators). The statistics suggest that in the all path models, the one Keysar 
LV model is preferred, but in the significant path only models, the individual measure Keysar LVs are 
preferred (see Appendix C). 
 122
  
Response 
Inhibition 
e e
e
e e e e
GNG GNG (P) CR (int.) 
CR (cont.) 
Simon SS SM 
 
Response 
Selection 
 
Ambiguous 
 
Relational 
 
Egocentric 
Int. 
 
Altercentric 
Int. 
e
K (amb.) 
e
K (rel.) 
e
VP_O 
e
VP_S 
CR 
common 
variance 
d d d d
 
Figure 6.2: Significant paths only (final model3) 
 
Table 6.3  
Significant Paths Only 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational ← RI 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.23 
Egocentric int. ← RI 0.46 0.15 <0.01 0.39 
Rel. → Amb. 0.83 0.09 <0.01 0.96 
     
                                                 
3 The final model includes the two covariances in green (Table 6.4) and red (Table 6.5)  
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Table 6.3 continued 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised  
Estimate 
Ego. → Alt. 0.33 0.11 <0.01 0.45 
Variances and covariances 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.21 0.62 <0.01  
 
Square Multiple Correlation 
Relational 0.05    
Ambiguous 0.91    
Ego. Interference 0.15    
Alt. Interference 0.21    
 
 
Model 3 (covariance between cued recall and ambiguous errors) 
The modification indices suggested adding a covariance from the error term of the cued recall 
interference measure to the error term of the ambiguous errors task would significantly improve the 
model fit. As the model was designed only to measure inhibitory control as the construct of interest, 
the covariance suggests the presence of another construct that is unexplained by the current model 
(covariance in a SR model indicated shared unexplained variance between the two variables 
involved). It is likely that inhibitory control is not the only executive function or theoretical construct that 
is related to or part of ToM, so the covariance was added to the model. This covariance is shown by 
the dashed curved green line in Figure 6.2. 
Table 6.4  
Path Model with Covariance between CR and Ambiguous Errors Added 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised  
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational ← RI 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.22 
Egocentric int. ← RI 0.46 0.15 <0.01 0.39 
Rel. → Amb. 0.79 0.08 <0.01 0.94 
Ego. → Alt. 0.33 0.11 <0.01 0.45 
 
Variances and covariances 
e CR ↔ e Amb.  -1.34 0.39 <0.01 -0.44 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
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 Table 6.4 continued     
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised  
Estimate 
     
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.18 0.61 <0.01  
     
     
Squared Multiple Correlations 
Relational 0.05    
Ambiguous 0.88    
Ego. Interference 0.15    
Alt. Interference 0.21    
 
 
Model 4 (covariance between go / no go (picture) and ambiguous errors) 
The modification indices showed that adding a covariance between the go / no go (picture) measure 
error term and the ambiguous errors task error term would significantly improve the model fit. As the 
go / no go (picture) and the cued recall task (which already covaried with the ambiguous errors error 
term) were correlated, it was likely that this covariance represented the same unexplained variance as 
the previous covariance. Therefore it was added to the model. This covariance is shown by the 
dashed curved red line in Figure 6.2. 
 
Table 6.5  
Path Model with Covariance between GNG (P) and Ambiguous Errors Added 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational ← RI 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.22 
Egocentric int. ← RI 0.46 0.15 <0.01 0.39 
Rel. → Amb. 0.73 0.08 <0.01 0.92 
Ego. → Alt. 0.33 0.11 <0.01 0.45 
 
Variances and covariances 
e CR ↔ e Amb.  -1.14 0.38 <0.01 -0.38 
e GNG (P) ↔ e Amb. 1.24 0.47 <0.01 0.24 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.19 0.61 <0.01  
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 Table 6.5 continued     
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
Relational 0.05    
Ambiguous 0.85    
Ego. Interference 0.15    
Alt. Interference 0.21    
 
At this point all the parameters included were significantly different from zero, and there were no 
parameters that would significantly improve the model fit that had a strong theoretical grounding. The 
model fits can all be seen in Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6  
Model fit statistics 
Model CMIN df p NFI CFI AIC RMSEA Low High 
CFA model 61.77 38 0.01 0.78 0.90 117.77 0.07 0.03 0.09 
All paths 61.91 38 0.01 0.78 0.89 115.56 0.07 0.03 0.09 
Significant paths only 66.67 44 0.02 0.76 0.90 110.67 0.06 0.03 0.09 
Sig. paths (add. cov.)* 53.60 43 0.13 0.81 0.95 99.60 0.04 0.00 0.07 
Sig. paths (add. cov)** 46.75 42 0.28 0.83 0.98 94.75 0.03 0.00 0.06 
 
*added covariance between error terms of cued recall interference measure and ambiguous errors measure 
**added covariance between error terms of go / no go (picture) measure and ambiguous errors measure 
 
The final model includes significant paths from the response inhibition latent variable to the egocentric 
interference effect, from the response inhibition latent variable to relational errors, There are also 
covariances from the cued recall interference measure error term to the error term of the Keysar 
ambiguous errors measure, and from the go / no go (picture) measure error term to the error term of 
the Keysar ambiguous errors measure, indicating a shared variance that is unexplained by the current 
inhibitory model. As these tasks are correlated, it is likely to be the same unexplained variance in both 
covariances. This could potentially be a different executive function such as working memory. A 
different battery of executive tasks could be used to investigate this potential relationship. 
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 Discussion and follow up analyses 
Structural equation model 
The initial overall model was a confirmatory factor analysis model, with covariances between the two 
inhibitory control latent variables (response inhibition and response selection) and the four ToM latent 
variables (egocentric interference, altercentric interference, relational errors and ambiguous errors). 
There were also covariances within the pairs of ToM measures (between the egocentric and 
altercentric interference measures, and between the relational and ambiguous error measures)4. This 
model was identified (this step is necessary to establish that the more parsimonious structural model 
will also be identified, and in addition to check that the model had a reasonable fit to the data), so the 
structural model was tested next in which the covariances were replaced by direct paths for the 
structural model. The path estimates that were not significantly different from zero were removed. This 
resulted in direct paths from the response inhibition latent variable to the egocentric interference latent 
variable and to the relational error latent variable. There were also direct paths between the pairs of 
ToM latent variables (that replaced the covariances). The fit statistics for this model were adequate, 
but the modification indices suggested adding covariances from the error term of the cued recall 
interference measure and the error term of the go / no go (picture) to the error term of the ambiguous 
error latent variable. Adding covariances between error terms of indicators of endogenous and 
exogenous latent variables is only done when there are good theoretical grounds for doing so (it 
should not be done simply to improve model fit). The covariance between the cued recall control 
measure and go / no go (picture) error terms suggests that these tasks tap a construct not included in 
the current model. This is likely, due to task demands, to be working memory. As working memory has 
also been linked to ToM performance (Carlson & Moses, 2001) in children, it is possible that it is also 
related to ToM in adults. Therefore the covariances were added to allow this relationship in the model. 
This resulted in a good set of fit statistics, in terms of the individual path coefficients and also the 
overall model fit. 
                                                 
4 The value of the estimate for the path between the relational and ambiguous latent variables was < 
0.9, suggesting they were identical, so an alternative set of models was tested in which the relational 
and ambiguous measured indicators tapped one Keysar latent variable. AIC values indicated that the 
separate Keysar latent variables models were better than the single Keysar latent variable models 
when non-significant paths between the EF and ToM latent variables were removed (see appendix C). 
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 Path from Response Inhibition latent variable to the Egocentric Interference latent variable.  
This path shows that the variability of participants on the response inhibition latent variable affects 
their variability on the egocentric interference latent variable. The model structure means that an 
increase in the response inhibition latent variable results in an increase in the egocentric interference 
latent variable. As a high score on the measured indicators of the response inhibition factor (for both 
the shape-matching task and the stop-signal task) is a result of greater interference (by the distracter 
in the shape-matching) and less inhibitory control (in the stop-signal task), the higher the factor score, 
the lower the ability to efficiently inhibit responses. The egocentric interference measure also 
increases when the interference between the perspectives is greater (a higher response time equates 
to lower performance). Therefore the (positive) path coefficient between the response inhibition and 
egocentric interference latent variables shows that the ability to inhibit responses successfully is 
associated with the ability to successfully deal with interference from your self perspective when 
attempting to process another’s perspective. There is no path between the response inhibition latent 
variable and the altercentric interference latent variable.  
 
The direct path between the two visual perspective latent variables could be replaced by a covariance 
between their error terms. This would represent a shared variance that is unexplained by the model. 
The direct path represents a relationship that accounts for some of the variance in the model as a 
whole. Changing the direction of the path between the two latent variables affects the model fit, the 
path estimates and the interpretation of the model. The direction in the current model is from the 
egocentric interference latent variable to the altercentric interference latent variable. The reasoning 
behind this is that as the response inhibition latent variable has a path to the egocentric latent variable, 
it seems more sensible to have an indirect link from the response inhibition latent variable to the 
altercentric interference latent variable through the egocentric interference latent variable. The 
interpretation of this would be that dealing with interference from the self perspective (whilst trying to 
process an alternate perspective) requires some response inhibition, but that dealing with interference 
from another’s perspective whilst processing one’s own does not explicitly require response inhibition. 
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 To test this, further models were analysed to check that the path between the response inhibition 
latent variable and the egocentric latent variable did not mask a path between response inhibition and 
the altercentric latent variable. When a path was added between response inhibition and the 
altercentric latent variable (with the removal of the response inhibition-egocentric path), this path was 
significantly different from zero (Tables 4.1 and 4.3 in Appendix D). This suggests that altercentric 
interference also taps response inhibition. In these models the path between the interference latent 
variables was from altercentric to egocentric. When this path was reversed, the response inhibition – 
altercentric path was no longer significant (Table 4.2 in Appendix D). In order to see what would 
happen to the response inhibition – egocentric path in the same situation, a model was tested with a 
path from response inhibition to egocentric interference (with no response inhibition – altercentric 
path), with the path between the perspective variables from altercentric to egocentric. In this model, 
the response inhibition-egocentric path remained significant (Table 4.4 in Appendix D). The implication 
is that both egocentric and altercentric interference effects tap response inhibition, but that the 
stronger relationship is between response inhibition and egocentric interference. The best fitting model 
statistically (see Table 4.6 in Appendix D; Figure 6.2; Table 6.5) has a direct path from response 
inhibition to egocentric interference, and a path from egocentric to altercentric interference.  
 
However, from a conceptual standpoint it seems more likely that response inhibition is directly required 
in both interference effects, most probably in dealing with any interference arising from conflict 
between the perspectives. Model D in Appendix D (Figure 4.4 and Table 4.5) shows this relationship, 
with paths from response inhibition to both interference variables. The previous models (Tables 4.1 
and 4.3 in Appendix D) also suggest that altercentric interference is related to response inhibition. The 
relationship between the interference variables is represented by a covariance. The model fit statistics 
for this model (Table 4.6 in Appendix D) show that it has a similar (albeit slightly less close) fit to the 
data as the final model shown in Figure 6.2. The interpretation of this model is that dealing with 
interference from another perspective requires response inhibition (more so in the case of egocentric 
interference). There is also a theoretical construct that is common to both interference effects. This is 
not response inhibition, and may be another executive function. This model makes more sense 
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 theoretically than the current final model, but that model is better statistically. These models will be 
revisited in the general discussion (Chapter 9) in light of the findings from Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Overall there is a strong relationship between ability in response inhibition and ability in dealing with 
interference from self perspective, and a weaker relationship between ability in response inhibition and 
ability in dealing with interference from another’s perspective. The implication is that dealing with 
interference between perspectives requires inhibitory control. 
Path from Response Inhibition latent variable to the Relational Error latent variable 
For the relational error measured indicator an increased score showed that the participant was not 
using the information gained from the instructor’s perspective. The positive direct path between the 
response inhibition factor and the relational error factor shows that the ability to successfully inhibit a 
response is related to the ability to use the information from another’s perspective.  
 
To test whether this path masked a path from response inhibition to ambiguous errors, an alternative 
model with a path from response inhibition to ambiguous errors was tested (without a path from 
response inhibition to relational errors). The path between the two error variables was from ambiguous 
to relational. In this model the path between response inhibition and ambiguous errors only 
approached significance. This suggests that the stronger direct relationship is between response 
inhibition and relational errors. 
 
The direct path between the two latent variables of the Keysar task could also be replaced by a 
covariance between their error terms, representing a shared variance that is unexplained by the 
inhibitory model. Including a direct path means that the relationship shown accounts for some of the 
variance in the model as a whole. This would also suggest that ability in response inhibition is related, 
indirectly, with performance in ambiguous trials. This relationship would be mediated by the relational 
trials. As there is only a direct path to the relational error latent variable from the response inhibition 
latent variable that is significantly different from zero, the implication is that relationship between 
response inhibition and ambiguous errors will be mediated by performance in the relational trials. The 
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 direction of the path between the two latent variables can also affect the model fit and the path 
estimates.   
 
There is therefore a direct relationship between response inhibition ability and ability in passing 
relational trials, and an indirect relationship between response inhibition and ability in passing 
ambiguous trials. An interpretation is that passing a relational trial requires response inhibition to deal 
with the competing perspective information (of self and instructor). Participants are presented with two 
potential referents for a critical instruction, and need to take on the instructor’s perspective to select 
the correct one. There are in essence two separable go signals, as there are two alternative referents 
(for example, two ‘small balls’ (see Figure 3.7)), one from their perspective and one from the 
instructor’s perspective. Participants have to respond to one signal and not the other, with the 
knowledge that the items have different properties (position or size) providing a distinction between the 
items. Due to the inherent perspective difference cueing due to the ambiguity of the instructions, the 
ambiguous trials may not require response inhibition directly. The two potential referents have the 
same name, and so the process that works in the relational trials will not compute for the ambiguous 
trials as there is no clear distinction between the items in terms of size or position. However, in the 
current model, performance on the relational trials that do involve response inhibition can predict 
performance on the ambiguous trials, which does suggest that similar processes are involved if the 
relationship between the variables is a direct path. In addition, the perspective difference cueing may 
make the ambiguous trials less effortful, and hence less directly reliant on executive function. The 
reliability of the ambiguous trials was also lower. This was perhaps due to the lower variance within 
the task (the range of participant scores was lower than in the relational trials). This then meant that 
the estimated error variance was higher. An interpretation of this may be that the ambiguous trials are 
a less pure measure of ToM use than the relational trials, possibly due to the perspective cueing 
aspect involved. This may mean that more than one executive function is tapped by the processes 
involved, resulting in there not being a direct relationship between response inhibition and the 
ambiguous errors latent variable in this model. This is supported by the covariances involving the 
ambiguous indicator error term. 
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 Another interpretation of this part of the model is that people can differ on their propensity to take on 
another person’s perspective (Wu & Keysar, 2007). This is more likely to be represented by a 
covariance between the relational and ambiguous latent variables, as it is not explicitly related to 
inhibition. In this case, the relational trials are a better measure of the participants likelihood to take the 
instructor’s perspective, and if they are likely to do that (and perform well in these trials), then they are 
also likely to take the instructor’s perspective in the ambiguous trials and perform well in those too. If 
they aren’t as likely to take the instructor’s perspective, they would tend to perform adequately on the 
relational trials, but would not be as good on the ambiguous trials due to the relative difficulty in 
selecting one of the two items. This gives another account for the relationship between relational and 
ambiguous errors and for the direction from relational to ambiguous, in addition to a purely executive 
function based account. 
Covariances 
As noted, there were covariances added from the cued recall (interference) error term and the go / no 
go (picture) error term to the ambiguous errors error term. This indicates that there is some common 
variance between these tasks that is not explained by the current model. As this model focuses on 
inhibitory control, the implication is that the common variance is not inhibitory in nature, and may be 
another executive function. The developmental literature (esp. Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 
2002; Carlson, et al., 2004) shows that inhibitory control and working memory are associated with 
false belief performance (but that conflict inhibition tasks predicted false belief performance over and 
above working memory, possibly due to their tapping of both inhibitory control and working memory), 
so the common unexplained variance may be working memory or a memory construct. For the 
ambiguous trials, the perspective cueing may result in working memory being needed to hold both 
perspectives in mind in order to be able to select between them. This may be the basis of an error-
correcting strategy, but may also involve some level of response inhibition to deal with any 
interference between the perspectives. This may account for the potential indirect relationship with 
response inhibition. The presence of another executive function in the underlying processes of theory 
of mind is sound theoretically, as it is unlikely that such a complex set of processes as theory of mind 
would be attributable to only one (inhibitory control) executive function, even if that has two 
components (response inhibition and response selection). 
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 The amount of variance of the ToM latent variables explained by the model also differed. The variance 
explained of the visual perspective latent variables was approximately 17%, and of the Keysar latent 
variables approximately 45%. The implication of this difference is that the processes involved in the 
Keysar task rely on executive function to more of an extent than those involved in the visual 
perspective task. However, this is only true of inhibitory control as the executive function. Other 
executive functions may contribute to the processes involved, but are not included in the current 
models. It is also possible that the relationship between the Keysar variables explains more of their 
variance than the relationship between them and response inhibition. This would mean that the 
executive function requirements of the two tasks are more similar. Overall, although this model is 
applicable only to the current data set, the two sets of theory of mind tasks, which are both level-one 
perspective taking tasks, show similar associations with the inhibitory control latent variables, but show 
no correlation between their task pairs, and have differing amounts of variance explained by the 
(inhibitory control) model.  
 
This evidence suggests that one possibility is that there could be two different sets of underlying 
processes for the two ToM tasks. Both require inhibitory control, but one is a relatively fast process, 
with any processing or interference costs being shown by increases in response time rather than 
errors. The other may require more inhibitory control and potentially other executive functions, and be 
a more flexible process as a result. Because of this, this process is more prone to errors (and any 
costs or interference are shown by errors rather than increases in response time).  
 
Another possibility is that the lack of a relationship between the tasks may be due to task demand 
differences. As described earlier in the thesis, the visual perspective task requires the participant to 
observe a sequence of images (a cue as to what perspective to take; the number of circles to verify 
from that perspective; the image itself) and then to respond by pressing the appropriate mouse button. 
This involves inferring the alternate perspective, maintaining and using the information from that 
perspective and dealing with any interference. The Keysar task requires the same processes, but the 
participant additionally has to follow auditory instructions to select a referent, and then to click and 
drag the item as per the instruction. This means that they need to integrate the information from the 
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 instructor’s perspective with their instruction. Therefore even though the two tasks are in essence both 
level-one perspective taking tasks, as the participant needs to take another’s perspective into account 
in order to successfully complete a trial, some of the individual task demands are different. This could 
explain the lack of a correlation between the two task pairs of latent variables, rather than there being 
two different processes that underlie the two different tasks. This could be due to the Keysar task 
being quantitatively more difficult than the visual perspective task, which could result in the recruitment 
of different executive functions, or perhaps the recruitment of more of a given executive function 
(Stuss & Alexander, 2007). However, the demands of the two tasks show more similarities than 
differences, suggesting that there should be at least some significant correlation between them. The 
absence of such a correlation would suggest that a two-system explanation is more likely than one 
based on task demands.  
 
A final possibility is that the common demands of the two tasks account for very little of the variability 
of either task. As the likelihood is that the common task demands are ToM processes, this would 
suggest that ToM plays very little role in either task, which seems unlikely. If this was true, it would 
result in there being no correlation between the two tasks, as the common variability would be low.  
 
In either case, the implication is that the individual differences in ToM will depend on the type of ToM 
task that is used, and the relative task demands. Ways of clarifying whether task demands or different 
underlying processes account for the two separable and uncorrelated tasks could include using 
different tasks to see whether they were also separable on the same basis of the two processes 
involved. This could be done by the design of a novel level-one perspective task whose difficulty can 
be increased. The differing task demands explanation would be supported if the version with 
increased difficulty did not correlate with the original version. Tasks could be designed that are more 
equal in terms of task demands but that can be categorised as using one system or the other in order 
to see if they were still uncorrelated. If this was the case, then the two-system explanation would be 
supported, as task demands would be equal. An issue to consider is how to systematically define the 
difficulty of the tasks and the respective task demands that are involved. To run another individual 
differences study would have been difficult due to time constraints, so the technique of dual tasking to 
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look at the contributions of executive function to complex tasks was used. This technique allows the 
investigation of whether executive function is involved in level-one perspective taking generally. This 
approach will be detailed in Chapter 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7. High and low inhibitory control groups 
In order to cross-check the validity of the overall model findings in the individual differences study, the 
performance of participants in the executive function tasks was compared to their performances on the 
ToM tasks. If the relationships found in the SEM model are valid, then the high and low performing 
groups on a given latent variable of executive function (established on the factor scores in the model) 
should also differ in their performance on the ToM tasks linked to that latent variable in the SEM 
model.  
 
Therefore it would be predicted from the model that high and low groups on the response inhibition 
factor would differ in their performances in the visual perspective task (specifically on egocentric 
interference) and on the Keysar task (specifically in relational errors). High and low groups on the 
response selection factor should not differ on any of the ToM tasks. 
 
The response inhibition factor is positively related to the ToM factors: if the factor score increases, the 
ToM factors scores will also increase. As an increase in task DV is indicative of an increase in 
interference or errors (for inhibition tasks and for ToM tasks), low scores on the inhibitory factors show 
a high level of inhibitory control, whilst a high score on the factors show a low level of inhibitory control. 
The low inhibition groups would be expected to show greater interference effects in the visual 
perspective tasks and a greater number of errors in the Keysar task compared to the high inhibition 
groups.  
 
Initial analyses 
Using the factor score weights calculated in AMOS (the regression weights of the measured indicators 
for each factor) a score was calculated for each participant on each inhibitory factor1. The 20 lowest 
scoring and 20 highest scoring participants on each factor were then identified and grouped (the 
                                                 
1 Participants were also grouped using the factor scores from the EF factor model, and by using a 
single task from each factor as an exemplar of that factor. Results from these alternative analyses 
showed a similar pattern to the method chosen. 
 136
 remaining 101 participants on each factor were classed as ‘medium’ and were not analysed here), 
forming two independent variables with two levels: 
 
Response Inhibition: high IC group and low IC group 
Response Selection: high RS group and low RS group 
 
The groups were created for each factor independently, but of the participants who were classed as a 
high or low score for a factor, only nine also had a high or low score for the other factor. Of these nine, 
three had the same classification in both factors (three low on RI and RS), and six had different 
classifications in the factors (three low on RS and high on RI; three high on RS and low on RI). The 
remaining 31 participants scored either high or low on one factor and were classed as medium on the 
other factor. 
 
The performances of the high and low groups from each executive factor on the ToM tasks were 
analysed using separate ANOVAs for each ToM dependent variable and for each executive factor. 
The dependent variables were egocentric interference and altercentric interference from the visual 
perspective task, and relational errors and ambiguous errors from the Keysar task. 
 
F1: Response Selection (IV = high or low RS group) 
There was no effect of group on the relational errors (F (1, 38) = 0.37, p = 0.55, ηp2 = 0.01) and 
ambiguous errors (F (1, 38) = 0.61, p = 0.44, ηp2 = 0.02) from the Keysar task. The high RS group did 
not perform differently than the low RS group in the Keysar task.  
 
There was no effect of group on egocentric or altercentric interference (F (1, 38) = 0.88, p = 0.35, ηp2 = 
0.02 and F (1, 38) = 0.00, p = 0.97, ηp2 = 0.00 respectively), so there was no difference in the 
performances of the RS groups on the visual perspective task. 
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 F2: Response Inhibition (IV = high or low IC group) 
There was a main effect of group on the relational errors from the Keysar task (F (1, 38) = 9.93, p ≤ 0.01, 
ηp
2 = 0.21), and on the ambiguous errors (F (1, 38) = 5.07, p = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.12). The high IC group 
performed significantly better than the low IC group on the relational trials and the ambiguous trials. 
 
There was a main effect of group on egocentric interference (F (1, 38) = 4.38, p = 0.04, ηp2 = 0.10) and 
altercentric interference (F (1, 38) = 10.76, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.22). The high IC group had significantly 
lower interference effects than the low IC group on both self and avatar perspective trials. 
 
The response selection high and low groups did not differ in their performance on both the relational 
and ambiguous errors from the Keysar task or the egocentric and altercentric interference effects from 
the visual perspective task. This is consistent with the SEM model, which has no direct paths from the 
response selection factor to any ToM latent variable.  
 
There was a difference for the response inhibition groups on the relational and ambiguous errors from 
the Keysar task and for the egocentric and altercentric interference effects from the visual perspective 
task. This is consistent with the SEM model in there being differences in performance in the Keysar 
task and in the visual perspective task based on response inhibition ability. This difference in 
performance was found in the task measures that were directly linked to response inhibition in the final 
statistically best fitting SEM model (relational errors and egocentric interference) and also with the 
measures indirectly linked to response inhibition (ambiguous errors and altercentric interference). 
These findings support model D in Appendix D that has paths from response inhibition to both 
interference effects, rather than the final model in Chapter 6. The effect size of group is larger for 
altercentric interference than for egocentric interference, which is the opposite finding from the SEM 
model (for both the best-fitting statistically and the alternative model D).  
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 Secondary analyses 
In order to investigate the different performances of the high and low inhibitory control groups on the 
ToM tasks, group was used as a factor. These analyses would show whether the high performing 
group were more efficient in the ToM tasks compared to the low performing group. In the visual 
perspective task this would be shown by the consistency effects being different for the groups, with a 
larger consistency effect in the low performance group because of greater difficulty in resolving conflict 
between the inconsistent perspectives. For the Keysar task, this would be shown by a higher error rate 
in the low performance group. This would give some indication of whether good executive function 
ability results in better (faster and less error-prone) ToM performance. Therefore, for the visual 
perspective task, the analyses were two 2 x 2 mixed ANOVAs on response times and errors 
separately: Consistency (consistent v inconsistent) and Group (high v low). Perspective was analysed 
separately, as only the consistency effect was of interest. For the Keysar task, the performance of 
each RI group on the number of relational and ambiguous errors was analysed by using a one-sample 
t-test with a theoretical value of zero.  
 
Visual Perspective: Response Inhibition factor only 
Self perspective 
There was a main effect of consistency, with the inconsistent response times (733.93ms) significantly 
longer than consistent response times (656.77ms) (F (1, 38) = 76.27, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.67), and a main 
effect of group (F (1, 38) = 17.93, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.32), with the high performance group significantly 
faster than the low performance group. There was also a significant interaction between consistency 
and group (F (1, 38) = 10.76, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.221). This suggests that the groups show differing 
consistency effects. 
 
The two groups were then analysed separately. The low performance group showed a main effect of 
consistency (F (1, 19) = 62.60, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.77), with response times in the inconsistent condition 
being significantly longer than those in the consistent condition. This was also the case when 
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 examining the high performance group only (F (1, 19) = 17.55, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.48). Both groups showed 
a consistency effect, indicating that both groups showed a cost in resolving the conflict between the 
inconsistent perspectives. 
Avatar perspective 
There was a main effect of consistency with the inconsistent response times (765.06ms) significantly 
longer than consistent response times (637.36ms) (F (1, 38) = 64.91, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.63). There was a 
main effect of group (F (1, 38) = 15.03, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.28), with the high performance group 
significantly faster than the low performance group. There was also a marginal significant interaction 
between consistency and group (F (1, 38) = 4.06, p = 0.05, ηp2 = 0.10). These results also suggest that 
the groups showed differing consistency effects. 
 
The two groups were again analysed separately. The low performance group showed a main effect of 
consistency (F (1, 19) = 35.11, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.65), with response times in the inconsistent condition 
significantly longer than those in the consistent condition. This was also the case when examining the 
high performance group only (F (1, 19) = 32.86, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.63). Again, both groups showed a 
consistency effect, indicating that both groups showed a cost in resolving the conflict between the 
inconsistent perspectives. All of these differences can be seen in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: Response times (and standard error) by condition and group 
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 For the self perspective trials the identical error analyses resulted in a main effect of consistency (F (1, 
38) = 17.24, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.31). There was no effect of group (F (1, 38) = 0.01, p = 0.94, ηp2 = 0.00) and 
no interaction between consistency and group (F (1, 38) = 0.17, p = 0.69, ηp2 = 0.00). The avatar 
perspective trials also showed a main effect of consistency (F (1, 38) = 40.98, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.52). 
There was no effect of group (F (1, 38) = 0.04, p = 0.85, ηp2 = 0.00) and no interaction between 
consistency and group (F (1, 38) = 1.30, p = 0.26, ηp2 = 0.03). Therefore there were no differences 
between the high and low response inhibition groups in the consistency effects of errors on the visual 
perspective task. 
 
Overall the response inhibition groups differed in response times to both avatar and self perspective 
trials, with the high response inhibition group being significantly faster in both. Both groups were also 
significantly faster in the consistent trials than the inconsistent trials. There was a significantly larger 
consistency effect in the low response inhibition group than in the high response inhibition group in 
both the avatar (F (1, 38) = 4.06, p = 0.05, ηp2 = 0.10) and self perspective trials (F (1, 38) = 10.76, p ≤ 
0.01, ηp2 = 0.22). This suggests that the high inhibition group were more efficient in the ToM tasks than 
the low inhibition group in terms of speed, as the smaller consistency effect suggests they could 
resolve the inconsistent perspectives faster. There were no differences in the errors made. This 
suggests that better executive function can lead to better ToM performance. However, the high 
performance group still showed performance costs as shown by the consistency effects. 
 
Keysar task: 
Relational and Ambiguous errors: Response Inhibition factor 
Relational errors 
 
Examining the experimental trials only showed a main effect of group (F (1, 38) = 11.71, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 
0.24), with the number of errors made by the low response inhibition group being significantly higher 
than that made by the high response inhibition group. The number of errors made by each group was 
then compared to zero (using a one-sample t-test with a theoretical value of zero).  
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 The high response inhibition group made significantly more errors than zero (t (19) = 3.20, p ≤ 0.01), 
with a mean difference of 1.40. The low response inhibition group also made significantly more errors 
than zero (t (19) = 6.25, p ≤ 0.01) with a mean difference of 4.10. 
 
Ambiguous errors 
 
Examining the experimental trials only showed no main effect of group (F (1, 38) = 11.71, p = 0.06, ηp2 = 
0.09), with the number of errors made by the low response inhibition group being slightly higher than 
that made by the high response inhibition group. This would support the lack of direct link between 
response inhibition and ambiguous errors in the SEM model. The number of errors made by each 
group was then compared to zero (using a one-sample t-test with a theoretical value of zero). The high 
response inhibition group made significantly more errors than zero (t (19) = 2.29, p = 0.03), with a 
mean difference of 0.65. The low response inhibition group also made significantly more errors than 
zero (t (19) = 5.27, p ≤ 0.01) with a mean difference of 1.40. 
 
Both groups made errors, but the low response inhibition group made significantly more than the high 
response inhibition group (ToM).). The data suggests that although good inhibitory ability results in 
better ToM performance, errors will still be made (there is no ‘perfect’ ToM). 
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Figure 7.2: Mean number of relational and ambiguous errors (and standard error) by response 
inhibition group 
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Summary 
The findings show that there is a relationship between response inhibition and performance in both 
measures of each of the ToM tasks. This is consistent with the findings of the alternative individual 
differences model (model D from Appendix D). The secondary analyses show that better executive 
function ability is linked to better, but not perfect, ToM performance. The converse, that lower 
executive function ability is linked to worse ToM performance, is also shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8. Dual-task 
 
Background 
The previous chapters hypothesised a link between inhibitory control ability and ToM performance. 
Using a dual-task design allows the testing of whether or not these hypothesised inhibitory resources 
used for ToM are actually necessary for efficient ToM performance. Unlike a correlational design 
(which is similar to that used in the individual differences study) that can only show that an executive 
component is associated with a target (or primary) task, a dual-task design allows the experimenter to 
test whether one process (tapped by the secondary task) is necessary for another (required by the 
primary task). This would be shown by decreased performance in the primary task in the dual 
condition.  
 
Dual-task studies have focused on working memory contributions (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007) and 
inhibitory control (Bull et al., 2008) to ToM. The tasks used in these studies are standard ToM tasks 
(the reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001), and 
Stories tasks (similar to those in the studies by Happe, 1994; Channon & Crawford, 2000; Stone et al., 
1998). The executive function tasks used as secondary tasks included a two-back test (designed to 
tap working memory; used in McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007), and an inhibition task, switching task 
and updating task (Bull et al., 2008), all of which had some effect on the ToM tasks.  
 
More specifically, the ToM (Stories based) task was affected by the two-back test in McKinnon and 
Moscovitch (2007) (both second-order and first-order task performance was significantly affected, and 
second-order significantly more than first-order). This would indicate a need for working memory in the 
Stories ToM task. In Bull et al. (2008) the experimental (ToM) Stories task and the control version 
were both affected by all the executive tasks and The Eyes task was only affected by the inhibitory 
secondary task. The evidence therefore suggests some role for working memory in the Stories ToM 
tasks (McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007), and for inhibitory control in the Eyes task (Bull et al., 2008). 
However, the decreased performance of both the ToM Stories task and the control Stories task in Bull 
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 et al. (2008) in dual conditions of all the secondary executive tasks suggests that as both versions 
require the same general executive resources, there is not one that is specifically related to the ToM 
Stories version. This goes against the relationship found between working memory and ToM (as 
tapped by the Stories task) by McKinnon and Moscovitch (2007). 
 
However, one issue that needs to be considered are the incidental demands of the primary task. In 
these cases these were the incidental demands of the ToM tasks. These incidental demands could be 
disrupted by the secondary task, which would then affect performance of the ToM task, even though 
the interference is not with the ToM aspect of the task. If the incidental demands of the tasks are 
above and beyond the actual difficulty of the ToM component of the task, the interference caused by 
the secondary task would be due to incidental demands and not to ToM.   
 
In summary, inhibition is therefore linked to performance in the Eyes task, and may be used in the 
inhibition of automatically generated (socially attributed) responses to the facial features in the task. 
The possibility of inhibition being required to select the most appropriate response from plausible 
alternatives was ruled out by the lack of interference in the dual condition of the control version of the 
Eyes task, which has the same response selection element (Bull et al., 2008). The Eyes task 
associated with inhibition in Bull et al’s (2008) study does not explicitly involve perspective taking, an 
established component of ToM.  
 
The current study therefore looks at the relationship between inhibitory control and perspective taking 
in ToM, in the form of two separate level-one perspective taking experiments, the Keysar task and 
visual perspective task, using a dual-task design. 
  
The relationship that was established by the individual differences study only indicates that inhibitory 
control and ToM were related, but does not show if inhibitory control was necessary for ToM.  The 
dual-task study could establish whether this was supported or not.  
 
 145
 As only one secondary task was used in the study, the most established inhibitory control component 
of response inhibition was chosen as the resource of that secondary task. This is also the inhibitory 
construct that was related to both the Keysar task (relational errors) and the visual perspective task 
(egocentric interference) in the individual differences model. The secondary task that was used to tap 
inhibitory control was based on the pilot study created by Apperly, Samson, Carroll and Carroll 
(unpublished). The main demand of the task is to carry out a response that is not the dominant (or 
learned) response to the stimulus. This therefore involves the inhibition of a dominant response, the 
definition of response inhibition. 
 
In Apperly et al. (unpublished) several different secondary tasks were piloted for use in a later study. 
The one chosen used either words (‘one‘ or ’two‘) or beeps (one beep or two beeps) that participants 
heard and responded to with key presses either incongruently (hear ’one‘ or one beep, respond with 
two key presses; hear ’two‘ or two beeps, respond with one key press) or congruently (hear ’one‘ or 
one beep, respond with one key press; hear ’two‘ or two beeps, respond with two key presses). The 
results suggested that participants’ performance was worse in the incongruent condition. The specific 
inhibitory component being tapped by the incongruent condition is response inhibition, as the tendency 
is to respond congruently, and to stop this dominant response, response inhibition is required.  
 
However, the task may also tap response selection as there are two possible responses, one for each 
stimulus. Therefore the participants may respond based on a priori knowledge of the stimuli rather 
than by inhibiting a dominant congruent response. It is also possible that the task taps other executive 
functions, and may have incidental task demands that may affect the primary tasks. These issues are 
indicative of the general problem of task impurity that occurs when using a single task to tap a single 
theoretical construct.  
 
Nonetheless, the findings from the individual differences model show that response selection has no 
relationship with either of the primary ToM tasks, which suggests that even if the secondary task does 
tap that resource it will not disrupt the primary tasks on that basis. As the secondary task does also 
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 require response inhibition (in order to inhibit dominant responses as above) any disruption to the 
primary tasks is likely to be due to the sharing of that resource.   
 
Performance in the secondary task will be impaired in the dual-task conditions if it shares a common 
resource with the primary tasks. Based on the individual differences findings, the visual perspective 
task should disrupt secondary task performance as it shares a demand for response inhibition. 
Likewise, the Keysar task will also disrupt secondary task performance as it also requires response 
inhibition. The level of disruption caused in the secondary task performance should be greater for the 
Keysar task as it has a greater reliance on executive function. 
 
The individual differences findings suggest that dealing with interference between perspectives in the 
Keysar task requires response inhibition, and hence this should be disrupted by the secondary task in 
the dual condition. The measure of error rates in this task means that for both Keysar measures 
(relational errors and ambiguous errors) any interference would be shown as an increase in error rate 
(as this would be indicative of failing to inhibit self perspective, and moving items that only the 
participant can see). The two-system approach suggests that performance in the Keysar task is likely 
to be impaired in the dual-task condition due to its requirement for response inhibition. The task 
demands explanation would also suggest that the Keysar task may be impaired in the dual-task 
condition as the same processes that may be affected in the visual perspective task are present.  
 
The individual differences model shows a significant path between response inhibition and relational 
errors, and a significant path from relational to ambiguous errors. This would suggest that the number 
of relational errors is likely to increase in the dual condition. The number of ambiguous errors may 
increase due to the indirect path from response inhibition to them (through relational errors) but not to 
the extent of the relational errors. The Keysar task may be susceptible to interference due to incidental 
demands caused by the auditory instructions and any semantic processing involved. The speaker 
used in the secondary task was chosen for its vibrating cone that allowed participants to feel the 
vibration of the beeps they needed to respond to. This should reduce the need for the participant to 
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 hear the beep, and so reduce the potential auditory interference between those beeps and the 
instructions of the Keysar task. 
 
The individual differences findings show that in the visual perspective task, response inhibition may be 
required to resist any interference between the self and avatar perspectives. If this is the case, the 
result would be a decrease in the performance in the task in the dual condition. As the two measures 
used in the visual perspective task are interference measures (between consistent and inconsistent 
conditions), then an increase in the interference between perspectives would be expected. The final 
individual differences model suggests that disruption to egocentric interference should be greater than 
to altercentric interference. 
 
Another potential role for inhibition in the visual perspective is in the process of computing the avatar 
perspective, in addition to the role it has in resolving interference between perspectives. This was not 
tested in the individual differences model due to difficulty in calculating appropriate measures. 
 
There are different patterns of results that could be expected if inhibition is required to process the 
avatar’s perspective. Response times in the dual condition should increase for the avatar perspective 
trials in both consistent and inconsistent conditions. The difference in response times between the 
consistent and inconsistent self perspective trials that is present in the alone condition may also be 
reduced in the dual condition. Interference to processing the self perspective would become easier to 
resolve due to the basis of this interference (the avatar perspective) being disrupted by the dual-task. 
This would be more evident in the inconsistent self condition, so reducing the differences between the 
consistent and inconsistent self conditions. 
 
If both patterns are shown, then this would go against the two-system approach, as it suggests that 
inhibition is intrinsically involved in basic visual perspective taking. The two-system approach suggests 
that response inhibition is required at the level of resolving of conflict between perspectives, not at an 
intrinsic level of processing perspectives. This pattern of results would therefore favour the task-
demands approach.  
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 Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two students participated in the study for course credits. Participant age varied from 18 to 36, 
with a mean of 20.9 years of age and a standard deviation of 4.5 years. Written consent was gained 
from all participants. Five were male, and 27 were female. There were two left-handed participants 
(one who normally used their right hand) and 31 right-handed participants. 
 
Apparatus 
The primary tasks were presented on a 15-inch Samsung SyncMaster 793s monitor connected to a 
2.40GHz Pentium-based desktop PC using EPrime 1.1 (Schneider et al., 2002) (Keysar task) or 
DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003) (visual perspective task). A standard 102 keyboard was used for 
responses. The secondary task was presented on a Toshiba Satellite Pro laptop, using EPrime 1.1 
(Schneider et al., 2002), using an external speaker to produce the vibrations. 
Design 
Primary ToM tasks 
The main experimental condition was the task condition (with or without the secondary task). The ToM 
tasks used in this study were nearly identical (in design) to the tasks used in the previous individual 
differences study. The Keysar task differed in being divided into four separate sections (as opposed to 
one). This was done in order to vary the section(s) that would be completed under the dual-task 
conditions. The visual perspective task was already designed in four separate blocks. Each participant 
completed both primary tasks, half in the alone condition and half in the dual condition. The order of 
the blocks within the Keysar and visual perspective tasks were identical for all participants but the 
order of the tasks themselves was counterbalanced, as were the blocks that were under the alone and 
dual conditions. 
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 The experiment used a within-subjects design. Participants completed all four conditions (visual 
perspective alone and dual, Keysar alone and dual) in one of four orders: 
 
Table 8.1  
Block and Condition Orders for both Primary and Secondary Tasks 
 Order 
 A1 A2 B1 B2 
VP 1 & 2 VP 1 & 2 K 1 & 2 K 1 & 2 
VP 3 & 4 VP 3 & 4 K 3 & 4 K 3 & 4 
K 1 & 2 K 1 & 2 VP 1 & 2 VP 1 & 2
 
 
▼ 
K 3 & 4 K 3 & 4 VP 3 & 4 VP 3 & 4
 
K = Keysar 
VP = Visual Perspective 
Condition = alone; dual 
 
Secondary Inhibitory control task 
The task was based on a pilot study by Apperly, Samson, Carroll and Carroll (unpublished). 
Participants were presented with a series of trials consisting of either one beep or two beeps. The 
beeps generated a vibration that could be felt through the palm of the hand. This reduced the 
interference effects from the shared demands of the auditory processing of the secondary task. They 
were required to respond incongruently, so that the response to one beep was to tap the spacebar 
twice, and the response to two beeps was to tap the spacebar once. The trials were in a pseudo-
random order with no more than three trials of the same sound in a row. The layout of the task itself 
varied on the primary task it was paired with, as for both tasks the participants were instructed to stop 
responding to the beeps once the primary task block had finished. The sequence of trials of the 
secondary task was designed to be long enough to fill the duration of the appropriate primary task. 
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 Participants did 100 trials of the secondary task on its own to act as a measure of baseline 
performance. There were two blocks of 150 trials for the visual perspective dual condition, and two 
blocks of 100 trials for the Keysar dual condition. As participants did all conditions, there was a total 
500 experimental secondary task trials in the dual-task conditions.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. For the secondary task participants were told that they would just 
see a fixation cross on the screen for the entire experiment and would hear sounds and feel vibrations 
occurring every two seconds. Participants held the palm of their left hand over a portable speaker 
positioned before the laptop. They were able to tap the spacebar whilst in this position, and also feel 
the vibration of the speaker when the beep was presented as part of a trial. They could also clearly 
hear the same beep. Participants were instructed to press the space bar of the laptop once in 
response to two beeps, and twice in response to one beep. RTs and errors were recorded. 
 
Participants were given a practice session on the first primary task (for both tasks, the practice session 
lasted three minutes). They were then given five practice trials on the secondary task, with feedback. 
After this they were given a further 100 trials on the secondary task alone to act as a measure of their 
baseline performance. At this point, if participants were to complete the visual perspective task first, 
they were then given 75 trials of the visual perspective task, or if they were to complete the Keysar 
task first they were then given 30 instructions of the Keysar task (corresponding to six grids) together 
with the secondary task in order to practice the dual-task condition. The overall duration of the dual-
task condition practice session was the same for both primary tasks.  
 
The four experimental blocks of the first primary task were then completed. Participants were then 
given a practice session on the second primary task. After this they were given another five secondary 
task practice trials with feedback, and then another practice session in the dual-task condition with the 
second primary task of the same duration as the initial dual-task condition practice session. They then 
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 completed the four experimental blocks of the second primary task. The order of the primary tasks and 
the order of the alone and dual conditions were varied as shown in Table 8.1. 
 
Results 
Secondary Inhibitory control task 
The performance of participants in the secondary task was analysed first. If only primary task 
performance is taken into account, then it is possible that a finding of no interference in the primary 
task will be interpreted as meaning the executive component (tapped by the secondary task) is not 
required for that primary task. However, it is still possible that performance in the secondary task is 
impaired, which would suggest that there may be a shared resource for the tasks, even though the 
primary task is unaffected. By taking the performance on both the primary and secondary tasks into 
account this eventuality is avoided. 
 
Response times 
The inhibitory control dual-task was analysed using a 3-way repeated measures ANOVA, with task 
condition as the factor (baseline, visual perspective task, Keysar task). The response times (for which 
there were no outliers outside +/- two standard deviations), showed a main effect of task condition (F 
(2, 60) = 62.58, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.68). Post-hoc tests indicated that there was a significant difference 
between the response times to the secondary task in the baseline condition and those in the dual-task 
conditions (to Keysar: t (30) = 8.81, p ≤ 0.01; to visual perspective: t (30) = 9.10, p ≤ 0.01). There were 
no differences between the response times to the secondary task in the two dual-task conditions (t 
(30) = 1.20, p = 0.24). This can be seen in Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1: Response time (and standard error) by condition in secondary task 
Proportion of correct responses 
The proportion of correct responses (for which there were three outliers removed at + / - two standard 
deviations) was also analysed using a 3-way ANOVA, resulting in a similar result, a main effect of task 
condition (F (2, 54) = 49.83, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.65). Post-hoc tests showed that there was a significant 
difference between the proportion of correct responses to the secondary task in the baseline condition 
and those in the dual-task conditions (to Keysar: t (27) = 8.30, p ≤ 0.01; to visual perspective: t (27) = 
7.49, p ≤ 0.01). There were no differences between the proportions of correct responses to the 
secondary task in the two dual-task conditions (t (27) = 0.88, p = 0.39). This is shown in Figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2: Proportion correct (and standard error) by condition in secondary task 
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 The results of the response time and proportion correct analyses show that the secondary tasks 
performance was disrupted by both primary tasks, and that there was no difference between the 
disruption caused by the visual perspective task and the Keysar task. This suggests that there may be 
a common construct or resource in the secondary and primary tasks, as concurrent performance 
resulted in decreased performance in the secondary task, indicating that the resource needed to 
process that may have being utilised by the participant to process the primary tasks. 
 
Visual Perspective 
The visual perspective task was examined using the same analyses as in the individual differences 
study, with the addition of the task condition (alone or dual). Therefore the analysis was a 2 x 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA (Consistency: consistent v inconsistent; Perspective: self v other; Task 
condition: alone v dual). 
 
 
Efficiency scores are shown for brevity of presentation, and were calculated by condition (as response 
time / proportion of correct responses). The same patterns of results were shown by separate 
response time and error analyses. Prior to analysis response times 2.5 standard deviations away from 
the mean were eliminated as outliers, as were response omissions due to the timeout procedure. The 
results showed that there was a main effect of consistency (efficiency in the inconsistent condition was 
significantly less than in the consistent condition; F (1, 28) = 90.39, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.76), whilst there was 
no effect of perspective (F (1, 28) = 0.43, p = 0.52, ηp2 = 0.02). This is in agreement with the findings 
from the individual differences study. The additional factor in the analysis was task condition, which 
had a main effect (efficiency in the dual condition was significantly less than in the alone condition; F (1, 
28) = 115.72, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.81). There was also a significant interaction between consistency and 
task condition (F (1, 28) = 13.47, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.33). The interaction between consistency and 
perspective was the closest to significance (F (1, 28) = 2.64, p = 0.12, ηp2 = 0.09). The remaining 
interactions were as follows: perspective x task condition: F (1, 28) = 0.71, p = 0.41, ηp2 = 0.03; 
consistency x perspective x task condition: F (1, 28) = 0.06, p = .81, ηp2 = 0.00.  
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 The interaction between consistency and condition was examined further. In both the alone and dual-
task conditions, there was an effect of consistency (efficiency in the inconsistent condition was 
significantly less than in the consistent condition; alone only: F (1, 28) = 57.44, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.67; dual 
only: F (1, 28) = 59.25, p ≤ 0.01, ηp2 = 0.68). The differences between the mean inconsistent and mean 
consistent response times was 132.34ms in the alone condition, but for the dual condition the 
difference was 268.27ms. The actual difference in response time between the conditions may be 
caused by the lower efficiency in the dual condition. The interactions and effects can be seen in Figure 
8.3. 
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Figure 8.3: Consistency effect (and standard error) by task condition (efficiency scores) 
 
The dual-task condition affects performance in the visual perspective task as well as performance in 
the secondary inhibitory control task. This fits with the individual differences study’s finding of a link 
between response inhibition and resolving interference.  
 
The consistency effect (the interference effect) of the dual condition (as perspective has been 
collapsed) is significantly larger than that of the alone condition. Therefore the results show that the 
secondary task affected the interference between perspectives (the consistency effect) but also that it 
affected the egocentric and altercentric interference effects equally. This suggests that response 
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 inhibition is used in conflict resolution between perspectives. The individual differences model would 
have predicted a stronger effect of the secondary task on egocentric interference than on altercentric 
interference. However, the further individual differences models tested and the high and low inhibitory 
group analyses showed that there was also a relationship between altercentric interference and 
response inhibition, which supports the current findings. 
 
A secondary interpretation was that if inhibitory control was involved in the processing of the avatar 
perspective, then the dual-task condition would have shown a reduction in the difference between the 
inconsistent and consistent conditions of the self perspective. The reasoning is that the resource of 
inhibitory control needed to process the avatar perspective would be shared with the secondary task. 
This meant that the processing of the avatar perspective would have been disrupted, making it easier 
to resolve interference when making judgments about the self perspective. This would have had a 
greater effect in the inconsistent self condition, so decreasing the difference between that condition 
and the consistent self condition. As this was not the case, it suggests that inhibitory control is not 
critically involved in the visual perspective task (at least in taking perspectives), but is more likely to be 
used in resolving interference between perspectives. 
 
Keysar task 
The Keysar task was also examined using the same analyses as in the individual differences study, 
with the addition of the task condition (alone or dual). The analysis was a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA (Condition: experimental v control; trial type: relational v ambiguous; task condition: alone v 
dual). 
 
Errors 
Three participants were excluded, as they had previously completed the Keysar task in a different 
experiment. An additional participant was excluded because of a wrong task selection by the 
experimenter. T-tests were used as there were no errors made in the control conditions. 
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 A one-sample t-test with a theoretical value of zero showed that participants made significantly more 
errors than zero in the experimental condition (t (26) = 9.32, p ≤ 0.01), with a mean difference of 6.37. 
A paired-sample t-test showed that significantly more errors were made in relational trials than in 
ambiguous trials (t (26) = 5.32, p ≤ 0.01), with a mean difference of 2.22. One-sample t-tests with a 
theoretical value of zero showed that in both experimental conditions participants made significantly 
more errors than zero (relational: t (26) = 8.18, p ≤ 0.01, mean difference = 4.30; ambiguous: t (26) = 
9.74, p ≤ 0.01, mean difference = 2.07). This follows the pattern of the individual differences study. 
There was, however, no difference between the errors made in the alone and dual conditions (t (26) = 
1.11, p = 0.28, mean difference = 0.52). This is shown in (Figure 8.4). 
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Figure 8.4: Mean number of errors (and standard error) in Keysar task by condition and type 
 
Response times 
The same four participants that were excluded from the error analyses were excluded from the 
response time analyses. 14 further participants were excluded from the analyses. 10 of these were 
excluded for no response time values, as they responded before the instruction was completed. These 
were not marked as errors. All of these timeouts were in the experimental condition only. Of these 10 
participants, four participants timed out in both alone and dual conditions, two timed out in the alone 
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 condition only and four timed out in the dual condition only. The remaining four participants were 
excluded for response times more than two standard deviations from the mean. Due to the large 
number of exclusions these response time analyses1 need to be interpreted with caution but give no 
reason for doubting the error analyses. 
 
The Keysar task error responses are unaffected by the secondary inhibitory control task in the dual-
task condition. This would suggest that the construct that the secondary task is tapping is not 
necessary for performance in the Keysar task. As this construct is ostensibly inhibitory control, this 
would contradict the findings from the individual differences study. However, the secondary task is 
affected by the Keysar task, so it is possible that participants are able to prioritise (consciously or 
unconsciously) the deployment of their inhibitory resources to the Keysar task rather than the 
secondary task when necessary. This may also be helped by the nature of the Keysar task (a series of 
instructions, in which only a few are critical and require processing of perspectives) means that 
participants are able to follow the control instructions without error, and with no decrement in their 
secondary task performance. When there is a critical instruction in the Keysar task, they concentrate 
on processing that instruction, resulting in a decrement in the secondary task performance at that point 
in time. These periodic decrements in the secondary task performance are shown by the overall 
decrease in performance in this task in the dual-task condition with the Keysar task (as compared to 
the baseline). This would also account for there being no decrease in Keysar task performance in the 
dual-task condition. 
 
The zero response times indicate that some participants (10 of the sample of 29) dealt with the 
interference from the secondary task faster than other participants, but only in the experimental 
condition. Four participants did this in the dual-task condition, as opposed to two in the alone condition 
(four participants responded during the instructions in both conditions). The information needed to 
                                                 
1 To see whether the pattern of the response times would follow the pattern of the errors (as they did 
in the individual differences study), the same analysis was conducted on them as for the errors. There 
was no effect of condition (response times in the experimental condition were the same as for the 
control condition; F (1, 12) = 0.02, p = 0.88, ηp2 = 0.00). There was a main effect of type, with response 
times to ambiguous trials being significantly faster than those to relational trials (F (1, 12) = 36.87, p ≤ 
0.01, η2 = 0.75). There was no main effect of dual-task (alone condition response times were similar to 
dual condition response times; F (1, 12) = 2.78, p = 0.12, ηp2 = 0.19), and there were no interactions. 
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 select the item (which was the recorded critical measure) is completed in the instruction before the 
final word(s) that instruct where the item is to be moved. Therefore the participants may have clicked 
on the item before the last few words and then moved it after the instruction was completed. This 
would have been recorded as correct and with a zero response time. 
 
Another possibility is shown by the results of the high and low performance group analyses from the 
individual differences study. These suggest that the association between inhibitory control and ToM 
task performance can mean that people with high inhibitory control ability can show better ToM task 
performance. It is possible that those participants who responded before the completion of the 
instruction in the dual condition have high inhibitory control (as compared to the rest of the sample), 
meaning that any interference of the secondary task would affect their performance on the Keysar task 
less than for other participants. The effect of this lesser interference may have manifested in their 
responding before the instructions were completed in the trials due to increased processing speed.  
 
Discussion 
The dual-task results showed that performance in the secondary inhibitory task decreased significantly 
when in the dual condition. This was true in terms of the number of correct responses and also in the 
response times to the trials. This indicates that the resource tapped by the secondary task was also 
used in both of the primary ToM tasks (the visual perspective task and the Keysar task). The decrease 
in performance of the secondary task was the same for both primary ToM tasks, so in that respect 
there is no difference in their task demands. This may be indicative of common task demands such as 
perspective taking, maintenance of perspective and information, and dealing with any perspective 
interference. 
 
For the visual perspective task, the dual condition resulted in higher response times and higher error 
rates than in the alone condition. To see whether there was any trade off between response time and 
error rate, a combined efficiency score was used (response time / proportion of correct answers, which 
inflates the response time if more errors are made), and the results were similar, with an decrease in 
 159
 efficiency in the dual condition as compared to the alone condition. This is shown by the mean 
differences between the consistent and inconsistent conditions for the dual (268ms) and alone 
(132ms) conditions. These results show that inhibitory control may be used in resolving perspectives, 
but do not say anything about whether it is involved in the process of perspective-taking.   
 
The results also showed that the secondary task affected both egocentric and altercentric interference 
equally, supporting the findings of the high and low response inhibition group analyses (that there is a 
relationship between response inhibition and both egocentric and altercentric interference). They also 
support the choice of the individual differences model with direct paths from response inhibition to both 
interference effects (Model D from Appendix D rather than the final model of Figure 6.2). The 
combined findings point to a role for response inhibition in the visual perspective task, probably in 
dealing with interference between perspectives (as this was the task measure used). 
 
An additional interpretation was that if inhibitory control was involved in the perspective task in the 
processing of the avatar perspective, the dual condition would result in a smaller difference between 
the inconsistent and consistent self perspective conditions. This would be due to the processing of the 
avatar perspective being disrupted, leading to the lessening of that interference with the processing of 
the self perspective. As this would have more of an effect in the inconsistent condition, the differences 
between this condition and the consistent condition would be reduced. As the results did not show this 
pattern of results, it is likely that inhibition is not integral to perspective taking, which goes against the 
task-demand approach, thereby supporting the two-system approach. Response inhibition may in fact 
be required for dealing with perspective interference. The requirement for response inhibition may 
however be at a more unconscious level (Sumner, Nachev, Morris, Peters, Jackson, Kennard & 
Husain, 2007) than the possibly more actively demanding Keysar task.  
 
Performance in the Keysar task is unaffected by the secondary task in the dual condition. This is true 
of both error rate and response times, and for both the relational and ambiguous trials. The secondary 
task performance is affected in the dual condition, so there is some common resource between the 
two tasks. The immediate interpretation would be that the Keysar task does not rely completely on the 
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 resource that is tapped by the secondary (inhibitory control) task as there is no primary task 
interference, only secondary task interference. However the nature of the Keysar task may mean that 
the participant is able to consciously or unconsciously prioritise the deployment of their inhibitory 
resource. On the relatively few critical instructions the participant can focus on the primary task, so 
performance on the secondary task will decrease for that period. Overall, the results would show a 
small decrease in secondary task performance and no change in the primary task performance, which 
is what was observed. The two-system approach would interpret this as meaning that the flexible 
nature of the system used to pass the Keysar task may allow the tactical deployment of the available 
resources to the primary or secondary task as needed (whether consciously or unconsciously), which 
the more inflexible system used in the visual perspective task can not do, resulting in the decreases in 
efficiency in its dual-task condition. 
 
The findings suggest that there seems to be some common resource to the Keysar, visual perspective 
and secondary task (due to the impairment in secondary task performance in both primary task dual 
conditions). This is likely to be response inhibition as this may be required by the common task 
demands of the ToM tasks. With a two-system view this shared demand is at the level of resolving 
conflict between perspectives. With a task demands view this shared demand on inhibition is intrinsic 
to the perspective taking component. Based on the patterns of the results from the three tasks, the 
role for inhibition seems to be at the level of resolving conflict between perspectives, supporting the 
two-system approach. 
 
In the current dual-task study, the secondary task was a very simple task that required an incongruent 
response from the participants. As the dominant response was thought to be congruent, stopping that 
response in order to respond incongruently should have required response inhibition. The meaning of 
the dual-task results is constrained by the interpretation of what resource the secondary task used. 
This is because one of the most important aspects of the dual-task study is the resource measured by 
the secondary task. The secondary task in a dual-task study measures the (shared) resource of 
interest, in this case response inhibition. In contrast to the individual differences model, a single task is 
used to measure that construct. This means that the secondary task must be a reasonable measure of 
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that construct to be valid, whilst in a SEM model several possibly impure tasks are used to estimate a 
pure latent variable that represents the construct. An individual differences approach means that the 
theoretical construct being measured is likely to be validly estimated in the model. Dual-tasking relies 
on the secondary task being a good measure of a theoretical construct (an executive function in the 
current study), which is less likely to be the case. Nevertheless, in order for this to be an issue in dual-
tasking, the other theoretical constructs that the secondary task may measure must be shared by the 
primary task(s). In this case the individual differences model showed that the other construct, 
response selection, which the secondary task might tap, did not have a relationship with any of the 
ToM measures, so obviating this issue. 
  
However, what is lost in possible task validity is gained in the interpretation of the relationship between 
the primary and secondary tasks. An individual differences SEM model provides evidence that there is 
a relationship between estimated latent variables, but it can not say whether this relationship is causal 
or critical. The individual difference model tells us that, in this sample, there is a relationship between 
response inhibition and ToM task performance, but it does not say whether response inhibition is 
critical to ToM. Dual-tasking tells us if the resource that tapped by the secondary task is required by 
the primary task. If this resource is required by the primary task, then performance in the primary task 
will be impaired in the dual condition compared to alone condition. 
 
In conclusion, the findings can be interpreted as showing that response inhibition is probably needed 
for fast inflexible perspective taking, and is also used in more complex perspective taking. This is 
consistent with a more general picture in which executive function has also been shown to contribute 
to aspects of ToM tapped by questions on complex social interactions (specifically working memory, 
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007) and the Eyes task (inhibition, potentially response selection, Bull et al., 
2008).  
 
 
 9. Discussion 
The findings on the inhibitory control factors will be discussed first, followed by their relationships with 
the ToM tasks, and the ToM tasks themselves. The results of the high and low inhibitory control ability 
groups will then be covered, followed by the dual-task findings. Finally, the implications of these 
findings and possible avenues of future research will be discussed. 
 
The aim of the thesis was to investigate the cognitive bases of theory of mind performance in adults. 
The literature showed that executive function had been related to ToM in children and in adults, and 
that the most widely reported relationship involved inhibition. The next step was to examine the 
literature and see how inhibition had been treated in terms of its fractionation into reliable sub-
components. 
 
 
Summary of findings 
Executive Function factors 
The aim of this part of the thesis was to establish reliable and valid latent variables that represented 
components of inhibitory control, and that could be associated with ToM. The literature varied between 
three inhibitory components (interference control / cognitive inhibition / behavioural inhibition (cf. 
response inhibition); Dempster, 1993; Harnishfeger, 1995; Nigg, 2000) and two inhibitory components 
(response-distracter inhibition / resistance to proactive interference (cf. cognitive inhibition): Friedman 
& Miyake, 2004).  
 
An initial one factor model was tested which fit the observed data, but only reasonably well. A model 
with a response and cognitive inhibition factor was also tested, as described in Chapter 2. This had a 
slightly worse fit to the data than the one factor model. A model with response inhibition and selection 
factors was also tested as a possible alternative two factor model (see Chapter 5). The fit of this model 
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 was significantly different from the actual data, and was worse than both the one factor and two factor 
(response and cognitive inhibition) models.  
The model statistics of the one factor model suggested that the shape-matching task tapped a 
different theoretical construct to the other tasks. Therefore a model with the shape-matching task 
loading on a separate latent variable was also tested. The fit of this model was better than all of the 
previous models. Paths were added that improved the model fit significantly and that were also 
theoretically justifiable. This resulted in a final model in which response selection was tapped by the 
Simon, go / no go, go / no go (picture), cued recall, and stop-signal tasks, and response inhibition by 
the stop-signal and shape-matching tasks. There was also a covariance between the cued recall 
(control) and the go / no go (picture) measures error terms, indicating a shared unexplained variance. 
 
The tasks themselves almost certainly tapped more than one theoretical construct or executive 
function, but the task measures were designed to only capture the inhibitory process involved in the 
task. The Simon and shape-matching tasks both used interference measures, but loaded on different 
factors. This suggests that the interference was dealt with by different processes in each task: the 
Simon task interference was dealt with by selecting which stimuli to respond to, whilst the shape-
matching task interference was dealt with by the inhibition of the competing distracter stimulus. The go 
/ no go tasks both tapped response selection, as the participants had a priori knowledge of the 
categorical stimuli and how to respond that resulted in them selecting a response type. However, the 
go / no go (picture) task required participants to categorise the image stimuli into mammal or bird, and 
then respond or not based on the initial letter. The task measure was the proportion of responses to 
no go trials, which mainly relied on response selection, but may have had an element of working 
memory in the initial categorisation into mammal or bird. As this categorisation was likely to be 
available before the initial letter (van Turennout et al., 1997), it is possible if categorisation was not 
complete before the letter processing, interference could result. This suggests that the working 
memory involved could still affect the final task measure.  
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 The initial cued recall measure was not reliable, and an alternative measure that factored out the 
variance common to the two component scores (proportion of correct control trials and proportion of 
correct interference trials) was used. The interference common to both measures was from the 
distracter task and the different presentation modalities of the two lists; aloud and silent. The 
remaining variance (in the measure of correct interference trials) that tapped response selection was 
the interference of the foil word with the target word. Participants were likely to need response 
selection to choose the word to respond with. The cued recall control measure error term covaried with 
the go / no go (picture) error term, indicating shared variance. As working memory was suggested to 
have a role in the go / no go (picture) measure, and is also likely to be required to recall the target 
word in the cued recall control measure (over the interference of the distracter task and presentation 
modality), it is likely to be the executive function the two measures have in common. 
 
The stop-signal task tapped both response inhibition and response selection, which is supported by 
the literature (Rubia et al., 2001). Response inhibition was needed to inhibit the activated response, 
and response selection may have been involved in selecting how to respond. 
 
The literature suggested that the tasks could have loaded onto three components of inhibition 
(Dempster, 1993; Harnishfeger, 1995; Nigg, 2000). The fact that the one factor model had a better fit 
suggests that it is more likely that there is one underlying theoretical construct of inhibition than there 
being two factors of cognitive and response inhibition (or three factors), which was an unexpected 
finding. There was also no evidence that a two factor model of response selection (Ikier et al., 2008; 
Rubia et al., 2001) and response inhibition was any better than either the response and cognitive 
inhibition model or the one factor model. The data suggest that there are two underlying constructs of 
inhibition defined here as response selection and response inhibition. The two factor structure is 
similar to the structure found by Friedman and Miyake (2004).   
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 SEM analyses of Executive Function and ToM 
Having established the two inhibitory control latent variables, the relationship between them and ToM 
was then investigated using a structural equation modelling approach. This approach allowed pure 
latent variables of the inhibitory components and the ToM measures to be estimated, and for the 
relationships between these variables to then be investigated. Each ToM latent variable had a single 
measure (Keysar: relational and ambiguous errors; visual perspective; egocentric and altercentric 
interference). The relational and ambiguous measures correlated, as did the egocentric and 
altercentric measures. However, there was no correlation between the measures of the separate tasks 
(all correlations < 0.09).  There are different explanations of this lack of relationship. One explanation 
is that they are tapping separate systems or components within ToM. Another is that they have 
different task demands, and hence recruit different executive functions, leading to a lack of a 
relationship. 
 
In either interpretation, the task demands or processes that are present in the tasks are critical for 
understanding the cognitive basis of ToM in adults. Both tasks are level-one perspective taking tasks 
(tasks that require the ability to understand that the content of what one can see can be different from 
the content of what another sees in the same situation). Demands or processes that are required and 
are common to both tasks are being able to take another perspective, maintenance of that perspective 
and the information contained within therein, and being able to deal with any perspective interference 
(conflict resolution). The Keysar task additionally involves more items (the visual perspective task had 
a maximum of three discs compared to the Keysar task’s four x four grids containing eight items) and 
also requires participants to integrate the information in the instructor’s perspective with the instruction 
given (in order to select the correct item that is mutually visible). These additional demands may result 
in an increased requirement of executive function, or the recruitment of different executive functions 
(Stuss & Alexander, 2007). 
 
Therefore, a conceptual analysis of the two tasks suggests that there might be many processes in 
common. This would imply that based on the task demands approach, the two tasks should correlate. 
As they do not, it seems more likely that the two tasks tap different components of ToM. An alternative 
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 possibility is that the contribution of these common processes to the tasks variability is so small that 
there is no overall correlation. As these tasks are ToM tasks, and the common processes are likely to 
be ToM processes, this is unlikely. 
 
The literature suggests that inhibitory control and working memory have a role in ToM tasks, but the 
studies tend to involve tasks that are more complex than the current one, which may then mean they 
recruit more and different executive functions. Some of the ToM tasks used include false belief tasks 
(both location and content based) and appearance-reality tasks. These tasks have been related to 
both inhibitory control and working memory (Carlson et al., 2002), and involve the participants knowing 
the nature of the items presented, and having the language ability to make their response. The current 
tasks do not require a verbal response, and in the case of the visual perspective task, any specific 
item knowledge. This is because the participants are shown example grids and the discs are explicitly 
referred to. Thereafter they simply need to count them. Conceptually it seems likely that inhibitory 
control would be used in conflict resolution, and perhaps in the role of inhibiting self perspective when 
taking another perspective. Working memory seems a candidate for the maintenance of perspective 
and information, as well as for dealing with any increase in complexity of the task (number of items or 
instructions). The possibility of these resources being required for these processes has been covered 
by Carlson et al. (2004) and Hughes & Ensor (2005), amongst others. The measures of the visual 
perspective task are interference effects, which would tap the process of conflict resolution of the two 
salient perspectives. The measures of the Keysar task are the number of errors made in the 
ambiguous and relational trials. The errors made may be due to any one or any combination of the 
processes of the Keysar task (taking another perspective, maintenance of that perspective, and 
conflict resolution). Overall, the model shows that inhibitory control ability is related to proficiency in 
conflict resolution (in the visual perspective task) and to more general ToM processing errors (in the 
Keysar task).  
 
The directions of the paths in the individual differences model between the inhibitory factors and the 
ToM factors were from inhibitory control to ToM. This was used for two reasons. One was the initial 
basis for the individual differences study: as executive function is a complex, higher order, set of 
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 processes located in a similar area of the brain (frontal lobes) as ToM, which is also a complex higher 
order process (or set of processes), it was thought that simple components of the fractionation of 
executive function (for example, inhibitory control, working memory and planning abilities) could also 
contribute to the processes of ToM. As inhibitory control is a sub-construct of executive function, it 
would therefore be a sub-construct of ToM. The direction of the direct paths should therefore go from 
the inhibitory latent variables to the ToM latent variables. The second reason was the relationship 
found in developmental studies (Hughes & Ensor, 2007), in which early executive function 
performance predicted later false belief performance. This would also suggest that the direction of the 
direct paths should be from the inhibitory control latent variables to the ToM latent variables. 
 
The relationships found amongst the inhibitory factors and the ToM measures were between the 
response inhibition factor and both the egocentric interference and the relational errors in the 
statistically best fitting model. There was no relationship between the response selection and any of 
the ToM variables. This is unlikely to be due to the response inhibition tasks having greater variability 
due to being more difficult, as the more difficult tasks (go / no go (picture) and cued recall) are on the 
response selection factor. The path estimates of the stop-signal task are also virtually identical for both 
factors, suggesting that (at least on that task) difficulty is approximately equal. As described in Chapter 
6, there were alternate models tested that showed that there was a more theoretically grounded model 
that was only slightly less well-fitting than the original final model. This model included paths from 
response inhibition to both egocentric and altercentric interference variables, as well as to the 
relational errors variable. This model suggests a role for response inhibition in both interference 
effects, both of which involve conflict resolution. This conceptually and theoretically makes more sense 
than response inhibition only being required for egocentric interference. The relationship between the 
interference effects is represented by a covariance in this model that would suggest that there is some 
unexplained common variance in the interference effects. This could be another, different, executive 
function or theoretical construct. The covariance may represent working memory, as in order to have 
conflict resolution between perspectives, it would seem logical that working memory is required to hold 
those perspectives in mind. This model is supported by the high and low inhibitory control group 
analyses and the dual-task study.  
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The relationship between response inhibition and the relational errors of the Keysar task suggests only 
that response inhibition is required in some or all of the processes involved in the task. The models 
tested show that a path from relational errors to ambiguous errors provides the best fit to the data. The 
reason for this path direction may be the relatively low reliability of the ambiguous indicator. Low 
reliability can equate to low variability, meaning that there is less likelihood of a relationship being 
shown. The ambiguous trials can not be solved with the process that is used in the relational trials, 
possibly meaning that performance on them relies on other constructs. The ambiguity of the instruction 
may also cue the participant to any perspective differences, making it less of a pure measure of 
perspective taking. In either case, performance in the reliable relational trials (that are more typical 
perspective-taking trials) is likely to predict performance in the slightly less demanding ambiguous 
trials. An alternate explanation is that participant propensity to take perspectives may influence 
performance in the trials (Royzman et al., 2003; Wu & Keysar, 2007), and act as a common underlying 
process. This propensity would be seen more directly in the relational trials, and if performance in 
those was high, then the performance in the ambiguous trials, which also require taking perspectives, 
would also be high. 
 
The covariances between the cued recall (interference) and go / no go (picture) error terms and the 
ambiguous indicator error term implies a common unexplained variance. As the covariance between 
the cued recall (control) and go / no go (picture) error terms has been proposed to be working 
memory, it is likely that this covariance also represents working memory. Ambiguous trials’ critical 
instructions may result in the participants being cued to the perspective difference, suggesting that 
working memory may be used to hold those perspectives in mind for some form of error-correcting 
strategy. 
 
Overall these two tasks have similar task demands and also rely on the same executive functions (to 
different extents, in terms of variance explained). According to a task demand approach, they would 
be expected to correlate, whereas according to a two-system approach (cf. Feigenson et al., 2004; 
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 Perner et al., 2006; Saxe & Powell, 2006) they would not. The latter approach is supported by the 
current data.  
 
For a more direct investigation, the task demands could be matched as closely as possible. If the 
tasks of similar complexity still did not correlate then the two-system approach would be supported, 
and if they did, then the task demand approach would be supported. A potential way of doing this 
would be to design a study that systematically varies the complexity of the Keysar task in terms of grid 
size and so also in the number of items contained in the grid. This should retain the similar 
requirements for response inhibition whilst varying the differing requirements for working memory, 
whilst also decreasing the incidental task demands. Participant performance could be analysed at the 
different levels of complexity – to process the more simple grids, the two-system approach would 
propose that the process used for the current visual perspective task would be utilised (as children 
have been able to pass a simpler version of the Keysar task (smaller grids, less items) (Nadig & 
Sedivy, 2002). The more complex grids would use the process that is used for the current Keysar task. 
The differences in performance would be borne out in the pattern of processing costs. The cognitively 
efficient inflexible process shows costs (caused by perspective interference) in increased response 
time, but not in errors. The cognitively demanding flexible process shows costs (again caused by 
perspective interference or by not using the information from the instructor’s perspective) in increased 
error rate, but not in any change in response times. A change in the pattern of responses would 
indicate that there were two separable systems present, and also show exactly where the crossover 
point was from the use of one system to another. If there was no change in response patterns, then 
the task demands approach would be supported. 
 
High and Low inhibitory control ability group analyses 
These analyses were designed to test whether the relationships found in the SEM model between 
inhibitory control and the ToM latent variables were supported by analyses that compared the 
performance on the ToM tasks in high and low executive function ability groups. The high and low 
performers on each inhibitory factor were calculated and placed into two groups. The performance of 
these groups on the ToM tasks was then analysed. The results of the initial high and low ability 
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 inhibitory group analyses supported the model with direct paths from response inhibition to both 
interference effects. This was because there was a group difference in both interference effects, 
whereas the statistically best fitting model would predict a difference only in egocentric interference. 
The findings were also consistent with the Keysar latent variable relationships, with a direct 
relationship between response inhibition and relational errors, and an indirect relationship between 
response inhibition and ambiguous errors. This path, as discussed earlier, may also represent another 
process or theoretical construct such as the propensity of participants to take an alternate perspective. 
This may be in addition to the response inhibition element or instead of it. When participants were 
grouped according to performances on the response selection latent variable, there were no 
differences on any ToM task performance. This is also consistent with the individual differences 
model. 
 
In addition to testing whether differences in executive performance led to differences in ToM 
performance, it was also checked whether the qualitative pattern of ToM performance was the same 
for the high and low inhibitory control groups. The general findings were that the high performers (on 
the response inhibition factor) tended to be lower in terms of error rates (Keysar task) and had smaller 
consistency effects (visual perspective task). The low performers had significantly worse performances 
than the high performers in all the tasks. The high performance groups still made errors and showed 
consistency effects (significantly more than zero, but significantly less than the low performance 
groups): there were no expert ToM performers.  
 
The position of the high and low performance groups on the distribution of the inhibitory factor scores 
and on the ToM scores were examined to see if any of them lay on an extreme tail of a skewed 
distribution. If they did the implication could be that the low performance group could be the start of 
another distribution that could lead to the association of impaired or lower executive function 
performance with impaired or low ToM abilities (impaired executive function ability has been linked to 
later impaired ToM in young children with autism; Pellicano, 2007). The distributions for the inhibitory 
control factor scores were distributed normally, and the high and low performance groups were in the 
tails of the distributions, as would be expected. The high and low performance groups fell in the main 
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 cluster of scores in the distribution of the ToM tasks (which were not normally distributed). This all 
means that both group types are part of one sample rather than potentially being part of another 
sample. 
Dual-task analyses 
The dual task analyses were conducted to see if inhibitory control (specifically response inhibition) was 
necessary for the two ToM tasks. This was because the SEM models are limited to showing that there 
is a relationship, not that inhibition is required for ToM. The dual task results suggest that there was a 
common resource to the secondary task, visual perspective task and the Keysar task, as performance 
in the secondary task was impaired to the same extent in both of the primary tasks’ dual conditions. 
When compared to the individual differences model and the high and low group analyses, the 
likelihood is that this common resource is response inhibition. This supports the findings of Bull et al. 
(2008) that inhibitory control is linked to ToM (in that study measured by the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes task). A task demand approach suggests that tasks that are quantitatively similar in terms of 
difficulty (task demands and processes) are likely to require qualitatively similar executive resources, 
and hence are likely to correlate. The likelihood that the ToM tasks share the same resource of 
response inhibition, taken with the majority of task demands being identical, would, according to the 
task demand explanation, lead to expectation that the tasks correlate. The fact they do not suggests 
that despite their common resource of response inhibition and shared task demands, they are 
measuring separate components or systems. 
 
The visual perspective task performance was also impaired in the dual condition. This impairment in 
performance was similar for both interference effects, suggesting that response inhibition is used for 
the conflict resolution of perspectives, whether that interference is from self perspective or another 
perspective. The dual task did not disrupt the process of taking the avatar’s perspective, only the 
process of resolving perspectives in order to make a response based on one and not the other. These 
results support the choice of the individual differences model with direct paths from response inhibition 
to both interference effects. Keysar task performance was not impaired in the dual condition. 
Considering that the amount of variance in the Keysar task that was explained by the inhibitory 
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 individual differences model was almost twice as much as in the visual perspective task, this is 
surprising. The likelihood is that response inhibition is used in the task, but as there are infrequent 
critical trials the overall results do not show any impairment in performance in the dual condition. 
 
The executive function associated with the visual perspective task is response inhibition (directly for 
both egocentric interference and altercentric interference). The executive function associated with the 
Keysar task is also response inhibition. The final model is Model D in Appendix D, replicated below in 
Figure 9.1. 
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Figure 9.1: Final model 
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 Implications 
The combined findings show that executive function ability, specifically response inhibition, is 
associated with ToM performance in this sample, supporting earlier findings (Channon & Crawford, 
2000; Happé et al., 2001; Stone et al., 1998). This suggests that executive function is required for ToM 
in adults. Executive function has been associated with the development of ToM in children (Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson, et al., 2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2005; Hughes & Ensor, 
2007), and the continued association between these constructs in adults suggests that executive 
function (in particular inhibitory control) is necessary not only for the development of ToM, but is also 
an integral part of the fully developed ToM in adults. There is also another potential executive function 
associated with the ToM performance in the sample, which from the nature of the tasks involved 
seems likely to be working memory. Working memory has also been linked to ToM in children (Carlson 
et al., 2002), and these analyses point towards it being also used in ToM in adults. 
 
Response inhibition seems to be involved in dealing with perspective interference (conflict resolution), 
as shown by the relationship between it and the two visual perspective interference effect measures. 
The role of response inhibition in the Keysar task is less clear. The errors on this task could have 
come from several different processes that were involved in the task (conflict resolution, taking of a 
perspective, maintenance of that perspective), so it is unclear exactly which of these processes 
required response inhibition. However, as conflict resolution between perspectives is also likely to be 
needed for the Keysar task, it is possible that this is what response inhibition is required for. Previous 
literature has suggested that response inhibition is needed for the inhibition of the self perspective 
(Samson et al., 2005), although there is evidence for it also being needed for the inhibition of any 
alternate perspective (Samson et al., submitted). These findings show that it is likely to be additionally 
required for resolving any conflict between perspectives. Conceptually, working memory may be 
required for the maintenance of the perspective and the information contained therein that is 
necessary for both tasks. This is represented by the covariance between the interference factors of the 
visual perspective tasks, and the covariances between the ambiguous factor and the go / no go 
(picture) and cued recall measures. The level of working memory required is likely to be more for the 
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 Keysar task as there are more items to maintain, and this is shown by the different representations of 
the working memory aspects of the two tasks. 
 
There is clear evidence from the current study that executive function is involved in ToM in adults. This 
would seem to be typified by the Keysar task, and is supported by the findings of the individual 
differences model. This is consistent with existing literature from adult studies (Bull et al., 2008; 
German & Hehman, 2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007) and patient studies (Channon & Crawford, 
2001; Happé et al., 2001; Samson et al., 2005). Therefore, it seems reasonable to think of ToM as 
cognitively demanding.  
 
However, there is also evidence from the current set of studies, especially from the dual-task studies, 
that runs the other way. The dual-task showed that the Keysar task was not disrupted in the dual 
condition, which goes against the prediction from the individual differences model. This may be 
because the intermittent critical trials allow participants to stop performing on the secondary task to 
focus on the Keysar task, which suggests that executive function is required for the task. The results 
for the visual perspective task in the dual task study showed that inhibition did affect task performance. 
However, the pattern of results showed that this disruption was caused in resolving interference 
between perspectives, but not in processing the avatar’s perspective. Therefore computing the 
avatar’s perspective may have been cognitively efficient. This suggests that there may be two aspects 
of ToM, one that is cognitively demanding and one that is cognitively efficient. 
 
This two-system explanation could account for the findings that infants and primates can pass 
perspective taking tasks (Onisihi & Baillargeon, 2005 and Sodian et al., 2007; Tomasello et al., 2003, 
respectively). The flexible and cognitively demanding process (that is therefore more prone to errors), 
that is proposed to be used in the Keysar task, may be ToM as it is classically defined. Both processes 
(or systems) are present in adults, as evidenced by the individual differences model. It would seem 
likely that executive function allows the flexible process to develop, which would account for the 
relationship between executive function performance and later false belief performance in children 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson, et al., 2004). As primates have limited 
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 executive resources (as do infants) they may rely on the inflexible cognitively efficient process and are 
unable to develop the flexible and cognitively demanding process that we generally term ToM. As both 
the inflexible and flexible processes appear to be present in adults, it is unlikely that the inflexible 
process is just a precursor to the flexible process: the flexible process is not just the inflexible process 
with executive function tagged on for increased processing power. That explanation would fit with a 
task demand-based explanation, though if this was the case there would be expected to be some 
correlation between the processes.  
 
The potential separation of these two systems could account for the findings in primates (Tomasello et 
al., 2003), without having to appeal to the idea of primates having a ToM as it has been commonly 
defined. This separation would also give a parsimonious account of how infants are able to pass 
perspective taking tasks at an age when they are unable to pass (the normal) false belief tasks. One 
issue that has not been resolved is the level of sophistication associated with the inflexible system. 
Interpretations of the abilities of infants and primates in being able to pass tasks that require 
perspective taking have often suggested that the participants are able to understand intentions and, to 
some extent, that the actors in the task have different beliefs to their own (which could be said to be an 
understanding of false belief). Whilst this interpretation is possible, the line of reasoning it suggests 
makes it difficult to argue against task designs and demands being the only reasons why primates and 
infants fail standard false belief tasks. It may be that any additional task demands mean that different 
executive functions are needed, perhaps to a greater extent. Limited executive resources may be why 
primates and infants are unable to pass those tasks, and a task demand based explanation can 
therefore also account for the findings that infants and primates can pass perspective taking tasks but 
not false belief tasks, as the false belief tasks may have additional task demands that require 
additional executive resources. 
 
In terms of understanding emotions (of people’s faces), it has been suggested that infants (and 
perhaps primates) are able to understand simple emotions (anger, happiness) at an earlier age than 
more complex emotions (confusion, apprehension) (Camras, Oster, Campos & Bakeman, 2003; 
Soken & Pick, 1999). A similar interpretation could be used for the level of understanding of beliefs 
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 and intentions associated with the inflexible system of ToM, in that it is possible that infants, and 
possibly primates, are able to understand simple beliefs (such as knowledge of object location) and 
intentions (actor wants certain object), but may not understand more complex beliefs or intentions. 
They may not know why the actor in the task wants that certain object, or understand the explicitly 
false nature of an actor’s belief – they may interpret as being different from their own, but not 
consciously as being ‘false’. However, these are all potential interpretations of the level of 
understanding shown by infants and primates in perspective taking tasks. 
 
The challenge is to design tasks that have lower task demands and that still require explicit false belief 
reasoning, and then see if infants or animals (as certain species of bird, such as scrub-jays, have 
shown evidence of ToM-like abilities; Dally, Emery & Clayton, 2006) are able to pass them. If they are 
able to pass them, then their difficulty is not with the understanding of false belief, but with the 
additional, more incidental task demands, supporting the task demand approach. Therefore both 
potential explanations of the current findings can be related to these findings. However, the fact that 
there is no correlation between the two tasks implies that it is more likely that there are two systems 
that can be recruited by adults, and that the faster, potentially more inflexible one is available to infants 
and primates, as it can be used with limited executive resources. 
Limitations 
The studies have potential limitations, covered in this section, in terms of the ideal statistical 
parameters for the analyses, the causation of effect, and also the strength of any interpretation of the 
analyses.  Statistically the sample size of the individual differences study was sufficient not to give any 
false negative or non-existent associations between both the measured indicators and the latent 
variables, or between the latent variables themselves. However, some of the actual parameter 
coefficients for the inhibitory control tasks, although significantly different from zero, are lower than 
what is normally considered satisfactory in SEM. This may be due to the amount of variance in the 
indicators attributable to inhibitory control being relatively small. Following this, the remaining variance 
in these tasks could be accounted for by other executive functions or perhaps is more automatic in 
nature, and in either case is not explained by the current executive function based model. The 
reliability estimates of these tasks that could have contributed to the low parameter estimates were 
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 however satisfactory in all cases. Therefore, as the parameter coefficients to and the variances of the 
inhibitory control latent variables are significantly different from zero, the general factor structure 
shown should be replicable.  
 
However different inhibitory tasks in additional individual difference SEM models should be tested to 
see whether this is the case. This would also aid in clarifying the definitions of the inhibitory constructs 
found, and would also allow another potential limitation of the study to be addressed. Ideally the 
number of tasks used to measure a latent variable is a minimum of three. When this study was 
designed the number of measured indicators for the proposed latent variables was three each. The 
factor structure identified showed that this was not the case, and the response inhibition latent variable 
has only two measured indicators. When this is the case, the parameter estimate needs to be 
constrained to a specific value (here calculated from its reliability estimate), which is not ideal. Another 
aspect of the current structure is that the stop-signal task loads on both inhibitory factors. This is again 
not an ideal situation, as tasks should be designed to primarily tap only one theoretical construct, 
though in this case literature has suggested that the stop-signal task does tap both of the inhibitory 
factors defined in this model. Using different and more numerous executive tasks would allow the 
number of tasks acting as measured indicators for the factors proposed to be three or more, thereby 
making the factors both more reliable and valid. It would also mean the factor structure found in the 
current study could be tested to see if it held for different inhibitory tasks.  
 
Some of the issues are also present in the ToM latent variables and their measured indicators. The 
initial model had all four measured indicators tapping the same latent variable, indicative of a unitary 
ToM, which would then have a sufficient number of indicators, as per the literature. The correlations 
suggested that there was no relationship between the ToM tasks, and so there was a possibility of 
having two ToM latent variables with two indicators each. The levels of the correlations between the 
two measured indicators of each ToM task indicated that there were potentially four separate, though 
correlated, ToM latent variables in the model. Single indicator target latent variables are common in 
SEM studies, as they are used as exemplars of complex processes that are require qualitatively and 
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 perhaps quantitatively different simple processes. This is similar to the present model of complex ToM 
requiring simple inhibitory processes, though this point will be returned to later.  
 
The reliability was not ideal for ambiguous errors or for altercentric interference. This may have led to 
the lack of a relationship between these latent variables and response inhibition in the statistically 
best-fitting model. Using more and different ToM tasks would allow the factor structure shown in this 
model to be replicated (or not), and may also allow more than one indicator to be used to measure any 
ToM latent variables found. 
 
The direction of causation between inhibition and theory of mind has been said to be from inhibition to 
ToM (Hughes & Ensor, 2007), but also from ToM to inhibition (Perner, Lang & Kloo, 2002). The current 
model suggests that the relationship is from inhibition to ToM, as these model statistics are better than 
for a model with paths from ToM to inhibition. Conceptually inhibition seems less complex than ToM, 
and so it would seem more likely to contribute to ToM than for ToM to contribute to it. 
 
Some general issues in the interpretation of these results hinge on the type and number of tasks used. 
As suggested later, different quantitative and qualitative tasks could be used in a similar individual 
differences study to examine whether the current findings hold. The tasks used in the current study are 
not classic ToM tasks (like, for example, false belief tasks). The processes involved may not be core 
processes of ToM (although the dual-task results suggest that the visual perspective task involves 
some level of cognitively efficient, possibly automatic, perspective taking, which may be), but are 
involved in the expression of those ToM abilities. Without an ability to resolve conflict between 
competing perspectives, being able to take those perspectives could be nearly an irrelevance. 
Likewise being able to use the information gained from taking a perspective allows the ability to 
understand another’s belief or mental state to be used in social situations. However, more tasks need 
to be used to reach a definite conclusion on the nature of the potential components of ToM. 
Future research 
The relationships found in the individual differences study between executive function and ToM 
performance are for this particular sample and these particular tasks. However, these relationships 
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 would be expected to generalise. The relationship still needs to be investigated for different executive 
functions and for different ToM target tasks. One way of doing this would be to use different executive 
function tasks in the battery to see whether the relationship between inhibitory control and the two 
target ToM tasks will hold with other (inhibitory control) executive function tasks. Tasks that tap other 
executive functions that may be present in ToM, such as working memory (which is potentially the 
explanation of the shared unexplained variance in the current model) could also be added to the 
executive function battery. The current findings would suggest that the requirements for response 
inhibition should be relatively similar for both tasks, but that any working memory requirement should 
be greater for the Keysar task due to the greater number of items to be maintained. This model may 
be able to show whether the Keysar task requires significantly more working memory than the visual 
perspective task, as this may lead to the lack of correlation between the tasks. If similar executive 
function demands are shown for the two ToM tasks when this different executive function battery is 
used, then the task demands of the two tasks are again likely to be the same. If the ToM tasks then 
still do not correlate then the two-system approach will be supported. If the task demands are different, 
then any lack of correlation between the tasks may be due to the different task demands. This 
approach may also give supporting evidence for the inhibitory control classifications of the current 
model, and using more tasks is also more theoretically sound for SEM analyses. 
 
Another way of further establishing the relationship between executive function and ToM would be to 
use different target ToM tasks. ToM tasks such as standard false belief tasks, the strange stories task, 
and the mind in the eyes task could be included in the model. Using these tasks with the ToM tasks 
from this study would also mean that more than one measured indicator could be used for any 
potential ToM latent variables, which is more theoretically sound. If these additional ToM task 
measures loaded onto the same two separate latent variables that are currently tapped by the Keysar 
and visual perspective tasks, which then did not correlate, then the two-system approach would be 
supported. If they all loaded onto one latent variable, or onto latent variables that did correlate, then a 
more unitary concept of ToM would be supported. It is possible that this model may result in more than 
two latent variables that represent different aspects of ToM. 
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 Another way of investigating the two-systems versus the task demand approaches would be to vary 
the complexity of the Keysar task and the visual perspective task to see if there is a change in the 
pattern of responses at any given point of complexity that would indicate a change in the process or 
system being used to process the trials. Varying the complexity allows the task demands to also be 
varied. Using eye-tracking software and hardware the implicit movements of the participant (indicative 
perhaps of the more inflexible, cognitively more efficient and hence implicit process) could also be 
compared and contrasted to their explicit movements (perhaps suggestive of the more flexible, more 
cognitively demanding and maybe more conscious process) through the analysis of both eye 
movement (implicit) and movement of the mouse (explicit), to give a more detailed and fine-grained 
set of measures to go with the pattern of actual responses and response times.  
 
A more general idea of future research would be to look into comparing more qualitative measures of 
ToM with the quantitative measures present in the current study. Quantitative measures of ToM may 
be reliable, but may not be representative of how ToM is used in everyday social situations. This issue 
would be addressed by the use of qualitative measures that show more validity. A potential measure is 
the number of mentalising words (such as ‘think’ or ‘want’) that a person may use in describing their 
friends (de Wit & Fernyhough, 2006). The higher the number, the better that person may be at 
mentalising, and hence at ToM. Generally this measure should correlate significantly with a 
quantitative ToM measure if they tap the same construct. It may however be that a qualitative measure 
is inherently more complex than a more narrowly defined quantitative measure, resulting in it loading 
on more than one (ToM) latent variable. Alternatively, it may load on the more flexible ToM latent 
variable as it requires additional resources such as executive function and language. This could be 
investigated by using language measures in addition to executive function measures in investigating 
their relationship to the qualitative and quantitative measures of ToM. The high and low inhibitory 
control group analyses showed that the level of performance of the high ability groups in the ToM 
tasks was similar to the overall sample, whilst the low ability groups were significantly worse than the 
overall sample. The distribution of the scores suggested that the high and low ability groups were in 
the tails of the normally distributed inhibitory control factor scores, so did not represent other potential 
samples (of adults who show impaired executive function abilities and hence impaired ToM). This 
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 pattern of results suggests that good executive function ability can result in better ToM performance in 
quantitative measures of ToM. This relationship could again be investigated with qualitative measures 
to see if executive function is also related to ToM as measured by more valid measures that are likely 
to be nearer to how ToM is used in common social situations. These two contrasting approaches could 
therefore provide convergent (if the ostensibly more complex qualitative measures loaded on the more 
flexible ToM latent variable) or potentially divergent (it loads on the more inflexible latent variable, or 
on both) evidence for the two-system approach and for ToM in general. It could also inform what 
resources a qualitative measure relies on (executive functions and / or language ability). 
 
Conclusion 
The individual differences model has provided support for the critical role of executive function in ToM 
in adults. The dual-task study results also supported this relationship. The presence of a relationship 
between executive function and fully developed ToM in adults suggests that the relationship between 
them in the development of ToM is critical, and that this relationship is integral to ToM throughout the 
lifespan. 
 
The battery of inhibitory control tasks loaded on to two separate latent variables, defined as response 
selection and response inhibition. This categorisation supports the view that the processes that have 
been defined as cognitive inhibition are not quantifiably different from those that have been defined as 
response inhibition, and that this definition of cognitive inhibition has been over-extended (Verbruggen 
et al., 2005). This suggests that the mechanisms involved in response inhibition are the same, or very 
similar, to those involved in what has been termed cognitive inhibition. This implies that dealing with 
distracters or irrelevant information once they have entered working memory (cognitive inhibition as 
defined by Nigg (2000) and Harnishfeger (1995) employs the same mechanisms as response 
inhibition, in the inhibition of that distracter or that information. However, the fact that there are two 
components of inhibition does support the general view that executive function can be fractionated into 
simpler components, but that the existing definitions of the inhibitory control components are not fully 
supported by the current findings. 
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The set of studies has also provided evidence for there being two separable systems of ToM (or two 
distinct processes within ToM). This is evidenced by the lack of correlation between the two target 
ToM tasks used (which were both level-one perspective taking tasks), even though the relationships of 
the ToM latent variables to the inhibitory control factors were relatively similar, with the Keysar task 
having one direct path and the visual perspective task having two direct paths from the response 
inhibition latent variable respectively. The amount of variance of the ToM latent variables explained by 
the inhibitory model also differed. The difference in variance explained suggest that the difference 
between the processes required to pass these two tasks is at least partly due to their differing reliance 
on executive function, and inhibitory control in particular. The interpretation is that the process used in 
the visual perspective task is a more cognitively efficient process that is fast, but may be relatively 
inflexible. The dual-task study results provided evidence that the difference between the two ToM 
tasks is unlikely to be simply due to task difficulty. The process used in the Keysar task is a cognitively 
demanding process that is slower but is flexible, but is more prone to errors (due to its reliance on 
executive function).  
 
These two processes or systems are present in adults, and may be used for different social situations: 
the cognitively efficient process may be used when relatively simple perspective taking is needed, or 
fast decisions need to be made on that basis. The fact that they are both present in adults means that 
the cognitively demanding system is unlikely to be just the cognitively efficient system with the 
additional processing flexibility of executive function. The cognitively demanding and flexible process 
may be used in situations where several different beliefs or mental states need to be processes and 
taken into account in order to guide one’s own behaviour or predict someone else’s behaviour. In 
addition, the cognitively efficient process may be the process that allows infants and some animals to 
pass tasks that require simple perspective taking at an age when they are unable to pass standard 
ToM tasks (as this process does not rely on executive functions that have either not developed (in 
infants) or are limited compared to humans (in animals)). This gives a plausible explanation for these 
abilities, without having to claim that infants and animals are exhibiting evidence of what is the current, 
singular, definition of ToM. It is also a more parsimonious explanation of this behaviour than potential 
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explanations based on behavioural rules (for example, the infant selectively looks at the last place the 
object was or where the actor last looked). The cognitively demanding and flexible process is likely to 
be the process that is currently interpreted as being the ToM that develops from around the age of four 
(it requires executive function as does the established idea of ToM). 
 
However, this two-system approach needs more evidence to support it. More work is needed, both on 
the details of the different ToM processes and on the validity of these processes as measures of 
individual variability in ToM. 
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 Appendix A 
Cued Recall  
Table A.1  
Cued Recall Words (Blue = Foils; Red = Targets) 
 List One (aloud) List Two (silent) 
Section 1 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Cue 
Filler Cement Nylon Poodle Rake     Dog 
Interference Astronomy Toaster Alto Conjunction Ore Can Opener Syringe Private Kitchen appliance 
Control Pitta Office Nails Lantern Lollipop Knife Flute Argon Musical instrument 
Interference Dinosaur Polka Boots Graduate Tangerine Great Dane Clogs Snare Footwear 
Control Plastic Mastodon Cheek Swine Seat Belt Extinguisher Typhoon Moccasins Windstorm 
Control Black Brooch Mile Vodka Lamp Iron Cobra Ham Snake 
Interference Peas Mirror Hawk Bourbon Clamp Captain Osprey Quarter Bird of prey 
Filler Lemon Eye Shadow Waltz Mango     Dance 
Control Pineapple Shears Rhombus Tyranny Article Asparagus Polyester Fez Cloth 
Interference Tympani Azalea Steel Stetson Dishwasher Zeus Nickel Betel Metal 
Control Clause Onion Dance Low Rider Tea Hexagon Whisky Exponent Shape 
Interference Tuba Mascara Diamond Thermos Mint Sourdough Opal Fox Trot Gemstone 
Control Muskrat Attic Duke Botany Schooner Tenor Forceps Spatula Surgical instrument 
Section 2          
Control Buttermilk Hustle Chihuahua Bass Joy Sombrero Gunpowder Chin Hat 
Filler Pronoun Brunette Watch Oven     Hair colour 
Interference Cocaine Fork Peers Leopard Torso Chopsticks Neurologist Locomotive Eating utensil 
Filler Maroon Skyscraper Penny Hull     Building 
Interference Kitchen Mountain Panda Blonde Rayon Sinkhole Lips Celery Natural Earth formation 
Interference Satisfaction Gun Hoe Skating Noon Axe Vanilla Cashew Weapon 
Control Motorcycle Crane Bassoon Beech Delete Foot Physics Razor Unit of length 
Interference Tennis Bathtub Month Marjoram Albatross Faucet Oboe Season Bathroom fixture 
Filler Saw Oxygen Vulture Talking     Chemical element 
Control Optometrist Tin Chief Reef Peyote Trowel Sapphire Architect Gardening tool 
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Interference Sperm Whale Backpack Jeep Loafer Democracy Rope Blender Ghost Camping equipment 
Control Duck Shovel Nut Hydrant Socks Basil Canteloupe Marxism Herb 
Section 3          
Control Cheese Belly Dancing Pointer Tom Tom Plate Shock Encyclopaedia Glucose Reference book 
Filler Yard Ant Cinnamon Mahogany     Spice 
Interference Lumber Garlic Addition Tomb Neutron Marines Division Anchor Mathematical operation 
Control Trapeze Orange Corduroy Tie Masters MorseCode Tractor Supper Four-wheeled vehicle 
Interference Auburn Sofa Elation Battalion Rudder RockingChair Crime Baritone Furniture 
Control Scooter Judicial Asp Gulf Pipe Diving Squall Fir Water-sport 
Interference Square Root Blue Wasp Garnet Realtor BassFishing Hornet Tanker Insect that stings 
Filler Yogurt Beret Walnut Aluminium     Nut 
Interference Snack Trunk Pickle Capitalism Nose Ring Bough Guppy Ankle Part of a tree 
Control Bible Gerbil Barge Loud Cumin Trampoline Sunset Stem Gymnastics event 
Filler Football Piranha Saxophone Dynamite     Tropical fish 
Interference Cloves Nephew Hamster Moped Canal Lime Guinea Pig Cellar Rodent 
Control Topaz Purple Judge Karate Almanac Cousin Rye Candle Bread 
Section 4          
Control Paprika Minute Hourglass Jack In The Box Freight South Bark Catfish Direction 
Interference Cologne Pen Logic Squirrel Robbery Chalk Spinach Tango Writing implement 
Control Dime Corporal Molecule Cabinet Robin Motor Marigold French Horn Flower 
Interference Necklace Surgeon Guitar Sirloin Zinc Slinky Piano Gopher String instrument 
Interference Duchess TNT Oak Rosary Ginger Kiwi Cedar Heron Wood 
Filler Nose Cow Shirt Dodo     Farm animal 
Control Frying Pan Fudge Wrench Chlorine Magenta Coal Blush Cosmetic Energy source 
Control Dentist Brass Sergeant Gorgon Crevasse Macadamia Bridle Morphine Horse-riding equipment 
Interference Sadness Goat Cream Adjective Monarchy Rein Curd Quadrilateral Dairy product 
Control Pencil Coast Guard Grape Chandelier Ostrich High Wire Cornet Pumpernickel Circus act 
Interference Biology Apple Summer Train Panther Cherry Sailfish Closet Fruit 
Filler Grave Sink Love North     Emotion 
 
 
 
 Shape–Matching 
    
 
    
 
Figure A.1: Shapes used (equivalent red and white versions also used) 
  
Go / No Go (picture) images 
Mammal (No Go) 
       
Aardvark       Anteater     Antelope       Armadillo       Echidna      Elephant Elk 
 
  
Otter          Ox 
Figure A.2: No Go mammal images 
Mammal (Go) 
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 Bat          Bear     Cat  Cheetah        Cow     Dog  Dolphin 
       
Donkey         Dugong    Fox  Gerbil         Giraffe     Goat  Hedgehog 
 
       
Horse         Kangaroo     Koala Leopard        Lion    Meerkat Mouse 
 
       
Pangolin       Platypus     Rabbit Raccoon       Rhino     Shrew Sloth 
 
       
Squirrel          Tapir     Tiger  Walrus         Weasel     Whale Wolf 
 
 
Zebra 
Figure A.3: Go mammal images 
Bird (No Go) 
       
Albatross       Avocet     Eagle Emu         Ibis     Oriole Osprey 
 
  
Ostrich         Owl 
Figure A.4: No Go bird images 
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Bird (Go) 
       
Blackbird       Blue Jay     Chicken Cockatoo      Crane     Cuckoo Dodo 
  
       
Duck         Finch     Flamingo Gull         Heron     Hummingbird Kingfisher 
 
       
Kookaburra   Magpie     Parrot Peacock        Pelican    Petrel            Pheasant 
 
       
Plover          Puffin     Quail  Robin         Rooster     Skua  Starling 
 
       
Stork         Swallow     Swan Swift         Toucan    Turkey           Vulture 
 
 
Woodpecker 
Figure A.5: Go bird images 
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 Keysar task grids and instructions 
Table A.2  
Critical Instructions and Grids for Keysar Task 
Type Critical instruction Order Control grid Order Experimental grid 
Position of 
critical 
instruction / 
Total 
number of 
instructions 
Relational 
Move the 
bottom 
block left 
one slot 
25 
 
9 
 
2 / 5 
Relational 
Move the 
large cup 
up one slot 
17 
 
29 
 
3 / 3 
Relational 
Move the 
small 
candle 
down one 
slot 
16 
 
5 
 
2 / 5 
Relational 
Move the 
top can 
right one 
slot 
4 
 
18 
 
1 / 4 
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 Type Critical instruction Order Control grid Order Experimental grid 
Position of 
critical 
instruction / 
Total 
number of 
instructions 
Relational 
Move the 
large jar 
right one 
slot 
23 
 
28 
 
2 / 5 
Relational 
Move the 
bottom 
hole-punch 
down one 
slot 
30 
 
22 
 
3 / 4 
Relational 
Move the 
small ball 
down one 
slot 
10 
 
2 
 
3 / 4 
Relational 
Move the 
top syringe 
left one slot 
1 
 
12 
 
2 / 3 
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 Type Critical instruction Order Control grid Order Experimental grid 
Position of 
critical 
instruction / 
Total 
number of 
instructions 
Ambiguous 
Move the 
mouse 
down one 
slot 
14 
 
31 
 
3 / 4 
Ambiguous 
Move the 
glasses 
right one 
slot 
27 
 
7 
 
1 / 3 
Ambiguous 
Move the 
tape left 
one slot 
13 
 
3 
 
3 / 3 
Ambiguous 
Move the 
brush up 
one slot 
19 
 
26 
 
1 / 3 
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Type Critical instruction Order Control grid Order Experimental grid 
Position of 
critical 
instruction / 
Total 
number of 
instructions 
Ambiguous 
Move the 
pipe up 
one slot 
21 
 
11 
 
4 / 4 
Ambiguous 
Move the 
tie left one 
slot 
8 
 
20 
 
4 / 5 
Ambiguous 
Move the 
disc right 
one slot 
6 
 
15 
 
1 / 4 
Ambiguous 
Move the 
pump up 
one slot 
32 
 
24 
 
4 / 5 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix B 
 
An alternate way of factoring out the common variance of the control and interference cued recall trials is 
to use the cued recall control measure to predict the cued recall interference measure, leaving the 
proactive interference or cognitive interference in the model. The following models are identical to those in 
the main chapters, except with the alternative method of factoring out the common variance of the control 
and interference cued recall measures. 
 
Figure B.1: One factor model 
Table B.1  
Path Estimates for One Factor Model 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimatea S.E.
b pc StandardisedEstimated 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go (P) 0.98 0.52 0.06 0.35 
Go / No Go 1.90 1.16 0.10 0.67 
Stop Signal 1.00   0.27 
CR int. (to IC) 0.46 0.31 0.14 0.16 
CR control (to int.) 0.64 0.06 <0.01 0.67 
Simon 0.65 0.43 0.13 0.22 
Shape Matching 0.17 0.41 0.68 0.05 
e e
e
e e e e
Simon SM CR (int.) 
CR (cont.) 
SS GNG GNG (P) 
 
Inhibitory 
Control 
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 Parameters Unstandardised Estimatea S.E.
b pc StandardisedEstimated 
     
Variance 
Inhibition 0.72 1.12 0.26  
 
 
Figure B.2: Two factor model (RI and CI) 
 
Table B.2  
Path Estimates for Response and Cognitive Inhibition Model 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response 2.11 1.40 0.13 0.70 
Go / No Go (P) →Response 0.99 0.53 0.06 0.33 
Stop Signal → Response 1.00   0.26 
CR int. → Cognitive 0.69 0.51 0.17 0.19 
CR control → CR int. 0.65 0.06 <0.01 0.67 
Simon → Cognitive 1.00   0.28 
Shape Matching → Cognitive 0.16 0.58 0.27 0.04 
     
Variances and covariances 
Response 0.65 0.61 0.29  
Cognitive 0.50 0.65 0.45  
Response ↔ Cognitive 0.43 0.34 0.20 0.76 
 
Response 
Inhibition 
e ee e e e
Simon SM CR (int.) 
CR (cont.) 
SS GNG (P) GNG 
 
Cognitive 
Inhibition 
e
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Response 
Inhibition 
e e
e
e e e e
GNG GNG (P) CR (int.) 
CR (cont.) 
SS SM Simon 
 
Response 
Selection 
 
Figure B.3: Two factor model (RI and RS) 
 
 
 
This configuration of the tasks did not fit the data, resulting in unexpected negative error variances. An 
alternate configuration of response inhibition and selection tasks was then chosen. As can be seen in the 
initial 1 factor model (Table B.1), the shape matching task had the lowest parameter estimate, so a two 
factor model with shape matching loading onto one latent variable was analysed (Figure B.4). 
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Response 
Inhibition 
e e
e
e e e e
GNG GNG (P) CR (int.) 
CR (cont.) 
Simon SS SM 
 
Response 
Selection 
Figure B.4: Two factor model (SM on one factor) 
 
Table B.3  
Path Estimates for Alternate Response Inhibition and Selection Model 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response Selection 1.00   0.73 
Go / No Go (P) →Response Selection 0.44 0.28 0.11 0.32 
CR int. → Response Selection 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.15 
CR control → CR int. 0.65 0.06 <0.01 0.67 
 Simon → Response Selection 0.30 0.22 0.17 0.21 
Stop Signal → Response Selection 0.43 0.29 0.14 0.25 
Shape Matching → Response Inhibition 1.00   0.79 
     
Variances and covariances 
Response Selection 3.10 1.94 0.11  
Response Inhibition 5.69 1.07 <0.01  
 
The modification indices calculated by AMOS suggested including a path from the stop – signal task to the 
response inhibition variable would significantly improve the fit of the model, and considering the theoretical 
basis for this path (that the stop – signal task requires both response inhibition and response selection), 
the path was added to the model. This resulted in the following set of parameter estimates (Table B.4). 
 216
 Alternatives for this path include a covariance between the error terms of the shape matching and the stop 
– signal tasks or a covariance between the latent variables of response inhibition and response selection. 
These give identical values for the model fit (and equivalent parameter estimates) and the path between 
the stop – signal and the response inhibition latent variable was chosen as it allowed the variance to be 
explained by the model (in the case of the alternative covariances, the variance they account for is 
unexplained by the model), and as it is based on theoretical grounds too. This path is shown by the 
dashed arrow in Figure B.4. 
 
 
Table B.4  
Parameter Estimates Including Path from Stop - Signal to Response Inhibition 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response Selection 1.00   0.77 
Go / No Go (P) →Response Selection 0.39 0.26 0.13 0.30 
CR int. → Response Selection 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.15 
CR control → CR int. 0.65 0.06 <0.01 0.67 
 Simon → Response Selection 0.27 0.20 0.18 0.20 
Stop Signal → Response Selection 0.40 0.28 0.16 0.24 
Stop Signal → Response Inhibition 0.28 0.13 0.04 0.22 
Shape Matching → Response Inhibition 1.00   0.79 
     
Variances and covariances 
Response Selection 3.44 2.23 0.12  
Response Inhibition 5.69 1.07 <0.01  
 
 
The modification indices calculated by AMOS further suggested adding a covariance between the error 
terms of the cued recall control trials measure and the go / no go (picture) task. The parameter estimates 
for this model are below (Table B.5). The covariance indicates that there is some unexplained variance 
common to the cued recall control and go / no go (picture) measure. As both tasks may rely to some 
extent on working memory, it is possible that this is the variance in common. This covariance is shown by 
the curved dashed arrow in Figure B.4. 
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 Table B.5  
Parameter Estimates for Figure B.4 (with Covariance between CR Control and GNG P Error Terms) 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response Selection 1.00   0.78 
Go / No Go (P) →Response Selection 0.35 0.25 0.16 0.27 
CR int. → Response Selection 0.20 0.15 0.21 0.15 
CR control → CR int. 0.64 0.06 <0.01 0.67 
 Simon → Response Selection 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.20 
Stop Signal → Response Selection 0.39 0.29 0.18 0.24 
Stop Signal → Response Inhibition 0.28 0.13 0.04 0.22 
Shape Matching → Response Inhibition 1.00   0.79 
     
Variances and covariances 
e3 (gng p) ↔ e7 (cr control) -1.30 0.51 0.01 -0.22 
Response Selection 3.54 2.43 0.15  
Response Inhibition 5.69 1.07 <0.01  
 
 
The error variances of the tasks were all significantly different from zero apart from that of the go / no go 
task. Therefore the error variance of this task was constrained to zero for the final model. This resulted in 
the following set of parameter estimates (Table B.6). 
 
Table B.6  
Parameter Estimates for Figure B.4 (Error Variance of GNG Constrained to Zero) 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Go / No Go → Response Selection 1.00   1.00 
Go / No Go (P) →Response Selection 0.21 0.08 <0.01 0.21 
CR int. → Response Selection 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 
CR control → CR int. 0.64 0.06 <0.01 0.70 
 Simon → Response Selection 0.17 0.08 0.05 0.16 
Stop Signal → Response Selection 0.23 0.10 0.03 0.18 
Stop Signal → Response Inhibition 0.29 0.13 0.03 0.22 
Shape Matching → Response Inhibition 1.00   0.79 
     
Variances and covariances 
e3 (gng p) ↔ e7 (cr control) -1.31 0.51 0.01 -0.22 
Response Selection 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
Response Inhibition 5.69 1.07 <0.01  
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 The final four models are nested within each other, and so the model fit statistics can be compared. The 
statistics show that adding the path from the stop-signal task to the response inhibition latent variable 
significantly improved the model fit (Χ2 change = 4.402, df change = 1, p = .036). Adding the covariance 
between the error terms of the cued recall control and go / no go (picture) tasks also significantly improved 
the model fit (Χ2 change = 6.820, df change = 1, p = .009). Constraining the error variance of the go / no 
go task (effectively removing a parameter estimate) did not significantly affect the fit of the model (Χ2 
change = 0.368, df change = 1, p = .544).The fit of the final model can not be compared to the one factor 
or response inhibition / cognitive inhibition model using a chi-square difference test, but looking at the AIC 
statistic shows that the preferred model is the final model (with the lowest AIC value).   
 
Table B.7  
Model Fit Statistics 
Model Χ2 df p NFI CFI AIC RMSEA Low High 
 
1 factor 
 
21.70 14 0.09 0.83 0.93 49.70 0.06 0.00 0.11 
 
2 factor: Response and  
Cognitive Inhibition 
 
21.57 13 0.06 0.83 0.92 51.57 0.07 0.00 0.12 
 
2 factor (alternate response 
inhibition and selection) 
 
21.78 15 0.11 0.83 0.94 47.78 0.06 0.00 0.10 
 
2 factor (path from stop – 
signal to response inhibition 
added) 
 
17.38 14 0.24 0.87 0.97 45.38 0.04 0.00 0.09 
2 factor (covariance 
between CR int. and go / no 
go (picture) error terms) 
10.56 13 0.65 0.92 1.00 40.56 0.00 0.00 0.07 
2 factor (gng error variance 
constrained to 0). 10.93 14 0.69 0.92 1.00 38.93 0.00 0.00 0.06 
 
Chi-square values that are not significant (α = 0.05) indicate a reasonable fit to the data. Values of NFI over 0.9 indicate a 
reasonable fit to the data. Values of CFI close to 1.0 indicate a good fit to the data. Values of RMSEA that have a lower bound less 
than 0.05 and a higher bound less than 0.10 show good approximate fit (and do not show poor approximate fit). Hoelter gives the 
sample size at which the model could be rejected. 
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 CFA Model 
 
Figure B.5: CFA model 
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 Model 1 
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Figure B.6: Direct paths 
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 Table B.8  
All Paths 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational → RI 0.26 0.12 0.03 0.24 
Ambiguous → RI -0.10 0.11 0.35 -0.11 
Egocentric int. → RI 0.45 0.15 <0.01 0.38 
Altercentric int. → RI 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.19 
Relational → RS -0.01 0.10 0.89 -0.01 
Ambiguous → RS 0.01 0.08 0.87 0.02 
Egocentric int. → RS 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.16 
Altercentric int. → RS 0.05 0.11 0.62 0.06 
Rel. → Amb. 0.86 0.09 <0.01 0.981 
Ego. Int. → Alt. Int. 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.35 
 
Variances and covariances 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.68 1.07 <0.01  
 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) 
Relational 0.06    
Ambiguous 0.93    
Ego. Interference 0.17    
Alt. Interference 0.22    
 
 
 
                                                 
1 As this estimate is above 0.7, an interpretation is that these two latent variables are in fact the same. In 
order to test this, models with one latent variable for the Keysar task were tested (with ambiguous and 
relational errors as indicators). The statistics suggest that in the all path models, the one Keysar LV model 
is preferred, but in the significant path only models, the individual measure Keysar LVs are preferred (see 
appendix C). 
 222
 Model 2 
 
 
Figure B.7: Significant paths only 
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 Table B.9  
Significant Paths Only 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational → RI 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.23 
Egocentric int. → RI 0.46 0.15 <0.01 0.39 
Rel. → Amb. 0.84 0.09 <0.01 0.96 
Ego. → Alt. 0.33 0.11 <0.01 0.45 
 
Variances and covariances 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
 
 
Square Multiple Correlation 
Relational 0.05    
Ambiguous 0.91    
Ego. Interference 0.15    
Alt. Interference 0.21    
 
 
Model 3 
 
The modification indices suggested adding a covariance from the error term of the cued recall interference 
measure to the error term of the ambiguous errors task would significantly improve the model fit. As the 
model was designed only to measure inhibitory control as the construct of interest, the covariance suggest 
the presence of another construct that is unexplained by the current model (covariance in a SR model 
indicated shared unexplained variance between the two variables involved). It is likely that inhibitory 
control is not the only executive function or theoretical construct that is related to or part of theory of mind, 
so the covariance was added to the model. This covariance is shown by the dashed curved green line in 
Figure B.7. 
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 Table B.10  
Path Model with Covariance between CR and Ambiguous Errors Added 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational → RI 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.22 
Egocentric int. → RI 0.46 0.15 <0.01 0.34 
Rel. → Amb. 0.80 0.08 <0.01 0.99 
Ego. → Alt. 0.33 0.11 <0.01 0.45 
 
Variances and covariances 
e CR ↔ e Amb.  -1.18 0.38 <0.01 -0.30 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
     
 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
Relational 0.05    
Ambiguous 0.89    
Ego. Interference 0.15    
Alt. Interference 0.21    
 
 
 
Model 4 
 
The modification indices showed that adding a covariance between the go / nogo (picture) measure error 
term and the ambiguous errors task error term would significantly improve the model fit. As the go / nogo 
(picture) and the cued recall task (which already covaried with the ambiguous errors error term) were 
correlated, it was likely that this covariance represented the same unexplained variance as the previous 
covariance. Therefore it was added to the model. This covariance is shown by the dashed curved red line 
in Figure B.7. 
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 Table B.11  
Path Model with Covariance between GNG (P) and Ambiguous Errors Added 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational → RI 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.22 
Egocentric int. → RI 0.46 0.15 <0.01 0.34 
Rel. → Amb. 0.74 0.08 <0.01 0.92 
Ego. → Alt. 0.33 0.11 <0.01 0.45 
 
Variances and covariances 
e CR ↔ e Amb.  -1.25 0.37 <0.01 -0.31 
e GNG (P) ↔ e Amb. 1.38 0.46 <0.01 0.27 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
     
     
Squared Multiple Correlations 
Relational 0.05    
Ambiguous 0.84    
Ego. Interference 0.15    
Alt. Interference 0.21    
 
 
At this point all the parameters included were significantly different from zero, and there were no 
parameters that would significantly improve the model fit that had a strong theoretical grounding. The 
model fits can all be seen in Table 6.6. 
 
Table B.12  
Model Fit Statistics 
Model CMIN df p NFI CFI AIC RMSEA Low High 
CFA model 57.55 38 <0.01 0.80 0.90 121.55 0.07 0.04 0.10 
All paths 59.56 38 0.01 0.78 0.91 115.56 0.06 0.03 0.09 
Significant paths only 64.32 44 0.02 0.77 0.91 108.32 0.06 0.02 0.08 
Sig. paths (add. cov.)* 53.78 43 0.13 0.81 0.95 99.78 0.04 0.00 0.07 
Sig. paths (add. cov)** 44.60 42 0.36 0.84 0.99 92.60 0.02 0.00 0.06 
 
*added covariance between error terms of cued recall interference measure and ambiguous errors measure 
**added covariance between error terms of go / nogo (picture) measure and ambiguous errors measure 
 
 
 
 226
 Error variances for EF factor models 
Table B.13  
Error Variances for One Factor Inhibition Model 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance 
Go / No Go (P) 5.12** 0.88 
Go / No Go 3.18* 0.55 
Stop Signal 8.90** 0.93 
Cued Recall (interference) 1.73** 0.28 
Cued Recall (control) 2.36** 0.35 
Simon 5.94** 0.95 
Shape Matching 9.20** 0.10 
* = significant at p < 0.05 for all tables 
** = significant at p < 0.01 for all tables 
 
Table B.14  
Error Variances for Response and Cognitive Inhibition Model 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance 
Go / No Go (P) 5.18** 0.89 
Go / No Go 2.90 (ns) 0.50 
Stop Signal 8.97** 0.93 
Cued Recall (interference) 1.64** 0.26 
Cued Recall (control) 2.36** 0.35 
Simon 5.75** 0.92 
Shape Matching 9.21** 0.99 
 
Table B.15  
Error Variances for Initial Response Inhibition and Selection Model 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance 
Go / No Go (P) 5.30** 0.91 
Go / No Go 2.24 (ns) 0.38 
Stop Signal 8.59** 0.99 
Cued Recall (interference) 1.74** 0.28 
Cued Recall (control) 2.38** 0.35 
Simon 6.01** 0.96 
Shape Matching 6.85 (ns) 0.74 
 
Table B.16  
Error Variances for First Final Model 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance 
Go / No Go (P) 5.23** 0.90 
Go / No Go 2.68 (ns) 0.46 
Stop Signal 9.04** 0.94 
Cued Recall (interference) 1.73** 0.28 
Cued Recall (control) 2.37** 0.35 
Simon 5.97** 0.96 
Shape Matching 3.532 0.38 
 
 
                                                 
2 Variance fixed using reliability value to identify model 
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 Table B.17  
Error Variances with Stop-Signal to RI Path Added 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance 
Go / No Go (P) 5.29** 0.91 
Go / No Go 2.34 (ns) 0.41 
Stop Signal 8.64** 0.90 
Cued Recall (interference) 1.74** 0.28 
Cued Recall (control) 2.38** 0.35 
Simon 5.99** 0.96 
Shape Matching 3.532 0.38 
 
 
 
Table B.18  
Error Variances for Final Model with Go / No Go Error Fixed at Zero 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance 
Go / No Go (P) 5.50** 0.95 
Go / No Go 0.00 1.00 
Stop Signal 8.87** 0.92 
Cued Recall (interference) 1.79** 0.29 
Cued Recall (control) 2.41** 0.36 
Simon 6.08** 0.97 
Shape Matching 3.532 0.38 
 
 
 
Table B.19  
Error Variances for Final Model with Covariance between CR Control and GNG (P) 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance 
Go / No Go (P) 5.50** 0.95 
Go / No Go 0.00 1.00 
Stop Signal 8.87** 0.92 
Cued Recall (interference) 1.89** 0.31 
Cued Recall (control) 2.37** 0.36 
Simon 6.08** 0.97 
Shape Matching 3.532 0.38 
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 Error variances for ToM disturbances 
 
Table B.20  
Error Covariances for All Paths between inhibitory and ToM Factors Model 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance
d1 (amb) 0.39 (ns) 0.07 
d2 (rel) 6.50**  0.94 
d3 (ego) 6.62** 0.83 
d4 (alt) 3.37** 0.78 
 
 
 
Table B.21  
Error Variances for Only Significant Paths between Inhibitory and ToM Factors Model 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance
d1 (amb) 0.47 (ns) 0.09 
d2 (rel) 6.56**  0.95 
d3 (ego) 6.68** 0.85 
d4 (alt) 3.42** 0.80 
 
 
 
Table B.22  
Error Variances for Significant Paths Model with Covariance between CR (int) and Ambiguous Errors 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance
d1 (amb) 0.58 (ns) 0.12 
d2 (rel) 6.56**  0.95 
d3 (ego) 6.69** 0.85 
d4 (alt) 3.42** 0.80 
 
 
 
Table B.23  
Error Variances for Significant Paths Only and Covariance between GNG (P) and Ambiguous Errors 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance
d1 (amb) 0.65 (ns) 0.15 
d2 (rel) 6.57**  0.95 
d3 (ego) 6.69** 0.85 
d4 (alt) 3.42** 0.80 
 
 
Table B.24 
Error Variances for Aternate Final Model (Direct Paths to Ego- and Altercentric Factors) 
Task Unstandardised error variance Standardised error variance
d1 (amb) 0.65 (ns) 0.15 
d2 (rel) 6.59**  0.96 
d3 (ego) 6.82** 0.86 
d4 (alt) 3.89** 0.90 
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 Appendix C 
 
 
 
Figure C.1: CFA model (all paths) 
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 As the covariance (and standardised correlation) between the ambiguous and relational measures of the 
Keysar task was < 0.7 in the models itself (although the correlation matrix calculated in Table 6.1 showed 
a correlation of > 0.7, which was why the model was first tested using separate latent variables for the 
ambiguous and relational errors), a model was tested in which the ambiguous and relational measures 
were indicators for one Keysar latent variable.  
 
There was a relationship between the response inhibition latent variable and the Keysar latent variable 
(comparable with the relationship to the relational variable), and the relationship between the response 
inhibition latent variable and the egocentric interference latent variable. As the models could not be 
compared directly, the AIC values were compared. In Table C.1 the single Keysar latent variable model fit 
statistics are highlighted in yellow. The initial models, with all paths included, show that the single Keysar 
latent variable model is preferred. Once the non-significant paths are removed, the individual measure 
latent variable models are preferred. On this basis the individual measure latent variable models were 
chosen. 
 
 
Table C.1  
Model Fits for Individual Keysar Measure LVs Compared to Single Keysar LV 
Model CMIN df p NFI CFI AIC RMSEA Low High 
CFA model 57.55 34 <0..01 0.80 0.90 121.55 0.07 0.04 0.10 
CFA model (K) 62.75 40 0.01 0.78 0.90 114.75 0.06 0.03 0.10 
All paths 59.56 38 0.01 0.79 0.91 115.56 0.06 0.03 0.09 
All paths (K) 60.97 41 0.02 0.78 0.91 110.97 0.06 0.02 0.09 
Significant paths only 64.32 44 0.02 0.77 0.91 108.32 0.06 0.02 0.08 
Sig. paths only (K) 68.03 46 0.02 0.76 0.90 108.03 0.06 0.02 0.08 
Sig. paths (add. cov.)* 53.78 43 0.13 0.81 0.95 99.78 0.04 0.00 0.07 
Sig. paths (add. cov.)* (K) 59.48 45 0.07 0.79 0.94 101.48 0.05 0.00 0.08 
Sig. paths (add. cov)** 44.60 42 0.36 0.84 0.99 92.60 0.02 0.00 0.06 
Sig. paths (add. cov)** (K) 54.46 44 0.13 0.81 0.95 98.46 0.04 0.00 0.07 
 *added covariance between error terms of cued recall interference measure and ambiguous errors measure 
**added covariance between error terms of go / nogo (picture) measure and ambiguous errors measure 
 
LV = Latent variable 
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 Appendix D 
Model A 
 
 
Figure D.1: Alternate RI to ToM paths 
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 Table D.1  
Parameter Estimates for Alternate RI - ToM Paths 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Ambiguous ← RI 0.17 0.10 0.09 0.20 
Altercentric ← RI 0.35 0.13 <0.01 0.41 
Amb. → Rel. 1.24 0.21 <0.01 0.96 
Alt. → Ego. 0.72 0.24 <0.01 0.51 
 
Variances and covariances 
e CR ↔ e Amb.  -1.08 0.37 <0.01 -0.36 
e GNG (P) ↔ e Amb 1.16 0.46 0.01 0.23 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.19 0.61 <0.01  
     
 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
Relational 0.93    
Ambiguous 0.04    
Ego. Interference 0.27    
Alt. Interference 0.17    
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 Model B 
 
 
Figure D.2: Alternate paths between visual perspective latent variables 
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 Table D.2  
Egocentric to Altercentric Path Model Parameter Estimates (Green Arrow) 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational ← RI 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.22 
Altercentric ← RI 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.22 
Rel. → Amb. 0.73 0.08 <0.01 0.98 
Ego. → Alt. 0.28 0.11 0.01 0.38 
 
Variances and covariances 
e CR ↔ e Amb.  -1.15 0.38 <0.01 -0.38 
e GNG (P) ↔ e Amb 1.24 0.47 <0.01 0.24 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.19 0.61 <0.01  
     
 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
Relational 0.05    
Ambiguous 0.85    
Ego. Interference 0.00    
Alt. Interference 0.20    
 
Table D.3 
Altercentric to Egocentric Path Model Parameter Estimates (Red Arrow) 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational ← RI 0.23 0.12 0.06 0.21 
Altercentric ← RI 0.35 0.13 <0.01 0.41 
Rel. → Amb. 0.73 0.08 <0.01 0.92 
Ego. ← Alt. 0.72 0.24 <0.01 0.52 
 
Variances and covariances 
e CR ↔ e Amb.  -1.15 0.38 <0.01 -0.38 
e GNG (P) ↔ e Amb 1.24 0.47 <0.01 0.24 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.19 0.61 <0.01  
     
 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
Relational 0.04    
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 Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Ambiguous 0.85    
Ego. Interference 0.27    
Alt. Interference 0.17    
Model C 
 
 
Figure D.3: RI - Egocentric model with altercentric to egocentric path 
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 Table D.4  
RI - Egocentric Model Parameter Estimates 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational ← RI 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.23 
Egocentric ← RI 0.38 0.15 0.01 0.33 
Rel. → Amb. 0.73 0.08 <0.01 0.92 
Ego. ← Alt. 0.50 0.22 0.02 0.37 
 
Variances and covariances 
e CR ↔ e Amb.  -1.14 0.38 <0.01 -0.38 
e GNG (P) ↔ e Amb 1.24 0.47 <0.01 0.24 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.68 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.19 0.61 <0.01  
     
 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
Relational 0.05    
Ambiguous 0.85    
Ego. Interference 0.24    
Alt. Interference 0.00    
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 Model D 
 
 
Figure D.4: Covariance between visual perspective latent variables model 
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Table D.5  
Visual Perspective Covariance Model Parameter Estimates 
Parameters Unstandardised Estimate S.E. p 
Standardised 
Estimate 
Direct effects 
Relational ← RI 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.21 
Egocentric ← RI 0.44 0.15 <0.01 0.37 
Altercentric ← RI 0.27 0.14 0.05 0.31 
Rel. → Amb. 0.73 0.08 <0.01 0.92 
 
Variances and covariances 
d Ego. ↔ d Alt.  1.84 0.91 0.04 0.36 
e CR ↔ e Amb.  -1.14 0.38 <0.01 -0.38 
e GNG (P) ↔ e Amb 1.24 0.47 <0.01 0.24 
RS 5.78 0.67 <0.01  
RI 5.67 1.07 <0.01  
Residual 4.19 0.61 <0.01  
     
 
Squared Multiple Correlations 
Relational 0.05    
Ambiguous 0.85    
Ego. Interference 0.14    
Alt. Interference 0.10    
 
 
 
 
Table D.6  
Model Fit Statistics 
Model CMIN df p NFI CFI AIC RMSEA Low High 
Model A 49.56 42 0.20 0.82 0.97 97.56 0.04 0.00 0.07 
Model B (ego to alt) 54.23 42 0.10 0.81 0.95 102.23 0.04 0.00 0.08 
Model B (alt to ego) 48.85 42 0.22 0.83 0.97 96.85 0.03 0.00 0.07 
Model C 49.63 42 0.20 0.82 0.97 97.63 0.04 0.00 0.07 
Model D 45.79 41 0.28 0.84 0.98 95.79 0.03 0.00 0.07 
Final model (from 
chapter) 46.75 42 0.28 0.83 0.98 94.75 0.03 0.00 0.06 
 
  
